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ABSTRACT:  
 
This thesis analyses how certain services of online communication (blogs, discussion 
forums, social news and bookmarking sites) contribute to the public sphere and to the 
culture industry. 
The concept of public sphere is derived from Jürgen Habermas' idea that political power 
can only be legitimate if it is applied in accordance with the best, common interests of 
the society – but these interests can only be crystallized in discursive debates between 
members of the society. However, contemporary national public spheres are said to be 
distorted and detached from real interests of citizens. The internet, through offering the 
possibility of democratic and reflexive communication, holds the potential of improving 
the state of public spheres. 
The concept of culture industry holds that the capitalization of the production of cultural 
products (i.e. works of art) rids societies of authoritative art, the one channel through 
which real individual freedom can be established. “Culture industry” is instrumental, 
through the promotion of consumption, to the capitalist domination of a few over 
masses. This, in turn, affects the general state of the public spheres. Once again, the 
internet has the potential to democratize this over-encompassing culture industry, 
through increasing cultural diversity via its several new channels of information and 
distribution. 
The analysis of blogs, discussion forums and social bookmarking and news sites 
confirms the democratic potential inherent in these services, but it also points out 
certain problems that hinder the actualization of this potential. 
It is established that the use of the generalizing category of “blogs” is misleading, 
because of the fake underlying dichotomy of “blogs vs traditional media.” The large, 
fragmented and asymmetrically interlinked (small, influential core and large, extremely 
fragmented periphery) totality of blogs is found to be contributive to the public sphere 
mostly as an alternative and very fast channel of information dissemination. 
The role of discussion forums is found to be ambiguous, certain forums being 
absolutely irrelevant, while others establishing powerful advocacy media and global 
issue publics. 
Social news sites are found to be potentially most constructive from the point of view of 
the public sphere, because they tend to effectively promote reasoned argumentation. 
 
KEYWORDS: Habermas, public sphere, internet, blog, forum, social news site
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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of certain services of the internet1 on the 
practical concepts of "public sphere" and "culture industry." There are various 
understandings of both of these concepts. 
The term "public sphere" in the original theory of Jürgen Habermas (1989) referred to 
an idealized sphere of social interaction, where independent private persons exchanged 
information in the form of rational debate, so as to give voice to a kind of public 
opinion on important matters – such as the ruling of the state. The original concept has 
been subject to ample criticism; but without further burrowing into questions of theory, 
suffice it to say here that the public sphere is some kind of an intangible area, made up 
of physical (e.g. a coffee house) and virtual (e.g. an internet chat room) places as well as 
various pieces of technology (e.g. telephone wires, TV sets or copies of magazines), 
where people can exchange information about questions concerning the public2. The 
public sphere is important because in a secular world, it is expected to legitimate the 
rule of a small minority of people over an entire state. It is at the same time the 
prerequisite of, and a guarantee for meaningful, legitimate democracy. But presently, 
national public spheres cannot complete their original objectives, as they have been “re-
feudalized” in line with exclusive, business interests of an affluent minority. 
The expression "culture industry" originally referred to the unwelcome 
commercialization of culture (meaning, roughly, valuable arts and pieces of 
entertainment), which eventually lead to all cultural products becoming shallow, 
worthless and boring. Mass produced culture is, according to the original theory, 
constantly creating a need for new pieces of entertainment (holding the promise of 
escaping from the drudgery of the everydays), but these new cultural products are 
essentially always the same, and as such they can never offer full satisfaction to their 
consumers. The culture industry is perpetuating itself, and so perpetuating the 
domination of capitalism. (Adorno & Horkheimer 1999.) 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper I will stick to the tradition of  referring to the internet with lower case 'i'. On the 
spelling of this word see Long (2004). 
2
 What "the public" is is a question of great theoretical importance, and as such will be covered later in 
this paper. 
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In this thesis, I will utilize the Habermasian concept of the public sphere, because I 
think it is still relevant and meaningful (although not necessarily in the original ways 
Habermas himself intended it to be), despite ample criticism and numerous revisions. 
Through individual analysis of certain particular services available on the internet, 
I will attempt to assess whether or not this global computer network could 
contribute to the operations of the public sphere(s). 
An underlying hypothesis of this paper is that the internet affects both the public sphere 
and the culture industry, and its impact could be empirically detected and measured. 
 
1.1 Internet – an unfulfilled promise? 
One of the key links between the internet, the public sphere and the culture industry is 
that the internet, as a decentralized and global communication channel, seems to 
hold the promise of (re-)democratizing both the public sphere and the culture 
industry. In the Western world, it is not such an over-exaggeration to say that almost 
anyone can make themselves heard on the ‘net; it seems the ideal, unrestricted medium 
for the exchange of information. It also helps the access to cultural products (e.g. in the 
form of digital music distribution), and gives audiences a greater freedom of choice. 
This is why I am interested in the internet. More precisely, it is my doubts about the 
possible success of this democratizing process. I am writing this paper with an 
underlying hypothesis in mind, which can be summed up like this: the internet fails to 
deliver the communication democracy it promises, precisely because of the 
overwhelming freedom it provides. Its freedom is confusing and, paradoxically, 
restrictive. (Keohane and Nye (2002: 171) refer to this as "the paradox of plenty.") 
In other words: a significant part of the world's population does not and cannot have 
access to the internet because of various (usually economic) reasons. But even those 
who do have access to it, cannot exploit its full potential, because unrestricted 
communication becomes unstructured at the same time – and it is great that everybody 
can have a voice on the net, but if everybody is speaking at the same time and, more 
importantly, nobody is aware of where everybody else is, let alone pay attention or 
understand them, it is hard to conduct a meaningful dialogue or form a common opinion 
(even if such a dialogue is not global, but only concerns smaller groups of people). 
It might be that such dialogues can only form if the new "electronic communication 
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culture" eventually leads to a technology-oriented dystopia, where the buzzword 
"content" is actually more important than what that actual content is. This side of the 
problem is more eloquently illustrated by Lash and Urry: 
The growth of information may be seen as liberating or as repressive. On 
the one hand, the use of new forms of information technology may facilitate 
the development of small communitarian public spheres. […]. Or on the 
other hand, information technology can lead to new forms of control and 
erode the critical crafts of reading and writing. (1994: 324.) 
 
In one of his later works, speaking about "the paradox of the information society," Lash 
also asks the question: "[h]ow can such highly rational production result in the 
incredible irrationality of information overloads, misinformation, disinformation and 
out-of-control information?" (2002: 2). In my hypothesis, the explanation lies in the 
uncontrollable multiplicity of information sources on the internet. 
It is also because of that abundance of information that the net fails to solve the problem 
of media bias: as post-modern theoretician John Hartley (1996: 86–87) noted, ever since 
the media was born, it has always been biased, and therefore no single medium could 
give fully impartial representation. This hasn't changed with the coming of the 
information age, but the internet did make rival media more easily accessible. So it is, in 
theory, easier to form a sufficiently objective picture of events by comparing various 
sources' representations. And yet, according to my working hypothesis, this is merely 
the theory – in practice, this is also an unexploited potential of the internet. 
The backbone of this thesis will be to test the validity of this hypothesis, using a 
practical approach, supported by considerable theoretical framework. 
 
1.2 The internet, the public sphere and (post-)modernity 
Before advancing any further, I feel it important to address the question of how this 
paper relates to the disagreements about the public sphere, due to the differing views of 
modern and post-modern academic traditions. 
The rivalry of the modern and post-modern views has been at the heart of the debate 
about the public sphere (cf. McKee 2002: 8–17). The debate concerns attitudinal 
differences towards modernity based on the Enlightenment values of equality, freedom, 
justice, comfort and solidarity:  "[t]he growing critique of modernity […] challenges the 
assumptions which link, on the one side, increasing rationality and faith in science, 
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innovation and progress generally, with, on the other side, enhanced social harmony, 
moral development, justice and happiness" (Dahlgren 1995: 73).  
Habermas' modernist view, arguing for the desired completion of the "unfinished project 
of the Enlightenment" is often attacked by post-modern academics (Dahlgren 1995: 74), 
and a key point of disagreement concerns the fragmentation of the public sphere 
(McKee 2002: 141–148). 
From a modernist point of view (see for example Garnham 1992; Bohman 2004), a 
single and unified public sphere, corresponding to the scope of authority of the 
institutions it might influence3, is desirable, while the post-modern tradition rejects this 
idea, and argues for the viable coexistence of multiple public spheres, not least because 
there is no one set of questions that should exclusively be addressed in a supposedly 
official public sphere. Everybody is a member of multiple different groups and "what's 
really important for a group is what that group thinks is really important to it" (McKee 
2002: 151), in the post-modern paradigm. 
When I argue for the internet's failure to deliver democracy in communication, it might 
seem that I take a modernist position, considering a post-modern, fragmented scene of a 
multitude of electronic public spheres undesirable. This is not so: throughout this paper 
I try not to take a stand in the modernism vs. post-modernism debate (partly because I 
agree with Dahlgren (1995) in that differences between the two views are often 
artificially magnified). This debate mostly concerns attitudes, while I try to focus on 
empirically proven facts. The internet seems to hold the potential to democratize public 
communication – and thus possibly to create a single and unified public sphere; and I 
believe it is possible to examine whether or not this potential is fulfilled without having 
to debate whether or not such a single public sphere would be a "good thing." 
 
1.3 The internet does matter 
Even without a precise definition of the notion "public sphere," one could suspect that 
the internet has something to do with it. The internet is merely a network of computers, 
                                                 
3
 I.e. even if there was a single, unified and unobstructed global public sphere, it might fail to become 
relevant because there are no such institutions that could have a global scope of authority, and 
therefore even if a global consensus is reached in the public sphere, there will be ne way to 
systematically and institutionally implement it. See Bohman (2004) – and chapter 3.3. 
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and the very purpose of networks is the exchange of products, resources or information. 
The relationship between the ‘net and the culture industry might not seem so obvious. 
But there is indeed such a relationship; and it has, in my understanding, two layers. 
First, the internet affects the business model of the culture industry, through offering 
new ways of distribution and marketing (these new ways can be, at least de jure, 
illegal), as well as new ways of tapping into the "creative resources" of the world and 
producing new kinds of cultural products. 
The second layer of the relationship between the internet and the culture industry stems 
from the relevance of cultural industry. This aspect of the cultural industry also explains 
why it is inseparable from the institution of public sphere. For a working definition, let's 
just say that the culture industry refers to all those lines of business which aim to 
produce and present or sell cultural products – books, movies, music, pieces of art etc4. 
Products of the culture industry ("texts") are not crucial or indispensable for human 
beings, but they are still relevant, because, according to Hesmondhalgh (2002: 3–7), 
they modify the way we interpret and understand the world – consequently, they 
influence our identities and ways of life. But before a text could reach us, it passes 
through the public sphere – whether this would mean advertising, media or word-of-
mouth passing of information. Moreover, the discursive environment of the public 
sphere is also where (or through which) change, inspired by the texts of the culture 
industry, can take place. In an atomized society, without meaningful public dialogue 
constituting a public sphere, a culture industry could possibly not function. But that, of 
course, would not be a problem, because nobody would need it anyway, as nobody 
would understand the concept of experiencing the relationship between the subjectivity 
of the self and that of others (manifested in texts of the culture industry). 
To sum it up, the public sphere is indispensable for the culture industry because it acts 
as a mediator between audiences and producers of texts. (See also chapter 2.7 about the 
culture industry.) This is the second layer of the relationship between the culture 
industry and the public sphere (and the very point of this paper is to examine whether 
the internet could really be an effective and helpful part of this connection). 
                                                 
4
 As it will be covered later in detail, David Hesmondhalgh (2002: 12) lists the "core" cultural 
industries as follows: advertising and marketing, broadcasting, film, the internet industry, the music 
industry, publishing, video and computer games. 
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Habermas argues that there has also been a historical link between the culture industry 
(although nobody called it "culture industry" at the time) and the original, bourgeois 
public sphere: it was in the "world of letters," in the first literary debates of the 18th 
century that readers could prepare and practice the "audience-oriented subjectivity" that 
is at the heart of critical public discussion. The public sphere was born in the world of 
letters: "[t]he self-interpretation of the public in the political realm […] was the 
accomplishment of a consciousness functionally adapted to the institutions of the public 
sphere in the world of letters" (Habermas 1989: 55; see also Habermas 1992: 423). 
This link still does exist, even if the public sphere(s) of today are markedly different to 
the ideal bourgeois public sphere of Habermas. Discussion about products of the culture 
industry is natural in the Western world, running on consumption-oriented capitalism. 
 
1.4 Western traditions 
In this paper I will also touch the issue of a possible global, and as such, intercultural 
public sphere. Therefore I feel obliged to underline that both the Habermasian concept 
of public sphere and that of culture industry are originally situated in the Western world 
of consumer capitalism. This is not to say that an institution akin to the the Habermasian 
discursive public sphere could not exist or function in other civilizations (or, for that 
matter, globally), but to point out a possible inherent deficiency of the model of the 
public sphere I will use. 
The internet, having started out as a military project in the cold war (Living Internet 
2000), also originates from the West. However, given that this latter is "only" a piece of 
technology, it can spread much easier than abstract concepts. It does spread indeed, and 
this is why the question of whether a global public sphere (or even a dialogue of 
different cultures) could evolve on the internet (possibly in the form of a meta-public 
sphere), is relevant and topical. 
When addressing this question, ideally, this paper should consider how the concepts of 
public sphere and cultural industry could be translated or adapted to various non-
western cultures. An important limitation of this paper is that it cannot undertake this 
task. Throughout this paper, I will represent a Western point of view, because of the 
Western ideas embedded in the original concepts I am examining. I still hope to be 
aware of the limitations of such an approach, and to be able to point out where, and in 
 11 
which ways, this Western focus gives rise to problems. But the deep, detailed analysis of 
public spheres and culture industries in other, non-western cultures, remains to be a 
possible subject of other, further studies. 
 
1.5 Theories and technologies 
Throughout this paper, I will try to be as practical as possible in my approach, partly 
because I came to the view that important theoreticians and thinkers of the topic tend to 
neglect the importance of empirical evidence or practical applicability altogether. I also 
hope to provide a solid theoretical background for the empirical analysis. 
First, I will present the two key theories of this paper: that of the public sphere and that 
of the culture industry, briefly running through and presenting the debates around them. 
Then I dedicate one chapter to current theories about the internet, and its relationship 
with the public sphere and the culture industry. In order to present these theories in a 
coherent manner, I will use the analytical framework provided by Dahlgren (1995), who 
used it in his analysis of the relationship between television and the public sphere.  
Finally, I shall look at how the practicalities of the internet support all the theories, 
focusing on a handful of services available online: blogs, social bookmarking and news 
sites, RSS and discussion forums.  
Both in the theoretical and the empirical part of this study, I will try to keep my focus on 
intercultural questions, such as: is it possible for different cultures to cooperate in 
running a meaningful public sphere (or a meta-public sphere, consisting of smaller, 
fragmented public spheres)? Could such a public sphere be even global? Could the 
internet change the business operations of the culture industry (or culture industries) in 
such a way that cultural diversity is supported? However, I would like to stress the 
limitations of this paper, mentioned under chapter 1.4, stemming from its decidedly 
Western approach.
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2 Theories of the public sphere and the culture industry 
 
In this lengthy chapter I present the two sets of theories that give the backbone of this 
paper: the theories about the (Habermasian) public sphere, and the most important 
thoughts about the phenomenon of the culture industry.  
 
2.1 The bourgeois public sphere 
Jürgen Habermas' The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was originally 
published in 1962. Its first English translation came to daylight more than 30 years later. 
This volume used the concept of public sphere in reference to all the places and events 
which accommodate critical and reasoned discourse, that is, where participants put 
"their reason to public use," to formulate a common (public) opinion, and thus to reflect 
on and to legitimate the operations of a government (as well as to critically evaluate the 
latest works of art and "products of the culture"). The public sphere rather happens than 
exists: it happens in coffee houses, in reading rooms and libraries, in reading the 
newspaper of listening to the speech of a government representative – everywhere 
where there is a meaningful discussion going on about public issues. (Habermas 1989.) 
The Structural Transformation... is about the history of this public sphere. It presents a 
theory that is at the same time a narrative – a story. 
The story of the real public sphere begins, according to Habermas, in the 18th century. 
Prior to that, in the middle ages, no meaningful public sphere could exist: what could 
have been termed "public sphere" of the feudalism of the middle ages was a sphere of 
representation, a social place where ruling classes of the society could present the 
symbols that were supposed to legitimate their – most certainly undemocratic – rule.  A 
public sphere in the modern sense of the word could not exist not least because of the 
lack of privacy: it is a crucial point in Habermas' theory that the notions of public and 
private presuppose one another – but under the regime of feudalism, there was no real 
distinction between these two categories, everyone being merely a link in the feudal 
chain, representing the ownership of the land. (Habermas 1989: 10–25.) 
This changed by the 18th century, with a combination of the development of early 
capitalism, technologies such as mass printing and transportation, the weakening of the 
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role of the church5, and the strengthening of the bourgeoisie (originally referring to the 
layer of society whose members gained wealth and power because of their trade and 
profession, not because they were born into aristocratic families). 
In Germany, Britain and France, it was members of the bourgeoisie – educated, 
property-owning, white males – that, according to Habermas, could experience a 
hitherto unknown type of subjectivity, and through this develop a certain self-
awareness, a reflexive group identity, which made it possible for them to act as a 
public6. This public, for the first time in history, could act as a "social and political force 
[that could] articulate collective political demands against the old estates and the states" 
(Nieminen 2000: 111). Importantly, Habermas makes a distinction between the cultural 
and the political public spheres, the former being the place where the "audience-
oriented subjectivity" and "reflexive group identity" could develop, and the latter being 
the place where these forces were put to political use. 
Members of this public (note that it is quite a restricted use of the word, as it refers to 
only a very small part of the people – educated and wealthy members of the 
bourgeoisie) would convene in various settings – e.g. in French salons, British coffee 
houses and at the meetings of German reading societies –, they would discuss about 
public matters, phrase their own thoughts about the desired ways of organizing state 
affairs, had these thoughts published in letters and in newspapers, and as a result of this 
intellectual activity, combined with the growing economic weight of the bourgeoisie, 
the concept of modern democratic nation states could be born. 
The connection of democracy and public sphere is crucial. One cannot exist without the 
other. If democracy means exercising the power of the state in line with the will of the 
citizens, then there needs to be some kind of a public opinion that would represent the 
"general interest" of the people, and that would guide those who make decisions in the 
name of the state. And it is in the debates and discussions of the public sphere that this 
"general interest" is crystallized. It is the public sphere that could rationally justify 
                                                 
5
 A crucial turn of events; see also the Theory of Communicative Action (or the next chapter in this 
paper). 
6
 "In the course of the 18th century, the bourgeois reading public was able to cultivate in the intimate 
exchange of letters […] a subjectivity capable of relating to literature and oriented toward a public 
sphere. In this form, private people interpreted their new form of existence which was indeed based on 
the liberal relationship between public and private spheres." (Habermas 1989: 171.) 
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the political domination of a few people over an entire state (Habermas 1989: 180).  
(Moreover, at the birth of the public sphere, stakes were high, because the initial 
question was not "What is the general interest of the citizens?" but rather "Should the 
general interest of the citizens replace the interest of the aristocratic ruling class in 
exercising power?" (Habermas 1989: 28). The bourgeoisie represented the general 
interest in that it promoted the values of the Enlightenment (equality, freedom, justice, 
comfort and solidarity)7; Habermas' starting point is that democracy is naturally 
preferable to practising state power without reference to the will of the citizens.) 
The link between the public sphere and democracy also means that a democratic public 
is necessarily a discursive public (or that a public is not merely a bunch of people 
together, without interaction, a public is a public because of the communication of its 
members; it is more than a mere sum of the parts). (Habermas 1989: 3–7, 21.) 
 
The golden age of the bourgeois public sphere did not last long. Perhaps it was a natural 
development that it had to compromise itself. Capitalism became more and more 
aggressive (affecting more and more areas of everyday life), and, partly in order to 
counter the negative effects of such a development, partly in order to provide more and 
more services (such as education or social security insurance), nation states interfered 
more and more with private lives of the citizens. The role of the institutions of 
employment also grew, coming to represent something that is between the private and 
public spheres, and therefore the crucial dividing line between private and public 
became blurred. One could say, it simply lost its original importance (at least from the 
point of view of the original bourgeois public sphere), because once democracies were 
established and the idea of monarchies and hereditary ruling seemed to fade into the 
past, there was no need to fight for them any more. What becomes a given can no longer 
be a force to propel change in a society. (Habermas 1989: 151–152, 176–180.) 
In addition, as democracy became generally accepted, the bourgeoisie, also beset by 
fragmentation and internal differences of opinion, lost its exclusive role: if democracy 
meant public participation in the political domination, then working classes wanted to 
                                                 
7
 It was the bourgeoisie that was in the position to promote these changes because it had the power, the 
"autonomy based on ownership of private property" (Habermas 1989: 55) to do so. 
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take part, too (as well as other groups of the society – most importantly: women). The 
public became more and more fragmented, first only in that more and more groups of 
people gained voting rights, and later in the course of history in the sense that various 
groups, usually tagged as "new social movements," such as feminist, gay or ethnic right 
movements, gave proof of their self-consciousness and demanded recognition beyond 
voting rights. (Dahlgren 1995: 8; McKee 2002: 143–147.) 
As a result of this fragmentation, and the blurring of the private / public distinction, the 
public sphere became once again re-feudalized, meaning that it once again became a 
public sphere of empty representation (Habermas 1989: 177–180). This re-
feudalization means "closed doors politics" (a system in which parties seek 
popularity so that they get into power, but once there, they make important decisions 
behind closed doors, without referring to the discourse of the public sphere and possibly 
without following the general interest of the populace), the misinterpretation of public 
opinion, and the public sphere becoming a sphere of advertising. In other words, 
even if the formalities of democracy are maintained, this does not legitimate the rule of 
the leading few – on the contrary, those abusing their power can hide behind the fact 
that this power was acquired through formally perfectly democratic procedures8. In 
addition, while in the case of the bourgeois public sphere the activity of reading 
literature was seen as a way to develop and cherish an independent, individual 
subjectivity, in the new public sphere, the cultivation of subjectivity in works of art is no 
longer appreciated, thanks to the commercialization of the culture industry. (Habermas 
1989: 160–163, 166–167; Dahlgren 1995: 8.) 
 
The theory of the bourgeois public sphere has been criticized by others and revised by 
Habermas himself. But I think it is still important because of its underlying premises: 
that there is, or at least there may be a public sphere, an intangible but crucially 
important space where communication is taking place and public opinion is formed; and 
that this public sphere in its ideal form both presupposes and guarantees democracy. 
 
                                                 
8
  "In terms of political theory, Habermas uses the theory of communicative action to articulate a 
substantial conception of democracy in contrast to a mere formal one" (Malmberg 2006: 11).
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2.2 The Theory of Communicative Action 
Responding to criticism of its original theory, Habermas made some adjustments to it – 
most importantly, admitting that his original notion of the public sphere, focusing solely 
on members of the bourgeoisie, was both idealized and too restrictive (Habermas 1992). 
But he also presented a new, much less historical theory about the legitimative powers 
of unrestricted communication: the theory of communicative action.  
The theory of communicative action starts from a simple question: how can secular, 
non-sacred domination be legitimated? Why do people accept others as genuine rulers 
or leaders, if these leaders cannot legitimate their rule with supernatural concepts such 
as being a direct descendant of gods or having been given power by God? 
The standard answer to this question had been, for many important scholars, that in 
modern societies the morality of laws is transformed into "externally imposed law" 
(Habermas 1987, vol. 2: 80). In other words, if people abide by laws, that is because 
they are forced to do so by the state. 
But Habermas rather supports the idea of Émile Durkheim: Durkheim proposed that 
secular law can be accepted as legitimate because of an unspoken agreement among 
members of the society, that states that rulers will follow the best interest of the society9. 
This common interest is, in Habermas' understanding, "by no means the sum of, or a 
compromise between" people’s individual interests; instead, it is reflective on them10. 
This common interest is distilled, or "communicatively shaped and discursively 
clarified" in the public sphere. This is what explains the importance of the public 
sphere: it serves as a proof of legitimacy of political domination. "The unity of the 
collectivity can be established and maintained only as the unity of a communication 
community, that is to say, only by way of a consensus arrived at communicatively in the 
public sphere" (Habermas 1987, vol.2: 82). 
The fact that makes such a consensus possible is that, according to Habermas, 
speech acts are always potentially (even if implicitly) rational. This rationality means 
                                                 
9
 "[...] the obligatory character of a contract is based on the legitimacy of the legal regulations that 
underlie it; the latter count legitimate only insofar as they express a general interest." (Habermas 
1987, vol. 2: 80.) 
10
 "The role of the state is not to express and sum up the unreflective thought of the mass of the people, 
but to superimpose on this unreflective thought a more considered thought, which therefore cannot be 
other than different" (Habermas 1987, vol. 2: 81). 
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that whoever is communicating is capable of arguing for their best interest. Every act of 
meaningful social interaction in an undistorted situation could be described as steps of 
communicative action in order to establish a mutual understanding (intersubjectivity) 
between the participants, with rational claims about their respective best interests. The 
key to democracy is the equality that is offered by the universally human, universally 
equal faculty of language. 
Speech acts are hardly ever take place in undistorted situations; but in some cases the 
potential rationality of communication can manifest itself in social changes of great 
magnitude – as in the birth of the bourgeois public sphere (Nieminen 2000: 112–113). 
 
The theory of communicative action distinguishes between two great social spheres in 
modern societies: lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and the economic and administrative system. 
Lifeworld refers to "life as it should be lived:" it comprises of all the "communicatively 
structured" spheres of life, all the social interactions where rational, communicative 
action is practised. The lifeworld is even less tangible concept than the public sphere: it 
is a loose, unorganized sphere that refers to instances of communicative action taking 
place in an ideal society. (Habermas 1989, vol. 2: 319.) 
In the original volume introducing the theory of communicative action, the public 
sphere is incorporated "in an unspecified manner" in the lifeworld (Malmberg 2006: 5), 
however, Habermas himself returned to the issue – see chapter 2.3.  
In contrast to the lifeworld stands the economic and administrative system, the invisible 
and intangible construct of power in a society. The aim of the system is to maintain the 
stability of, and to reproduce, society (but culture is reproduced in the lifeworld, not in 
the system). The system is made up of the economic and administrative, efficient 
organization of actions, and all the rules and actions that derive from this organization. 
Ideally, the lifeworld and the system would form a society together, and the connection 
between them could be described in terms of exchange of money and power (e.g. these 
relations describe how labour is offered from the individual  to the uses of the system, 
which, in return, provides the individual's income – and so, a person's private sphere 
becomes partly dominated by the system). (Habermas 1987, vol.2: 319–325.) 
 
The latest development is the colonization of the lifeworld by the system. "The 
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communicative practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utilitarian 
lifestyle […]. As the private sphere is undermined […] by the economic system, so too 
is the public sphere by the administrative system. The bureaucratic disempowering and 
desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion and will-formation expands the scope 
for engineering mass loyalty and makes it easier to uncouple political decision making 
from concrete, identity-forming contexts of life." (Habermas 1987, vol.2: 325.) 
The system lacks the reflexivity of the communicative action. Political and economic 
decisions get disconnected from the lifeworld, but because it is in the lifeworld that 
communicative action is practised, this means that these decisions lose sight of what the 
best, common interest of the citizens is. In addition, the invasion of the system into 
areas of the lifeworld also brings about a "cultural impoverishment." 
This unwelcome effect of the system stepping outside its ideal boundaries explains the 
state of the contemporary public sphere (already described in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere): it is a hollow sphere of representation and 
advertising that no longer truly legitimates the political domination of ruling parties: 
Rational dialogue between citizens, and between citizens and the state, is 
replaced by systemic and strategic exchanges of power. Citizens offer the 
state legitimacy (in the form of votes for parties and basic compliance with 
laws) in return for the benefits of the welfare state, whilst the state 'spends' 
its power in the form of the laws and policies it imposes upon citizens; 
always mindful of the need to win votes. (Crossley & Roberts 2004: 8.) 
 
 
2.3 Civil society (in the theory of communicative action) 
Habermas further elaborated the concept of the public sphere in the light of the 
lifeworld and the system in his 1996 book Between Facts and Norms. "[p]ublic sphere 
[is] a communication structure rooted in the lifeworld through the associational network 
of civil society," he writes, stressing that it is not a single institution or organization: 
"The public sphere can best be described as a network for communicating information 
and points of view […]; the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and 
synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public 
opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so, too, the public sphere is reproduced through 
communicative action." (Habermas 2004: 359–360.) 
This definition points to another concept that is of great importance in trying to see the 
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public sphere as not an abstract, theoretical construct, but an empirically existing 
phenomenon. This concept is that of civil society. As Dahlgren puts it: "[a]ll of civil 
society is not equivalent to the public sphere, but civil society constitutes the 
settings for the interactional dimension of the public sphere" (1995: 151). 
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations and movements that, attuned to how societal 
problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such 
reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society 
comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving 
discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of 
organized public spheres. (Habermas 2004: 367.) 
 
An important part of civil society is made up of the so-called "new social movements:" 
movements that are alarmed by the colonization of the lifeworld by the system11, and 
that try to directly influence the political system and to revitalize and enlarge civil 
society and the public sphere. (Habermas 2004: 370; Crossley & Roberts 2004: 8.) 
(The "democratizing potential" of the internet stems, in my view, partly from the fact 
that at least in theory it can help the organization of such new social movements.) 
The spontaneity of the organization of civil society also gives an insight into what the 
single and unified public sphere means for Habermas. "Public sphere in practice" does 
not mean that public discourse is always, everywhere about the same issues. Different 
groups of people meet in different conditions and have different conversations; for 
example, the audience of a rock concert might not have anything in common with a 
think-tank of economists. But the different discourses of these different publics are 
"porous to one another," they all represent different aspects of the same basic issues: 
"the one text of 'the' public sphere […] is divided by internal boundaries into arbitrarily 
small texts for which everything else is context" (Habermas 2004: 374).  
This is a much looser interpretation of the concept of the single public sphere than the 
one that could be understood from Habermas' earlier works. It also evades the modern 
vs post-modern debate: there is only one meaningful Public Sphere, but it doesn't mean 
an exclusion of other public spheres (unlike in the theory of the bourgeois public 
sphere), because 'the' Public Sphere is the complex cooperation of all the particular 
                                                 
11
 "[...] the crushing of social groups, associations, and networks," the "indoctrination and the dissolution 
of cultural identities," the "suffocation of spontaneous public communication" (Habermas 2004: 369). 
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public spheres – and all of these public spheres are relevant (as long as they are 
intelligible to one another), but none of them represents 'the' Public Sphere in itself. 
An institution that contributes immensely to the cooperation of the public spheres (as 
well as to the operation of the civil society and the state), is the mass media. Habermas 
remained uncertain about the effects of the mass media domination, but noted 
nevertheless that the media represents a certain information inequality, where a small 
group of people (media experts, programme directors and representatives of the press in 
general) can decide what topics the public spheres should focus on and discuss about 
(Habermas 2004: 377)12. This could also be seen as a sign of the decoupling of the 
lifeworld and the (business-oriented, economic) system. (See also Dahlgren 1995: 155.) 
 
2.4. From the theory of public sphere to the theory of communicative action 
As Malmberg (2006) points it out, the original theory of the bourgeois public sphere and 
the theory of communicative action could not be simply compared, given their 
difference in their approach and in their scope. 
They could be put into perspective using Hegel’s works as point of reference. The 
theory of the public sphere is institutionalist in its approach: it conceptualizes the public 
sphere as a separate institution, a distinct part in the model of society, along with the 
state, the civil society (here referring to the early, healthy capitalism as opposed to the 
feudal mode of production), and the family; based on Hegel’s tripartite model of society 
presented in his late work "Elements of Philosophy of Right," originally published in 
1821. In contrast, the theory of communicative action finds the source of legitimizing 
potential in the individual, more precisely in the individuals’ universal faculty of 
language, and in the universally human ability of logical argument. Here, the concept of 
civil society is used in a different sense (see 2.3); and the starting point of the theory of 
communicative action is closer to the young Hegel’s views. (Malmberg 2006.) 
The gap between the two theories illustrates a shift in Habermas’ attention, but this gap 
is by no means unbridgeable. As I pointed out in chapter 2.3, Habermas himself showed 
how the concept of public sphere could be linked, through the concept of civil society, 
                                                 
12
 "The basic problem of political communication [is] managing a two-way process of communication 
flows between the professionalized mass media and the non-professional everyday actors. Ideally, 
both should be sensitive to the other" (Malmberg 2006: 12). 
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to that of communicative action. In this sense, the theory of communicative action 
extends the original idea of the public sphere, providing it with a background, 
explaining how the public sphere is rooted in the lifeworld and, consequently, how it is 
threatened by the invasion of the system. Nevertheless, in this thesis I will approach the 
research problem from the young Habermas’ point of view. I now attempt to briefly 
explain the reason behind this choice. 
In discussing how Habermas revised his theories about the public sphere in response to 
the more and more apparent role and ubiquity of mass media, Malmberg concludes that: 
[…] maybe the media system has become over-complex in the sense that, 
given the immensity of its manifestations, nobody can with any certainty 
say what it includes. If this is so we, or any finite subject in the sense of 
Habermas’ post-metaphysical philosophy, can never know what the people 
wants politically, save through the formal procedures of voting. Such an 
upshot would, however, threaten to collapse the basic idea of substantial 
democracy so pressing to Habermas. (Malmberg 2006: 21.) 
 
But in my view, information overflow is not the result of the media system reaching 
new levels of complexity, rather, it is the result of the very birth of the media. From the 
moment that we can talk of "media," this word refers to a complex of information the 
totality of which nobody could ever grasp or process. In this respect, the 18th century 
was no different from today: if nowadays the theoretical possibility of getting to know 
to every single piece of the media output is even further out of touch, it doesn’t mean 
that this task was ever performable in the first place – not even in the highly restricted 
settings that Habermas presents in his original work about the public sphere. 
However, even if I don’t agree with the findings of the idealistic "historical sociology" 
of the young Habermas, I think that certain elements of his theory are, indeed, valid in 
the age of the internet: mostly, I refer here to the assumption of his theory of the public 
sphere that it is possible to discursively create and manage political power. 
This assumption is explicitly confirmed and explained by Habermas himself in his 
keynote speech held at the 2006 conference of the International Communication 
Association, in which he revisited the topic of the public sphere. The power structure of 
the public sphere is made up by political, social, economic and media power: it is in the 
interplay of these powers that issues of the political public sphere are framed and public 
opinion is crystallized. The public sphere is reflexive, meaning that all participants can 
 22 
in theory influence both the issues that the public opinion deals with and the qualities of 
this public opinion. But it is only pseudo-democratic, because there are important 
inequalities of power between participants of the public sphere.  (Habermas 2006.) 
In Habermas’ understanding, contemporary public sphere is but a "virtual stage" (sic), 
where in theory everybody can participate as well as spectate, but where exists a strong 
hierarchy, in which the "national quality press" is awarded the role of opinion leader 
(Habermas 2006: 19). The political public sphere is "dominated by the kind of mediated 
[mass-]communication that lacks the defining features of deliberation" (Habermas 2006: 
8–9), and hence it is the mass media professionals that have the power to select, shape 
and mediate opinions (originating either from the political system or from the civil 
society) towards the broad and general public(s). However, in an ideal scenario, with an 
independence of the mass media and with the help of an inclusive civil society, 
deliberative democracy could still function properly, in spite of the unequal distribution 
of power to influence public opinion construction (Habermas 2006: 20). Thus, in an 
ideal state of things, discursively created political power could be used to legitimate 
a democratic rule. But in a less-than ideal state of things, such power can also be 
used to attain or legitimate an undemocratic rule – as, again, Habermas himself 
suggests in writing about the re-feudalization of the public sphere. 
 
This latter line of thought can be traced back to the works of C. W. Mills. In his trilogy 
presenting the post-war society of the United States – The New Man of Power, White 
Collar and The Power Elite –, he warns of the dangers of a "new corporatism," referring 
to the blurring of the private and public spheres along the "war-economy"-related 
business interests of the elite. In such a corporatist society formal democracy is 
established, but the impeccable procedures of democracy merely cover for the lack of 
substantial democracy. This is possible because the power elite also heavily influences 
the mass media, which ends up manipulating people, who turn from a "community of 
[discursive] publics" into a "society of masses." (Eldridge 1983: 81–82.) 
As Mills himself writes – six years before the publication of Habermas’ Strukturwandel: 
 
Public relations and the official secret, the trivialising campaign and the 
terrible fact clumsily accomplished, are replacing reasoned debate of 
political ideas in the privately incorporated economy, the military 
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ascendancy, and the political vacuum of modern America" (Mills 1959: 
360–361, quoted in Eldridge 1983: 84. Emphasis added.)  
 
Importantly, these thoughts seem to have been inspiring for newer generations of 
thinkers, too. Joseph Nye (2004: 5, quoted in Chouliaraki 2007: 1) named the 
discursively created, symbolic power "soft power," as opposed to the hard power 
relying on military and economic resources. Graham and Luke (2007), starting from the 
concept of soft power, took the Habermasian idea of refeudalized public sphere one step 
further, describing contemporary Western society as that of "neofeudal corporatism." 
According to Graham and Luke, "the currently dominant [in the authors’ understanding: 
Western] form of social organization is ‘designed’ in a loose sense to produce and 
support high-tech, massive, globally operative, corporately owned military institutions" 
(2007: 27). They also point to the blurring of lines between the concepts of private and 
public ("The density and reach of corporatist mediations make it impossible to delineate 
militaristic mediations along private-public lines, or within that, between […] general 
activity and specifically military activity" (2007: 28)), and they conclude in affirming 
that "[t]he feudal spirit […] has re-emerged" (2007: 33). 
It is at least strange that Graham and Luke do not even mention, let alone reference, 
Habermas or Mills. But in any case they show an example of how their approach still 
lives on. And, although I contest the validity of Graham and Luke’s model of neofeudal 
corporatism13, I agree with their points that there is, in contemporary Western society, a 
discursively created imbalance of power, and that this imbalance of power could be 
repaired discursively. Therefore, while keeping in mind the possible further implications 
of the theory of communicative action, I will not examine how this latter’s supposed 
universal rationality is related to or manifested through the communication services of 
the internet. Rather, I will examine how these various online services will help or 
hinder a democratic, discursive, "counter-feudal" public, using the young 
Habermas' institutionalist approach to the public sphere. 
Before that, however, I briefly present the most important strands of criticism Habermas 
received, because these have important implications for how to analyse the role of the 
                                                 
13
 Parallelling today’s economy with that of the middle ages is interesting, but without even mentioning 
the role of land (cf. feudum) in the latter, or trying to find its equivalent in the former, the theory 
seems somewhat flawed to me. 
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internet. In short, critiques suggest a growing variety and uncertainty of social relations, 
and the growing importance of the ever so swiftly changing communication. 
  
2.5 Critical reflections on Habermas 
Based on the essay of Garnham (1992), the main strands of criticism towards Habermas' 
original work (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere) could be summed 
up as follows. First, the theory of the bourgeois public sphere is too restrictive: 
Habermas reserves the original public sphere for educated, property-owning, affluent, 
white males of the bourgeoisie, excluding other social groups (most notably, women, 
and the working class) from taking part in the democracy. (It might be that it was indeed 
the bourgeoisie that played the most important part in securing the institution of 
democracy in the first nation states. But even if it is so, Habermas errs in implicitly 
suggesting that such a state of affairs was fully democratic, which it wasn't, at least not 
according to the modern understanding of ideal representative democracy.) Second, the 
original theory presented an overly idealized picture – in fact, the model of the 
bourgeois public sphere seemed to combine, in a vague manner, idealistic description 
and factual analysis. Its idealism is manifested chiefly in Habermas' exaggerated faith in 
human reason and rationality, and his negligence of the distortions that are inherent in 
the operations of the media, as well as of irrational or restrictive (possibly malevolent) 
acts from members of the public sphere. (See also Hartley 1996: 67 and Dahlgren 1995: 
152, as well as chapter 2.5.) 
Third, in striking contrast with this belief in reason, Habermas also seems to assume 
that in certain conditions people easily suspend critical thinking altogether, and become 
blind subjects of domination (by the ruling political party, by the media, by the 
advertising of the culture industry). In reality, "[p]eople never passively consume 
images but actively and consistently debate and discuss everyday dilemmas, however 
small, within their day-to-day lives" (Crossley & Roberts 2004: 8). 
 
In the theory of communicative action Habermas seemed to tackle the problem of 
historical situatedness and the exclusivity of the bourgeois public sphere, claiming that 
rationality is inherent in all speech acts, and it was because of the specific historical 
circumstances that the bourgeoisie happened to be in the position to actualize this 
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potential rationality for the first time. This theory also received ample critical attention. 
It has been argued, most importantly, that the Habermasian ideal speech model leaves 
out of consideration a large number of factors that might seem irrelevant in theory, but 
which do affect communication in practice. One of these factors is the semiotic quality 
of language – one of the basic instruments of communication. Any given language uses 
signs to convey information, but the meaning of these signs will never be stable. It will 
always be relational, and dependent on those who send and those who receive the piece 
of information in question. Even in an undistorted communicative situation, when the 
participants speak the same language (!), are members of the same culture (!), can hear 
and understand one another perfectly, and are physically unrestricted in their 
communication, misunderstandings can occur, because of the uncertain relationship 
between what is being said, what is meant to be said and how the message is 
interpreted. Habermas neglects this aspect of the language, supposing that in an ideal 
speech situation, participants will say exactly what they mean, and this will be 
interpreted exactly the intended way by the other parties. Non-verbal communication 
does not appear in his model, either. (Dahlgren 1995: 102–103; see Lukes 1982.) 
Habermas also downplays the importance of the human psyche. He neglects the 
arational or irrational modes of communication, even though in practice it seems 
possible to achieve intersubjectivity (mutual understanding) through these modes of 
discourse as well. He is also accused of the "linguisticization of the unconscious," i. e. 
that he seems to forget about the Freudian unconscious or even physiological – bodily – 
drives such as hunger or sexual desire. "Television and other manifestations of our 
mass-mediated semiotic environment largely sidestep communicative rationality and 
employ other discursive modes, but we would […] understand how, if our analytic tools 
were grounded on Habermas' notion of the unconscious," writes Dahlgren (1995: 106). 
 
Finally, considering that the subject of this paper is the internet, a peculiarly interesting 
strand of critique refers to the physical setting of Habermas' model of communication: 
notably that it concerns direct, face-to-face communication, where participants can 
immediately reflect on one another's claims, or ask for clarification. This is not how 
texts delivered by the mass media are consumed, which might not seem that big a 
problem, because it is not in the primary consumption of texts, but in the discussion that 
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follows afterwards, that communicative action can manifest itself (through rational, 
critical debate over the piece of media text). But here the internet presents a problem, 
for it is a space where it is perfectly possible to discuss texts of the media using the very 
same discursive methods as the ones used for the consumption of the texts: for example, 
one can read an article in an on-line magazine and immediately add their own 
comments, which will become part of the original article. The theory of communicative 
action might prove too theoretical to tackle situations like this. 
 
2.5.1 Key features of modernity 
There is also a line of criticism that is tied to the changing – practical – circumstances of 
the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century – that is, with the changing settings 
of modernity. (Arguably, these arguments or settings are not entirely "new," but they 
were given weight by the technological inventions of the 20th and 21st century.) 
Habermas starts from the basis that the "unfulfilled project" of the Enlightenment can be 
finished: with rationality, reason, innovation and progress is possible, and this progress 
will eventually lead to the realization of freedom, equality, justice and comfort all across 
(in solidarity, fraternity with) the society. His stance is that of modernity, but the modern 
paradigm might not be able to accommodate (describe or explain) the changes that have 
been taking place in the past few decades at an immense speed. Dahlgren (1995) and 
Lash (2002) sum up in similar ways these changes of "late modernity." 
According to Dahlgren (1995: 80), the three key features of late modernity are the 
pluralization of microsocial worlds and identities, the disembedding of social 
relations, and the mediazation of the semiotic environment.  
Lash on the other hand emphasizes the importance of technology in the condition of late 
Western modernity: in his understanding, the modern way of life is decidedly 
technological in that people "cannot achieve sociality in the absence of 
technological systems" (Lash 2002: 15–16). The changes described both by him and 
Dahlgren point in the same direction: towards a growing variety and uncertainty of 
social relations, as well as the growing importance and the ever faster change of 
communication. These conditions of the late modernity fit perfectly into post-modern 
theories, too (notably, post-modernity does not "follow" modernity in a way that we 
could say modernity is over; these two paradigms exists parallel to one another). 
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Post-modern theoreticians such as Hartley (1992, 1996) or Fraser (1992) suggest that 
the idea of a single public sphere can no longer be valid in a fragmented, information 
and communication-driven, immensely varied Western world – partly because this also 
incorporates social groups that function following non-Western norms, standards, 
customs and cultures. The post-modern argument proposes that communication is not 
always possible among various public spheres, because these might be situated in 
completely different settings and using completely different frames of reference – and 
this is where they oppose the theory of the communicative action, which supposes that 
there is an inherent rationality in every speech act, and that rational reasoning could 
bridge the gap between any given intelligent participants of a social interaction. 
Fraser (1992: 123) introduced the concept of "subaltern counterpublics:" these are 
alternative discursive spheres where members of various alternative publics discuss 
issues they are concerned about. The existence of such counterpublics implies that there 
is no single "common interest" of the population; the only interest that could be 
formulated is that of justice and equality: all of the common interests that are hammered 
out in the various different public spheres should be given weight in political decisions, 
otherwise political domination cannot be legitimate. Subaltern counterpublics are also 
important because it is in their respective public spheres that alternative groups can 
maintain and cultivate their identities (for it is in relation to others, that concepts of 
identity and alterity gain their meaning). (Fraser 1992, 1995.) 
However, the post-modern view, to some extent, can indeed be reconciled with that of 
Habermas – see chapter 2.3. 
 
2.5.2 A side-note on the Madisonian concept of democracy 
If we accept the Habermasian understanding of public sphere, and the theoretical (if 
utopistic) possibility of an ideal, unobstructed version of this sphere, we might be 
tempted to say that more information is always better than less information, and more 
contact between the parties involved in discussion is always better than less contact. Of 
course the underlying hypothesis of this paper already implies otherwise: more 
information is potentially better, but this potential is only realized if the pieces of 
information in question meet certain criteria, concerning availability, credibility, 
accuracy, validity, usefulness etc. But if these conditions are right, then it is not within 
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the concept of the internet as a huge noticeboard14, that the problem is. 
But it is worth mentioning the so-called Madisonian concept of democracy15, for it is 
even more critical towards the beneficial effects of more available information; and it is 
critical to them in ways completely different from those of Habermas. For Madison, the 
biggest enemy of a well-established, representative democracy is the formation of 
"factions" within the supposedly democratic representative bodies of the people, along 
minority interests. The birth of factions can be tackled by an appropriate design of the 
deliberative institutions. In the Madisonian model, deficiencies in our capabilities of 
communication might be beneficial, because they hinder the reconciliation of interests 
outside the framework of the official design, supposed to safeguard the impartiality of 
the institution. (Applbaum 2002: 26–27).  
And from this point of view, the internet is rather a curse than a blessing, even if it has 
built-in "checking mechanisms" (Thompson 2002: 34). "The Internet [sic] does not 
shrink the number of interests, but precisely those aspects of interactive communication 
that thrill the direct democrats make the identification and organization of factious 
majorities more likely" (Applbaum 2002: 27). When evaluating the discursive potential 
of the internet, it is useful to keep in mind these reservations. 
 
2.6 Habermas and the public sphere – a short summary 
Habermas' theories about the public sphere, as presented in his works (Habermas 1987, 
1989, 2004), can be summed up as follows. 
The bourgeois public sphere was the first ever historical example of the actualization of 
the emancipatory potential of communicative action. The bourgeois public sphere could, 
for the first time in history, produce a discursively formulated common opinion, 
reflecting the best interests of the citizens. Referring to these interests, the public sphere 
could legitimate political domination in the first democracies. It also illustrated that 
democracies cannot exist without a discursive public. However, the bourgeois public 
sphere was also erroneous in being limited, restrictive and exclusive. 
The public sphere today is / has been refeudalized, turning once again into an empty 
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  For this metaphor credit is due to my supervisor Tarmo Malmberg. 
15
  After James Madison, fourth president of the United States and a key figure behind its constitution. 
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public sphere of representation. There is an increasing distance between spheres of 
power and spheres of private life, therefore the common best interest of the citizens is 
increasingly neglected, and the formulation of a meaningful public opinion is hindered. 
This process can be seen as the increasing domination of the non-reflective, efficiency-
oriented logic of the economic and political system, over the communicatively 
organized, potentially rational (and thus egalitarian) lifeworld. However, new social 
movements are trying to counter the colonization of the lifeworld by the system. 
The interactional part of the public sphere (in other words, where public sphere happens 
in practice) is the civil society. Permeating both the civil society and all the other social 
spaces is the mass media, which represents an inequality in information, but the effects 
of which on public sphere are uncertain, ambivalent. 
In the previous part of the thesis I outlined certain strands of criticism against 
Habermas. In spite of the arguable deficiencies of his original model, in this thesis I still 
plan to take advantage of his original, institutionalist approach, because of its implied 
model of discursively created (or "soft") power. However, I am to take into 
consideration the criticism offered especially by Dahlgren and Lash (who describe 
changing and more and more apparent circumstances of late modernity that propose 
uncertainty and possible new configurations for social relations), and by Applbaum and 
Thompson, who point out the differences in approach between the Habermasian and 
Madisonian concept of democracy. 
 
2.7 Culture industry – theory and critique 
The theory of the culture industry has been developed by Theodore Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, two philosophers that escaped the Nazi Germany for being persecuted 
because of their Jewish origin. It was most probably the booming capitalism and 
increased capitalization of the entertainment industry of the United States that inspired 
their ideas; main arguments of their original theory can be summed up as follows (all 
references to Adorno and Horkheimer 1999): 
Culture – under the umbrella term "entertainment" – has become a line of business. This 
fact has even become its own ideology, as if it offered an excuse for "the rubbish [it] 
deliberately produces." The operations of this particular line of business are tied to 
economies of scale (it is profitable to employ technologies of mass production, and 
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cater for the largest audience possible, instead of producing smaller amounts of products 
that are possibly better crafted). Culture has also become tied to, and reliant on, other 
industries, such as the electricity industry or banking and finance. 
The culture industry looks at audiences in a simplifying way. The masses are 
categorized according to a few basic characteristics (such as age and gender), and these 
audience groups are then treated as homogeneous: each of these groups demonstrates a 
largely similar taste in culture. These different tastes can be satisfied by following the 
rulebook of various well-established styles. In order to avoid risks, texts do follow these 
rules blindly; therefore in the end all of the cultural products resemble one another, with 
apparent features by which the audiences can easily identify which style or genre they 
represent: there are "kids' movies," "detective stories" and "love stories," for example, 
and each of these cater for a different group of audience, following the slight variations 
of a basic stylistic concept. Parts of the texts are interchangeable; one unimportant detail 
is often magnified in order to act as an "original" or "distinctive" feature: such detail 
could be the hair style of a star, or a catchphrase of a character; these superficial 
differences do not affect the basic similarity of the structure and themes of the texts. 
Culture industry affects an increasing part of everyday life, and thanks to technological 
development (note that the theory was originally published in the mid-forties, and 
consider how much technology has developed since then!), there is an increasing, 
seamless convergence between real life and cultural texts. This is how the cultural 
industry promises an "escape from the drudgery" of everyday life, and then it 
continuously cheats us of this promise. Satisfaction gained by the consumption of the 
products of cultural industry is always temporary and illusory, because the industry 
needs customers that are always hungry for new (of the same). 
 
The theory of the culture industry must influenced Habermas when he conceptualized 
the contemporary public sphere as the public sphere of advertising: he is speaking of a 
"dumbing down" of products of the culture industry, so as they are easily accessed by 
the biggest possible audiences. "Mass culture [...] achieves increased sales by adapting 
to the need for relaxation and entertainment on the part of consumer strata with 
relatively little education, rather than through guidance of an enlarged public towards 
the appreciation of a culture undamaged in its substance" (Habermas 1989: 165). 
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However, he also noted how the capitalization of culture helped the access to valuable, 
deep, substantial works: "Through paperback series printed in large editions, a relatively 
small stratum of readers educated or ready to be educated [...] have high quality 
literature made available to them" (Habermas 1989: 166–167). 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer  – members of the Frankfurt School – followed the ideology of 
what in hindsight is labelled as "Western Marxism"; a theoretical complex trying to 
revise marxism, and offer an alternative interpretation to it (Anderson 1984: 25). 
While they critically revised Marxism, they remained critical to capitalism, too, which 
is one of the underlying straits of thought of their essay – originally having appeared as 
part of the volume Dialectic of Enlightenment. According to Anderson, the basic 
argument of Dialectic... "effectively equated North American liberalism and German 
fascism" (1984: 34). In any case, Adorno's concept of art, a key topic of his studies, 
might help better understanding his arguments against the culture industry. 
In Adorno's understanding – and in my rather simplified presentation –, autonomous art 
is the sphere in which internal tensions and contradictions of a society as a whole are 
reflected upon. This, however, can only be done if the work of art in itself has no 
primary social function, because art can only point out the said tensions and 
contradictions if it stays outside of society: "There is nothing in art that's directly social. 
[...] If any social function can be ascribed to art at all, it is the function to have no 
function" (Adorno 1972: 322). Autonomous art must signal that it is something strange, 
something special, something out of the ordinary: 
One decisive reason why art works, at least those that refuse to surrender to 
propaganda, are lacking in social impact is that they have to give up the use 
of those communicative means that would make them palatable to a larger 
public. If they do not, they become pawns in the all-encompassing system of 
communication. (Adorno 1972: 344.) 
 
The scornful attitude towards "communication" is telling, and points to a key difference 
of thought between Habermas (belonging to the second generation of the Frankfurt 
School) and his mentors. Adorno and Horkheimer represented a view in which everyday 
communication cannot have an emancipatory or legitimizing role in modern society, 
because various public uses of the language – as in news journalism – degraded it and 
"deprived it of faculties capable of giving expression to personal experience" 
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(Malmberg 2006: 7)16. Instead of everyday communication, then, it is through art that is 
an "avenue through which freedom could speak" (Malmberg 2006: 7). 
According to Adorno, the appreciation of art requires a cognitive faculty; to understand 
the contradictions it presents, and to realize that the resolution of these contradictions 
must bring about changing society itself (and changing it for the better). The Freudian 
interpretation of art, or the "disinterested pleasure" thesis of Kant, or the theory of 
sensual pleasure and pain – these ideas, according to Adorno, are limited, restricted in 
their understanding what art is (Adorno 1972: 6–22). And this, importantly, draws a 
dividing line between art and entertainment. 
Entertainment cannot produce autonomous art: "[t]he autonomy of works of art […] is 
tendentially eliminated by the culture industry" (Adorno 2001: 99). In fact, 
entertainment has nothing to do with art at all, even though the two are presented as 
synonyms by the culture industry. What is important in art is at best secondary in the 
capitalization of the culture industry. Consumers of this industry are not exposed to 
artistically articulated representations of tensions within the society, but to a momentary 
experience of mild amusement: "[t]he culture industry [...] fills empty time with more 
emptiness. It does not even produce false consciousness, but takes great pains to leave 
everything as it is" (Adorno 1972: 348). 
In other words, Adorno and Horkheimer see the capitalization of the culture industry as 
an attack against the only sphere of life capable of addressing the most important 
problems of a society. This explains the vigour with which they phrase their criticism. 
 
Since the 1940's, the basic assumption of the theory of the culture industry have been 
questioned; most notably by a group of French sociologists (cf.  Miège 1987, quoted in 
Hesmondhalgh 2002). In their view, Adorno and Horkheimer followed an 
oversimplified approach in their evaluation of the culture industry (which partly 
stemmed from the fact that they couldn't have possibly experienced culture industry as it 
has continued to develop under the course of years). 
Miège (1989) summarizes the limitations of Adorno's and Horkheimer's models in three 
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 "What is called 'communication' today is the adaptation of spirit to [...] commodity fetishism" (Adorno 
1972: 109). Both in his original theory about the bourgeois public sphere and his ideas about 
communicative action, Habermas presents a markedly different view. 
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key points. First, he claims that Adorno didn't clearly see how much artistic practice 
itself had been changed and transformed by major technological innovations (Miège 
1989: 10). (I don't agree with this line of criticism by Miège. Adorno, especially at the 
time of writing the original essay, could not have been aware of all the possibilities 
improving technology would later provide for artists, but as I understand he had very 
clear ideas about the development, the life, death and changing nature of art itself 
(Adorno 1972: 4–6), and he saw technology as a sphere in which artists were looking 
for new ways to create autonomous art works: "[t]he infiltration by technology into art 
is caused [partly] by the objective situation of art, which is that authoritative art works 
are becoming more and more difficult to bring off successfully" (Adorno 1972: 87).) 
Second, Miège claims that "[r]eference to ‘cultural industry’ in the singular misleads 
one into thinking that we are faced with a unified field, where the various elements 
function within a single process. The phenomena – it is thought – are the same in 
literature, music, painting or in the radio" (Miège 1989: 10). This unified picture might 
fit the ideological, theoretical complex of Western Marxism, but it fails to take into 
account a handful of very important practical factors, stemming from the fact the 
cultural production – just as any other industrial activity – is a complex process, with 
several different variants pertaining to various branches within the industry. 
One way to differentiate between various branches in the culture industry would be to 
examine which one of the three contradicting commercial logics they follow. This could 
be the logic of publishing (concerning books, records and films, and other lines of 
business where customers buy the "right of enjoyment" of isolated, individual works), 
the logic of flow (concerning radio and TV, and lines of business in general where 
producers create content so as to build an audience and profit from advertising), and 
lastly the logic of the written press (which can be seen as a combination of the first two 
logics). (Miège 1989: 146–148.) 
Adorno himself was aware that the use of the term "culture industry" might be 
misleading, hence he suggested that "[...] the expression 'industry' is not to be taken too 
literally. It refers to the standardization of the thing itself – such as that of the Western, 
familiar to every movie-goer – and to the rationalization of distribution techniques," but 
"individual forms of production are nevertheless maintained" (Adorno 2001: 100–101). 
There is a difference of scale between the approaches of Miège and Adorno; the latter 
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describes the situation of the entertainment industry by a model rooted in philosophy, 
attacking the values and principles along which this industry works: it might very well 
be that there are different "logics" at work, but they all follow the idea of capitalization, 
and they all are against autonomous art. 
 
Finally, according to Miège, the third main deficiency of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s 
theory is that they expressed "greater interest in markets and in commodities than in the 
industry" – i.e. they reduced it to its technological components and methods of mass 
production, and in doing so, they failed to understand the limitations of the 
capitalization process of the culture industry (Miège 1989: 11). In other words, 
capitalization is not an unstoppable or infallible process, and thus it wouldn’t possibly 
be able to abolish or completely degenerate autonomous art. This is finally a point of 
criticism where the pro and contra arguments stand on the same ground; as Adorno 
noted in 1975, there was no scientific evidence that could have proven beyond doubt the 
detrimental effects of the culture industry on society, but "it can be assumed without 
hesitation that steady drops hollow the stone, especially since the system of the culture 
industry […] tolerates hardly any deviation" (Adorno 2001: 105). 
 
Further criticism concerns the practical contradictions that surface when the 
philosophical approach of Horkheimer and Adorno is translated into the language of 
cultural studies. Longhurst (1996: 11), for example, examines the actual production 
process of a commodified piece of culture, and points out that even if the "functional" 
part of the cultural product can be mass produced, this does not necessarily mean that 
the "textual" part of it can also be mass produced (e.g. vinyl or plastic discs can be 
mass-produced, but the music that they carry on themselves, cannot17). 
Critiques of the original theory also hold that the industrialization of culture also 
resulted in "exciting new directions and innovations" (Hesmondhalgh 2002: 15, see also 
Longhurst 1996: 12). Genres have become fragmented into an extensive array of sub-
genres (saying that The Who represents, under the folder "rock," the same music as 
Nirvana would be an oversimplification), and the development of technology made the 
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 Even if there are tentative steps in this direction, see The Economist (2006). 
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production of altogether new types of cultural products possible (cf. Miège 1989: 10). 
In addition, critiques of Adorno's and Horkheimer's original theory have opposed the 
view that audiences would consist of brainless masses, who can forever be fooled by the 
culture industry with shallow, meaningless cultural products. Even if the culture 
industry might try to do so, cultural markets are the place of a continuous struggle, and 
the relationship between producers and customers in this industry is at best ambivalent 
(Hesmondhalgh 2002: 16–17). 
In summary, a critical review of Adorno's and Horkheimer's theory sees the term 
"culture industries" (in the plural) more suitable than "culture industry" (in the singular), 
because the phenomena that it refers to are complex, ambivalent and contested. Culture 
industries today cannot be described simply by deploring everything they produce as 
output, as it also would be a mistake to suppose a general, overarching, all-
encompassing ideology behind every single aspect of these industries, serving but one 
purpose: capitalist domination. 
This of course does not mean that capitalist domination could not be one of the 
purposes, should one suppose that the culture industry is a single entity following the 
business interests of a “power elite.” For sure, industries involved in the production of 
cultural products seem to be capable of helping the discursive construction of 
legitimizing, soft power. According to Chouliaraki, this happens on two levels. 
First, she claims that all political speech acts are also part of the culture industry: 
"political discourse, even when it is formulated as a parliamentary address, is 
reflexively (though not necessarily consciously) designed in ways that appeal to broader 
contexts and audiences" (Chouliaraki 2007: 3). Political discourse anticipates its 
dissemination in the media. 
But, second, it is perhaps even more important how politics uses primarily cultural 
products – products of the entertainment industry! –, because "[t]he most effective work 
of legitimisation takes place through leisure and seemingly innocent entertainment" 
(Chouliaraki 2007: 4). Graham and Luke cite the example of 1986 action movie Top 
Gun as having "prepared the American people for the Gulf War" (2007: 28), while 
Machin and van Leeuwen (2007) suggest that Ridley Scott’s 2001 movie Black Hawk 
Down, and the computer game of the same title, was used for similar purposes, helping 
the legitimization of both past and future instants of American military intervention. 
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This leads us to two strands of questions to be asked about the internet and its effect on 
the cultural public sphere. The first strand concerns the technological possibilities the 
‘net offers in the creation and dissemination of cultural products, and the second line of 
inquiry should deal with the possibility of the internet contributing to the discursive 
creation of power and disguising it as (high) culture or (popular) entertainment. 
This approach differs from the one followed by Adorno and Horkheimer. My findings 
will neither confirm nor refute their claims, because these latter are strongly tied to a 
Western Marxist approach in the background, and to the concept of autonomous art as 
an emancipatory force in the foreground. Their claims should be tried and tested in an 
analysis focusing on the nature and quality of modern art, or the effects on this quality 
by capitalized culture industry. But such an aesthetic analysis I cannot undertake to 
attempt in this paper.
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3 Conceptualizing the internet 
 
That Habermas (2006: 9) downplays the importance of the internet in redemocratizing 
the public sphere is shown in the way he addressed the question in a footnote attached 
to his keynote speech at the ICA conference. In the speech itself, he examined the 
normative theory of deliberative democracy and a model of public sphere in it, in which 
model he attributed a key role to the mass media, and especially the national quality 
newspapers, which would serve as pillars of opinion formation in the public sphere. In 
contrast, the only positive development he attributes to the internet is that of 
undermining the censorship of authoritative regimes. 
In the context of liberal regimes, however, the online debates of web users 
tend instead to lead to the fragmentation of large mass audiences into a 
huge number of isolated issue publics. The rise of millions of fragmented 
chat-rooms across the world endangers only political communication within 
established public spheres, when news groups crystallize around the focal 
points of print media, e.g., national newspapers and magazines, which are 
the pillars of national public spheres. (Habermas 2006: 9, emphasis added.) 
 
Habermas (2006: 9) goes so far as saying that online communication had a "parasitic" 
role insofar as it could only exist feeding upon the traditional media institution. But 
"grassroots" online communication cannot significantly alter the discourse that is 
created by media professionals; it might help a larger number of opinions to come to 
daylight but it cannot decide which issues are relevant and how these issues are framed. 
 
This view of Habermas was criticized e.g. by Bruns, an advocate of online 
communicative cooperation. Bruns (2007) claims that the example Habermas uses to 
illustrate the insignificance of online communities is misleading. In his view, there are 
"many citizen news and commentary projects which can […] be identified all over the 
web" (Bruns 2007), that sprung to life independent of the mainstream media. 
Addressing the issue of the fragmentation of the public sphere, Bruns underlines the 
internet’s inherent ability to connect different discussion groups, blogs or any other 
homepage via the use of hyperlinks. "To speak of [online audiences] as fragmented and 
isolated ignores or rejects the reality that especially online, individual publics are 
multiply connected both implicitly through shared membership and explicitly through  a 
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network of hyperlinks connecting postings right across the boundaries of individual 
fora" (Bruns 2007). In his view, an egalitarian decentralization of access does not 
necessarily fragment debates, because there are effective quality control mechanisms 
built in the online discussion forums. Information overload has not arrived: "as 
networked information has grown, so have the tools available for making sense of it" 
(Bruns 2007). 
The pessimism of Habermas and the enthusiasm of Bruns provide some kind of a 
background to the analytical part of this thesis. I will examine certain services of the 
internet in trying to produce evidence either in Habermas’ or Bruns’ favour. In order to 
do so, first I will attempt to conceptualize the internet from various points of view, so as 
to clarify which questions I should ask in the first place. 
 
The internet is, on one hand, just a bunch of 1s and 0s running around in pieces of wire 
and on microwaves in the ether; on the other hand, of course, something way more 
complex. It could be described from numerous points of view, and I chose Dahlgren's 
analytical topology (1995: 11–23; the topology synthesizes ideas by Garnham (1992), 
Peters (1993), Fraser (1992) and Thompson (1990) among others)), to provide a useful 
and multi-faceted, structured description of the internet, this global computer network. 
In this approach, any given public sphere can be examined along four dimensions: 
media institutions, media representation, social structures and sociocultural interaction. 
What these dimensions refer to can best be explained by four sets of questions. These 
questions, in their original use, refer to the public sphere as such, not the internet, but I 
find it useful to also adapt them to the internet specifically, not the least because this 
way we might get a better understanding of what the internet, from the sociological 
point of view, is, and what it is not. The four sets of questions are as follows: 
 
1. What institutions belong to the media, and what does their organization, 
financing, regulation look like? Of special importance in the case of the internet: 
is the internet a media institution at all? And who owns the internet? 
2. What is represented in various media and how? What kind of information or 
knowledge is to be found on the internet, provided that the internet is in fact part 
of the media? 
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3. What is the social structure of the public sphere – where, in which social 
institutions does it exist (or happen)? Is it centralized, or are there multiple, but 
equally important public spheres? Is there coherence, a "goodness of fit" 
between the public sphere(s) and the political entities that they might influence? 
4. How does public sphere, in the communication of its members, come to being? 
How does it happen, what are the peculiarities of the interactions that are part of 
the public sphere, and how are they different from interactions that are not part 
of the public sphere (if such a question makes sense at all)? 
 
This last question, enquiring into the features of the sociocultural interaction within the 
public sphere, can further be broken down into three areas of analytical concern: these 
are the discursive, spatial and communal dimensions of interaction. 
The discursive dimension refers to what people are talking about when they interact in 
the public sphere, the spatial dimension of interaction registers where and how people 
meet when they interact. The communal dimension of social interactions refers to the 
"nature of social bonds between citizens." I will examine these dimensions one by one. 
 
3.1 The internet as media institution – the internet as business 
Is the internet a media institution?  If it is, should not the telephone be considered as 
media, too? After all, the telephone is also a device that makes the exchange of 
information possible between parties that are physically far away from one another... 
Clearly there is something wrong with the telephone analogy: the internet by today 
came to mean much more than just the connection between computers; it is a very 
complex package of services, of which the multimedia pages of the world wide web are 
just one example. But even if it was not so, the internet could not be compared to the 
telephone networks because unlike these latter, the internet can be used as a device of 
mass communication, too. 
Therefore, yes, the internet is media in the sense that it is a "transmitter of meanings" 
between an addresser and an addressee (Hartley 1996: 3). 
On the other hand, the internet would still exist and fulfil an important task if no 
messages were transmitted on it, just as smaller computer networks can function, 
allowing computers to share their resources such as storage or computing capacity. And 
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even when it acts as a transmitter of messages, it is significantly different from other, 
traditional media. In the case of the press, the television and the radio, the basic 
technology seems much more intertwined with the message and the use of the appliance 
itself: there are in fact very limited uses of a TV set or a radio appliance (disregarding 
the extreme cases when they act as, say, a stand for a vase or a piece of art), but the 
ways people can use the internet are numerous. Some of these uses involve the role of a 
clear "producer" of texts, just like in the case of traditional media, but some do not: for 
example, one could use the internet solely for the purpose of e-mail. If we look at the 
internet from the point of usability, it is media and non-media at the same time. 
We get to the same conclusion if we look at the internet from the point of view of 
Nieminen's theory of hegemony (2000: 126). Although the internet might not "act as an 
instrument in competition between different elite groups," and it is certainly not "part of 
this competition itself, pursuing the interests of […] the media elite," because it is not 
owned by such an elite, but it does "provide the public a more or less pluralistic view of 
society, reflecting differing interests and rendering items for identification for different 
social and political groups." Put shortly, the internet does represent some of the qualities 
of whatever media is, and it seems to have shed others. 
It is this ambiguous nature that would explain the term "new media," as sometimes used 
in reference to the internet. In any case, I think it's important to understand that the 
ambivalence concerning the internet stems partly from an ambivalence of definitions: 
while the term internet originally only referred to the actual physical components of the 
network, nowadays it is used (also in this paper!) as a synonym for all the services that 
became available on the network. If we speak of the network itself, it cannot be media 
any more than a piece of telephone wire, but if we speak of the services, then the 
internet can indeed act as a media (and it also can have other uses). 
In any case, along the lines of Dahlgren’s first dimension of analysis, the following 
question could be asked: is the examined service of the internet part of a commercial 
or public service media institution? If so, which parties have a vested interest in 
running the service in question? 
With reference to Habermas’ (2006: 9) argument, it must also be examined to what 
extent particular online services rely "parasitically" on traditional media in their 
discussion and setting of agendas. 
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3.1.1 Common and advocacy domains of the media 
As I noted under chapter 1.2, I try in this paper not to take a stand in the modern vs 
post-modern debate, but merely describe in what ways the internet changes public 
discourse, and what this possibly means for the existence of public spheres, in the light 
of various theories. This is in fact a similar attitude to the one by Dahlgren, who 
proposes the theory of the common / advocacy domains of the media not as solution to 
the modern – post-modern discussion, but a model that could be applied in the practical 
circumstances of our (Western) everyday lives. 
Dahlgren (1995: 155–159) underlines the importance of media in contemporary 
societies (cf. the trend of mediazation in late modernity).  The media is a line of 
business, and it has to face technological barriers that prevent interactivity or effective 
feedback from the part of media consumers18. This leads to a problem: "those media 
institutions which are of most significance for the majority of citizens are […] to a great 
extent beyond the reach of citizen practices and interventions. That is the rub: this 
duality is a central source of tension within the public sphere" (Dahlgren 1995: 155). 
One way of improving this would be to conceptualize the media as consisting of 
common and advocacy domains. The common domain is "where we find for the most 
part the dominant media, which ideally provide information, debate and opinion for all 
members of society," in an impartial and considerate way (mindful of the difference in 
interests of various social groups). It is also in the common domain that citizens can 
cultivate their common identity of being fellow citizens, members of the democracy. 
Reiterating a thought of Garnham, Dahlgren underlines that "[a]n important criterion 
and assumption here is the relative goodness of fit between the geographic boundaries 
of political entities and the reach of the media to which they correspond" (Dahlgren 
1995: 156). This idea, as I will present it later, might just be the key to explain the 
inability of the internet to actualize its democratizing potential. 
The advocacy domain, on the other hand, would be "the setting for all citizens who wish 
to pursue special interests, and generate group-based cultural and political 
interpretations of society." It would consists of "time and space made available within 
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 Economies of scale prevent media companies from providing personal messages and considering the 
opinion of every single media consumer in their broadcast – in the case of conventional media, that is. 
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the dominant media" as well as "of a plurality of smaller 'civic media' from political 
parties, interest groups, movements, organizations and networks," and it would provide 
a communicational channel to alternative public spheres – subaltern counterpublics – to 
cultivate their internal discussion and, importantly, to bridge the gap between different 
public spheres. "The net result would be […] multiperspective journalism, which would 
help counter the prevailing understanding that there is only one version of what 
constitutes truth or reality and only one way to talk about it." (Dahlgren 1995: 156.) 
Dahlgren also notes that "the advocacy status of civic media means that they will be 
portraying the world in ways which may differ from the canons of professional 
journalism" (1995: 159), and when we think of, say, blogs, we might be tempted to see 
the internet already as the real advocacy domain within media – it is certainly a question 
worth looking into: if the internet can, from certain points of view, be seen as part of the 
media, can it also be the scene of an advocacy domain of the media? 
 
3.1.2 Questions of censorship and regulation 
One aspect of the legal regulation of the internet is the complexity involved in this 
endeavour: the internet spans over borders, and therefore presents a situation for which 
the law of nation states seems outdated. Nation states cannot effectively control the 
internet (unless they decide not to allow it at all or to block its physical infrastructure), 
but there is no trans-national institution or organization that could enforce global laws 
over it. (That is to say, if such global laws could, in theory, be drafted.) In this thesis, I 
only plan to brush upon the subject of law, partly because of the complexity of the issue, 
partly because of my severely limited competence in legal matters. 
Another aspect however, that I will examine, is the emancipatory potential of the 
internet, in states where the real-life public sphere has to tackle censorship. 
 
3.2 The dimension of media representation 
Following Dahlgren's topology, the second dimension public spheres could be measured 
by is that of media representation. If we established that the internet is potentially a 
media institution, we can also ask what and how is represented on the internet, what 
kind of information, knowledge is to be found there? 
It is probably impossible to give even just an approximative account of the content that 
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is provided on the internet; the inevitable trend seems to be that "if you can't find 
information about it on the internet, it doesn't exist" (and yet again I'd like to draw 
attention to the Western-embeddedness of this point of view, as mentioned in chapter 
1.4). Precisely because it is so easy to become a producer of content on the internet, 
either in a "casual" way (i. e. taking part in discussion forums or wikis) or 
"institutionally" (i. e. running a website or providing content in another regular and 
structured way), it is not surprising that information is to be uploaded to the net about an 
ever increasing part of the "real life" (inverted commas due to the fact that there are 
phenomena that are 'real' only on the internet but cannot exist in what is usually termed 
real life). 
Importantly, some of this huge and constantly changing mass of information is made up 
of advertising. And sometimes it is not clear at all whether or not a piece of content on 
the internet is actually advertising, or something else. The internet is about possibilities 
and breaking down barriers: texts can easily serve purposes of advertising and 
entertainment, or advertising and education at the same time. (See Currie 2007.) 
Similarly, the dividing line between fact and opinion is easily blurred on the internet. 
Not necessarily in the case of the on-line representation of conventional media (e.g. the 
homepage of a newspaper or a television company), but in the case of the works of self-
appointed journalists, who are not necessarily forced by any set of conventions, rules or 
obligations that bound media professionals. 
In connection to this, there is also a certain degree of uncertainty considering the 
reliability of information found on the internet. The precise source of an information 
might be unknown, either in the sense that it is completely unknown, or in the sense that 
the internet identity of the source can be traced (as in a discussion forum, it is obvious 
who (and at exactly what time!) said something), but the internet identity gives to us no 
clue about the "real-life" identity of the person who provided the piece of information in 
question. (Naturally, it might be that even the if the real-life identity of the author of a 
certain text is known, it conveys no information about the reliability of the text, should 
that particular author be unknown to the reader.) With such uncertain identities, it might 
prove more difficult to decide whether or not a source can be trusted than in real life, 
and in communication situations taking place outside the internet. 
The three trends that could, in my view, sum up the topic of what is available on the 
 44 
internet are: abundance, uncertainty and, indeed, democracy, in the sense that every 
user is a potential content-creator on the internet (and this also means that the CEO or 
PR-manager of a company can pretend to speak as an ordinary Tom, Dick or Harry, 
about (for? against?) their own company). 
 
As for the how-part of the question of representation, again, we have to face a sphere of 
numerous possibilities. "Texts" on the internet might just mean texts – series of words, 
received either in the form of an on-line chat, an e-mail, or in a more structured way, 
but, as mentioned earlier, broadband technologies enable to convey messages in audio 
or in video format too. Modes of representation can vary from service to service, and 
this is why I will examine this question in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
3.3 Social structures on the internet – "globality and goodness of fit" 
Examining the role of social structures in the use of the internet, it testifies yet again of 
a democratizing potential. The internet is decentralized and in theory provides a 
communication channel that is available to everyone with a minimal computer literacy, 
regardless (again, in theory!) of their whereabouts or nationalities. Thanks to continuous 
innovation, the technology that is needed to establish computer networks is becoming 
cheaper and cheaper, therefore barriers to entry are becoming lower and lower. 
Naturally, here comes a big "but:" that in the Western world access to the internet is 
becoming an everyday commodity is positive development, but in large parts of the 
world and especially in developing countries, the situation is markedly different. This 
poses the danger that when we talk about a "global" public sphere, we in fact mean a 
"Western" public sphere, forgetting economically less prosperous and thereby politically 
and from a military point of view "insignificant" countries. (See also chapter 4.) 
 
The internet also provides anonymity to its users, and even more than that: free-to-
choose identities, or at least roles. Using the internet is the most private and most public 
experience at the same time: it is public by definition (the very point of the internet is 
interacting with others, even if indirectly, through leaving and retrieving messages), but 
it is also deeply private, because the self can remain invisible to everyone else on the 
internet. One can take on as many and as detailed disguises – if not identities – as they 
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want; and there are few limitations that have to be observed when deciding what to do 
or where to go inside the cyberspace (bar limitations tied to either legal regulations 
(such as censorship), or to the business interests of other parties (i. e. some areas of the 
internet are of restricted access, and available only in exchange of a fee). 
But this free-to-choose identity might, in my view, also act to the detriment of the public 
sphere. This is because this practice gets rid (or at least it could try to get rid) of a very 
important factor in every occasion of real-life social interaction: consequences. It is hard 
to hold someone accountable for what they said (or did) if acts of speech (or just any 
other act) are tied only to fictious identities. Surely, this might be positive: the internet 
can be used to establish an alternative to freedom of speech, should there be censorship 
active outside the cyberspace (this topic explored further in chapter 5.4).  
But the evasion of consequences can also serve the interests of those who, willingly or 
unwillingly, act to the detriment of reasoned critical discussion. It is just as easy to 
spread misinformation on the internet as it is to take part in a constructive discourse. All 
sorts of personal motives could incite users to obstruct debate, make false claims or 
promote ideologies of questionable ethics, and one can "get away with it" easily, hiding 
under the imaginary identity that is only made up of a user name and an e-mail address. 
However, this is but one possibility, and to suppose that willing or accidental crooks can 
subvert the operations of public spheres is to suppose that either the majority of internet 
users are malevolent or at least ignorant (which I don't believe), or that the majority of 
internet users are dumb (which I don't believe either). But there is another aspect of 
"consequences," which brings us back to Garnham's crucial point: 
the problem is to construct systems of democratic accountability integrated 
with media systems of matching scale that occupy the same social space as 
that over which economic or political decisions will be made. If the impact 
is universal, then both the political and media systems must be universal. 
(Garnham 1992: 371.) 
 
In other words, there must be a "goodness of fit" between the public sphere(s) and the 
political entities that they influence – otherwise there will be no meaningful 
consequences of the activities of the public sphere. Or to put it another way: the 
discursive power of a public sphere can only be translated into political power in an 
institution that has the same (or larger) scope of authority as the scale of the discussion. 
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Already on the national level, this goodness of fit might be slightly damaged, as 
everyone can take part in on-line discussions about internal affairs of a nation, 
regardless of whether they are actually citizens (or residents) of the nation state in 
question, or foreigners who merely speak the language of discussion and have an 
opinion about the matter. (Naturally, this gap between those who are affected and those 
who can have a say in the matters might also lead to positive consequences.) But when 
we think of a possible global public sphere, we immediately bump into a bit of a 
problem: at the moment, there are very few (dare I say: none) global political 
institutions that could act as an executive mechanism to the common opinion 
crystallized in the global public sphere. 
That certain aspects of civil society can "go global" is proven by the example of NGOs 
such as Greenpeace; but these NGOs cannot be seen as equivalent to a powerful global 
institution that could adapt its policies to the interests of the "global citizens." 
As Habermas says: "The political public sphere can fulfil its function of [...] thematizing 
encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the communication 
taking place among those who are potentially affected" (Habermas 2004: 365). 
Tomlinson (1994, quoted in Dahlgren 1995) established a more practical point of view, 
taking into careful consideration that it is, in practice, not always so easy to decide who 
is actually "potentially affected," and who is not. He also reflected on the differences in 
the experience of the sociocultural interaction: talking face-to-face with a friend is a 
different experience from talking with him on the phone, and again it is entirely 
different from seeing a televised speech of an important person of another country. The 
internet offers various new, other ways to experience interaction with a participant (or 
participants) who is (are) at a physically remote location. However, countering Giddens 
(1991, quoted in Dahlgren 1995), who argues that "although everyone lives a local life, 
phenomenological worlds [worlds that we experience through their apparent 
phenomena] for the most part are truly global," Tomlinson proposes a cautious in-
between stance. "Even if the immediate here and now still commands most of our 
attention, the geographically and temporally remote is no longer, by definition, 
irrelevant. The processes of mediation are altering people's cognitive maps, loyalties 
and frames of reference." (Dahlgren 1995: 89–90, summarizing Tomlinson's view.) 
And this, if we turn back to Habermas' idea, might just mean that practically, or at least 
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phenomenologically we might indeed be potentially affected in global issues. After all, 
if we accept that nations are imagined communities, it is just one step further that we 
find the imagined global community, or several imagined global communities which 
include everyone who considers themselves affected (and thus, included). Habermas 
refers to these communities, built around certain causes as "issue publics" (2006: 25). 
 
In colloquial language, this is the phenomenon the catchphrase "think globally, act 
locally" refers to. It suggests that there are issues that are global in the sense that they 
present themselves in some form or another in every nation state. Most of these issues 
rather lie in the territory of the cultural public sphere or in the uncertain area of the 
lifeworld that is devoted to leisure, but indeed there are some at the core of the political 
public sphere: e.g. the idea and respect of human rights, or the question of sustainable 
development and global warming. To expect that the UN, the European Court of Human 
Rights, Amnesty International, Greenpeace or any other international organization 
would create a universal solution for problems akin to these is rather utopian19. And yet 
I think a global discussion, even if happening in an unstructured way, is helpful, because 
it raises awareness of these issues – the first step towards their solution. 
 
In any case, it follows from the argumentation of Garnham (1992), Fraser (1992) and 
Tomlinson (quoted in Dahlgren 1995), that discursive communities can also be formed 
around any number of different causes or particular group interests. Habermas uses the 
term "issue publics" perhaps in a bid to emphasize that these publics are not necessarily 
formed in opposition to a dominating, majority discourse and group identity 
(conversely, Fraser (1992) emphasizes the alternative, oppositional nature of her 
"subaltern counterpublics"). An issue public merely means the totality of people 
interested in a particular problem, which may or may not be part of the "relevant 
discourse" taking place on the "virtual stage" of the national political public sphere. The 
fragmentation of the public sphere into issue publics is, according to Habermas, an 
unwelcome development. However, he adds that the multiplication of these publics 
                                                 
19
 It is most likely that such a universal solution could not be created even if there was an authority that 
could carry out all the practical tasks involved, simply because different nation states – different 
cultures – might prefer different solutions to the problems. 
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might actually act to the benefit of the political public sphere: "[w]hile a larger number 
of people tend to take an interest in a larger number of issues, the overlap of issue 
publics may even serve to counter trends of fragmentation." (Habermas 2006: 24–
25.) 
 
Lash, on the other hand, looks at the problem of globality from another point of view. In 
his theory of flows, in which he tries to "embed the public sphere both within an 
historical milieu and within wider social relations" (Crossley & Roberts 2004: 16), he 
proposes that the global is in fact more important than the local. It is the global flows of 
information, communication, images, money, ideas and technology that have a decisive 
impact on local politics, economics and culture (Lash 2002: 28). He speaks of "the 
erosion of the national 'society'," and the weakening power of nation states: 
"[p]olitically, supra- and sub-national institutions begin to threaten the hegemony of the 
institutions of the nation state" (Lash 2002: 26). On the other hand, in reference to 
Habermas, he also draws attention to the changing nature of institutions. He argues that 
institutions in general will more and more become "small, mobile and flexible 
groupings – sometimes enduring, often easily dissoluble – formed with an intensive 
affective bonding" (Lash 2002: 27). Monstrous bureaucracies are expected to die out, as 
quick and flexible institutions thrive. 
Does it mean, then, that there is a chance for a global public sphere? According to Lash, 
it is more likely that several global public spheres will be spawned (that is, beside the 
ones that are already operating!), as he positions the above mentioned trends as part of 
the postmodernization of societies. 
 
Bohman (2004) takes a different stance: opposing postmodernization, he argues that 
there is an "innovative potential of electronic public space for democracy," but this 
public space could only turn into a real and meaningful public sphere if it is secured 
through matching, innovative institutions. This means that, while the basic theoretical 
concepts of democracy should, in his view, remain unchanged, the practice of 
democracy needs to be altered to fit the global reality of today (and the foreseeable 
future). In other words, Bohman sees procedural (or formal) democracy to be the 
safeguard of also its substantial nature. 
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Finally, the theory of Keohane and Nye (2002: 161–178) explores the possibility of a 
global public sphere from yet another point of view. This theory posits that a global 
public sphere in the classical, Habermasian sense cannot become reality, but in a more 
restricted manner (but not through the cooperation of issue publics!) it does exist. In 
their essay, Keohane and Nye arrive at three conclusive points. 
First, they claim that the so-called "information and communications revolution" will 
not have an equalizing effect on the distribution of power among states, partly because 
strategically important information will not become significantly more easily available 
on the 'net. Second, however, cheap flows of free and commercial20 information have 
already multiplied the number of channels of contact between nation states, thus leaders 
will have more difficulty in maintaining a "coherent ordering of foreign policy issues." 
Third, soft power, the symbolic, discursively constructed, legitimative power becomes 
more important in relation to hard power, than before. (Keohane and Nye 2002: 177.) 
In this theory, the abundance of information is expected to lead to the increase in the 
value of credibility. For Keohane and Nye credibility is "a key resource both for 
governments and NGOs," and "asymmetrical credibility is a key source of [hard] 
power" (2002: 172). This is because credibility is the basis upon which "foreign policy 
occurs," credibility is required in deals on capital markets, and last but not least soft 
power can only be persuasive if it is credible (Keohane and Nye 2002: 172). 
To sum it up: Keohane and Nye exclude the possibility of a "classic" global public 
sphere, but they name credibility – synonymous with the term "reliability" I have used 
so far – as an important factor in international power relations. This falls in line with the 
idea that discursive power can be transformed into hard power. It also means that one 
way of challenging undemocratic rules would be to undermine their credibility – and the 
internet, with the possibility of presenting all sides to stories, by making all sorts of 
"unofficial" sources available, looks quite promising from this point of view. 
 
These theories mostly concern the political public sphere, but we should not forget the 
                                                 
20
 Keohane and Nye distinguish between "free," "commercial" and "strategic" information. "Free 
information is information that actors are willing to create and send without financial compensation 
from the recipient. […] Commercial information is information that actors are willing to create and 
send at a price. […] Strategic information […] confers great advantage on actors only if their 
competitors do not possess it." (Keohane and Nye 2002: 167.) 
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connection between public spheres and the culture industry. The argument of 
consequences loses its importance here, insofar as the possible practical consequences 
of a cultural discourse do not need to be institutional: one can debate over the artistic / 
cultural value of products in the public sphere, or could simply participate in the 
discourse there going on so as to get to know to new, interesting texts, but the uses and 
consumption of these texts hardly ever concerns political institutions (with the notable 
exception of censorship). And the existence of a global cultural public sphere is in line 
with the interests of the global economic sphere, too, because participants of the global 
cultural discourse will inevitably want to get hold of products of the culture industry. 
Here, the internet proposes a different kind of ambivalence. It extends the scope of 
information to a global level, at the same time expanding the cultural horizon of 
whoever is willing to take part in this public sphere. But at the same time (see chapter 
3.2), this might undermine critical activity, building an ever stronger and stronger 
"layman criticism," of which Habermas was already wary in 1962 (Habermas 1989: 
174). This is a development that post-modern theoreticians should rejoice over. 
 
In summary: there are ambivalent signs and trends as far as the possibility of a global 
public sphere is concerned – predictions are risky, because potential developments 
include the changing of such concepts as identity, democracy or group membership. 
This kept in mind, I shall ask also the following questions upon the analysis of 
individual services of the internet: is there, or can there be a "goodness of fit" 
between the service in question and the political institutions this particular service 
might affect? Is the identity or role of users of the service of peculiar interest?  
 
3.4 The internet as sociocultural interaction 
Having examined the internet from some sides now, it is not so surprising to find out 
that it is almost impossible to pinpoint single, apparent and straightforward trends about 
the internet as sociocultural interaction. The internet is consumed in many ways (for in 
spite of the quality of interaction, using the internet is a solitary act of consumption). 
Therefore, to the questions that can be raised following Dahlgren's concept, along the 
three dimensions to measure sociocultural interaction (discursive, spatial and communal 
dimensions), answers can only be given through concrete examples and contexts (this is 
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the task of chapter 5). Having said that, there are some general theoretical issues that are 
worth mentioning here. 
 
3.4.1 The discursive aspect 
As for the discursive dimension (what people are talk about on the internet when they 
talk as users, not as media consumers (although these two categories on the internet 
seem to melt into one another)), user-generated databases, encyclopaedias and 
instruction videos prompt the question: can the internet provide (discursive) 
knowledge21? 
That the internet is a rich warehouse of opinions and a place for discussions is 
unquestionable. On the first look, it seems that it also can provide valuable, in-depth 
knowledge about a large array of topics, and even presented in interesting, innovative 
and interactive ways – for example as video tutorials uploaded to a video sharing site 
such as YouTube22, or as interactive seminars carried out in the virtual university of 
Second Life. But on a second look, so to say, the question of reliability of information 
(touched upon in chapter 3.2) pops up its head. Wikipedia, this user-edited global 
encyclopaedia, is a case in point. It is currently the 9th most popular website of the 
internet (Index 2007), and apparently even the National Security Agency of the USA 
uses it, in the terrifying practice of gaining data from it to establish whether or not a 
certain individual is a terrorist or not... (Fisk 2007.) 
There is much talk nowadays about Web2.023 or the so-called community web – web 
services that are built around user-generated content. Taking advantage of the wisdom 
of the masses might provide you not only with knowledge, but also information on how 
to obtain knowledge – call this meta-information if you like –; i.e. a lot of community 
internet services focus on the idea that the best way to find interesting and important 
content on the internet is through the assistance of others. Hence the basic concept: 
share and rate whatever you find on the network, and thus help organize the information 
on the internet in a democratic, non-profit-driven way (examples of such services are 
                                                 
21
 Yes, this is mostly about Wikipedia. 
22
 Cf. the educative potential of the television (Dahlgren 1995: 57–59). 
23
 At the time of writing this thesis, the search query "Web 2.0" produces about 161 million hits on 
Google. 
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Digg, del.icio.us and StumbleUpon). Naturally, this also prompts the question of 
reliability, although not quite like in the case of Wikipedia or other primary sources of 
information (for a detailed explanation, see chapter 5.2). 
In any case, it is here that I have to mention Thompson’s (2002) idea on the role of 
misinformation, inspired by the Madisonian approach to democracy (see chapter 2.5.2). 
According to Thompson (who, perhaps deliberately opposing Habermas, downplays or 
ignores the role of privacy as the crib for publicness), an important consequence of the 
abundance of information is that the quality of all the available information will vary. 
But "the fabrications and falsehoods to which the Internet gives voice may 
admittedly serve some useful purposes," because if the unreliability of information is 
kept in mind then it will incite critical thinking in the consumers of this information. 
"Even while half believing the rumours they find on the net, most citizens, I trust, will 
seek guidance about which ones they may fully believe" (Thompson 2002: 36–37). 
It seems logical that this beneficial effect of misinformation applies to certain topics 
more than to others (it might not be apparent at all concerning topics which require the 
reader’s expertise in a specific science or field of knowledge, for example). 
Concerning the discursive aspect of the internet as sociocultural interaction, then, the 
following questions can be outlined: what kind of information does a certain service 
provide, and how does it aim to guarantee the reliability of this information? 
 
3.4.2 The spatial aspect 
As for the spatial dimension, the internet is something truly unique. First because the 
placelessness of cyberspace (see Lash 2002: 21, or chapter 2.5.1) is such that it permits 
being in several places at the same time. Not physically, but through participating in 
several acts of communication at the same time, creating the illusion for all the other 
participants that one is at the same – indeterminable, virtual – place as they are. This is 
what happens when someone is talking to different people at the same time on chat or 
messenger programs, playing in an online multiplayer game etc. Even if this "being 
there" experience will stay virtual, I cannot help subscribing to the ontological 
hermeneutical approach here: it is creation that takes place in the mere interpretation of 
the flows of information. 
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What does this mean from the point of view of my thesis – or Habermas’ ideas? 
Importantly, however keen I am on the idea of placelessness, I have to admit it mostly 
concerns interpersonal, not mass communication, chiefly because it demands the mutual 
exchange of texts (giving immediate feedback to the communication partners), which 
cannot be done in mass communication. But in any case the placelessness nature of the 
internet means openness of communication in a very practical way: it simplifies staying 
in touch with others and thus helps the spread of information. 
 
Concerning the spatial characteristics of the internet, it is noteworthy also that the 
biggest, almost infinite resource of cyberspace is, in fact, space.  
What I mean is that it is amazingly easy to set up new places of discussion on the 
internet – one could count the clicks of mouse it takes to register at a free forum 
provider company. The only question is: does this possibility not undermine the 
credibility and value of such spaces (see also 3.4.3)? And if there is always an 
alternative public space of discussion to everything (and not just for meaningful 
"subaltern counterpublics," but even for public spheres that only represent empty or 
insignificant differences in opinion), how can someone know which ones are 
meaningful, which ones are not, and how can someone participate in all the relevant 
discussions at the same time? 
 
There is also another question concerning the modes of consumption of the internet. Is 
the verbality of the internet the same as that of real life speech acts? What are the non-
verbal communicational devices that are used? Simply: in what (physical) ways do 
people communicate over the internet, how do these modes of consumption fit into the 
theoretical framework of late modernity (cf. Lash and Dahlgren), and what are the 
implications of such modes of communication as to the theory of communicative 
action? Can a public sphere exist solely in cyberspace? (Dahlgren (1995: 20) argues it 
cannot; there must be fact-to-face interaction to it, too.) 
In summary, the question raised by the examination of the spatial aspects of the internet 
as sociocultural interaction could be as follows. How and where is a particular text 
consumed – and what are the implications of the particular mode of consumption? 
 
 54 
3.4.3 The communal aspect 
Finally, the communal dimension of the internet as sociocultural interaction brings us 
once again to the question of identities, which I presented in the previous chapters. But 
not only to the question of identities, as it is aptly described by William Galston. 
He examined online communities according to the criterion set up by Bender (1982): 
according to these, a community, held together by shared understandings and a sense of 
belonging, is a group of people where membership is limited, norms are shared, ties 
between members are (at least partly) personal and affective, and where there is a sense 
of mutual obligation among the members (Galston 2002: 44–50). 
In Galston’s understanding, most internet communities fail to be communities in this 
"real" sense of the word. Membership in online communities is more often than not 
voluntary, and therefore – given that "for most people, diversity is a nice place to visit, 
but they do not really want to live there" – these communities are more likely to be 
heterogeneous than homogeneous (Galston 2002: 55–56). Being a member in an online 
discussion group is often "preaching to the converted;" what’s more, groups tend to 
radicalise easily24, further lowering the chances of productive inter-group discussions. 
"[online groups] may intensify current tendencies toward fragmentation and polarization 
in […] civic life" (Galston 2002: 54). 
However, the author acknowledges that "online groups can fulfil important emotional 
and utilitarian needs," even if they cannot be taken as solutions for "our current civic 
ills, let alone as comprehensive models of a better future" (Galston 2002: 56). 
But even if most of the online groups are not communities but merely groups organized 
around the idea of sharing information among like-minded people, it might still be 
interesting to put Galston’s scepticism to the test through examining concrete examples 
of – well, so-called communities, for a lack of better word. 
This is reasoned partly by the fact that Galston could not have written about the 
phenomenon known as "Web 2.0" or, perhaps slightly misleadingly, the "community 
web" (O'Reilly 2005). This loose umbrella term refers to all those services of the 
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 "[…]a group of like-minded people who engage in discussion among themselves are likely to adopt 
the more extreme rather than more moderate variants of the group’s shared beliefs, and particularly 
high levels of polarization occur when group members meet anonymously, which is precisely what the 
Internet [sic] permits" (Galston 2002: 55). 
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internet that somehow revolve around the concept of community or user-generated 
content (from MySpace through Wikipedia to Digg). These sites try to function in ways 
ordinary groups – discussion forums, newsgroups, mailing lists – cannot. 
A prime example of such "web 2.0"-sites is that of social networking sites (such as 
MySpace, Facebook or Friendster). These services aim at reconstructing their users’ 
real-life social networks on the internet: whoever registers can browse among the 
profiles of other members and indicate if there is a real-life contact between them. The 
end result is a huge database of personal profiles and a map of personal relationships 
(something Stanley Milgram would rejoice over). The social networking sites usually 
offer an armada of services that try to "improve the user experience" beyond simply 
providing a way to prove others that someone has non-imaginary friends; these services 
range from built-in instant messaging programs, through message boards and storage 
space for photos or videos, to virtual gifts or gestures one can pass on to friends. 
By their basic concept, social networking sites can be seen as an attempt to eliminate 
the factor of distance from real-life social networks; it does not matter whether my 
friends live next door or two continents away, I can just as easily maintain (some kind 
of a) contact with them through Facebook. The interesting point in such sites is that they 
only make sense if everybody actually uses them under their own names; and in this 
respect, they differ from all other potential "communities" on the internet. 
 
Community knowledge repositories, such as Wikipedia, should also be distinguished 
from ordinary discussion groups on the internet. Again, the basic concept is simple: 
people – either "members only" or any visitor of the site – can edit entries in a 
searchable database, and on a neighbouring (linked) webpage they can carry out a 
discussion concerning the topic of the entry in question. In other words, even though the 
area of interest is specified, this does not necessarily guarantee that like-minded people 
will be members of the "editorial community" (see also chapter 7). In case there is a 
supposedly impartial editorial committee overseeing the operations going on in the 
database, this is one area that looks suitable for reasoned debate, unlike much of the 
other types of online discussion groups. 
Last, but not least, there exist also groups on the internet – missing from Galston’s 
analysis – that I previously termed groups of meta-information (such as Digg, 
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del.icio.us or StumbleUpon). The aim of these groups is to organize information by 
taking advantage of "the public opinion" of users. These groups can become places of 
rational, reasoned debate, but it is perhaps more important that they might act as a 
sample of real-life public opinion and public opinion formation. (See chapter 5.2.) 
Considering the points above, the questions to be asked in the analysis of online groups, 
or group-focused online services: can the group in question be regarded as a 
community? And if so, can such a community exist solely virtually? Finally, could 
the group in question have a meaningful impact on "offline" communities? 
 
3.5 Summary of questions 
The basic question of this thesis is whether certain services of the internet can help 
redemocratizing the public sphere, or in other words, can they help discursively creating 
"soft power" that can legitimate a democratic rule? Do they help reasoned debate 
through which the common interest of the people can be distilled, or do they help 
particular, minority interests to thrive? Could this debate happen on a global scale? 
Considering postmodernist theories, does a particular service of the internet contribute 
to the destabilization of traditional social relationships, or to a general feeling of 
uncertainty – and if so, how? 
  
Keeping in mind this basic set of questions, applying Dahlgren's topology to the internet 
leads us to the following questions of smaller, analytical scope:  
Is a certain online service part of the media institution? If so, who has vested interests in 
modifying its output? Is this output censored according to business-related or political 
interests? Is a particular service capable of setting an agenda independent of 
conventional media? What kind of business model does a certain service utilize? 
Is there a goodness of fit between the scope of authority of certain web service, and the 
issues that its users try to have solved by it? Is the identity or role of these users of 
peculiar interest? Does a certain web service help formal or substantial democracy? 
Inseparably from all the above, what kind of information does a certain web service 
provide, and how can the reliability of this information be maintained? How and where 
is it consumed, and what are the implications of this particular mode of consumption? 
Could the group of users of a certain web service be regarded as a community (and if 
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so, could it exist solely virtually)? Does it allow discussion among fellow users? Can it 
influence or change "real-life" communities? 
 
These questions focus directly on the public sphere, but I shall not forget about the 
indirect role of the culture industry on the public sphere, either (chapters 1.2 and 2.7). 
In my understanding, Adorno's and Horkheimer's theory works on a different level than 
the counterarguments offered by e.g. Miège, Hesmondhalgh and Longhurst. The 
original theory of the culture industry is tied to the concept of autonomous art and its 
(declining) emancipatory role in modern society, while defendants of the "complex, 
ambivalent and contested" culture industries approach the question from the side of 
practicalities, not addressing the philosophical issue of autonomous art. 
In the confines of this MA thesis, I cannot undertake this task, either. While subscribing 
to the idea of multiple, complex and ambivalent culture industries (for it is, I believe, 
reconcilable with the original idea of the single, over-encompassing culture industry, 
given that Adorno used the term slightly differently to the way it is understood by his 
critiques), I cannot evaluate the validity of Adorno's philosophical arguments. 
However, I can analyse two aspects of the culture industry (or industries), and the 
effects of the internet on them – two aspects that Habermas himself also touched upon. 
Namely, I shall examine the effects of particular web services on the availability of 
cultural goods (and the information about these cultural goods), and the effects of 
particular web services on what Habermas termed "layman criticism," i.e. the 
pluralization and relativization of value systems that these cultural products are 
measured by. It is expected that the internet has a ambivalent role in these regards, 
because it is thought to increase both the availability of such products and layman 
criticism. These tendencies, although working in opposing directions, are not expected 
to balance one another, because they work in qualitatively different ways. But in any 
case, I shall examine which features of a certain web service point to which direction. 
I shall analyse the questions through individual web services (i.e. individual homepages 
and other technologies). But before this analysis, I turn my attention to the physical 
build-up and infrastructure of the internet, as well as its spread and popularity – because 
this will provide a context in which the analysis itself can take place.
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4 Economic background 
 
In analysing the possible democratizing qualities of the internet, I now turn my attention 
to its physical – infrastructural – constitution, and the corollaries stemming from it. I 
believe that the material conditions of the internet contribute to understanding the 
actual, practical effects this global network (potentially) has. 
Strictly from the point of view of the technology, the internet is a global, decentralized 
computer network – a network of networks that follow the same communicational 
standards (known in the case of internet as "protocols," such as TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol / Internet Protocol). Relying on these standards, the internet provides 
various services to its users, such as e-mail, on-line chat and instant messaging, peer-to-
peer data transfer or the world wide web. The web service provides users with the 
possibility to view (and, increasingly importantly, to create and modify) multimedia 
documents (web pages) through their web browser applications (such as Mozilla Firefox 
or Internet Explorer). Web pages are stored on web servers, which also store 
information about the pages' hyperlinks (dynamic points of connection). 
(TechEncyclopedia 2007.) 
Importantly, although the internet is decentralized – there is no one single point of 
origin, one central computer that makes everything running –, there are some points of 
orientation. Every computer that is on-line is identified by a unique series of numbers, 
known as IP-address (originally made up of four numbers, each between 0 and 255, 
separated by a dot (e.g. 123.123.123.123); a sign of the spread of the internet is that a 
new type of IP address, consisting of 6 numbers, is being introduced). An international 
non-profit organization, the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers) manages the database that associates IP addresses with familiar internet-
addresses such as www.uwasa.fi (which stands for 193.166.120.46). (ICANN 2007.) 
Users connect to the internet using the access provided by Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) companies. Importantly, neither ICANN nor any of the ISPs own the internet in 
any way; they merely supply the infrastructure to connect to the internet via their 
servers. (Unique internet addresses (domain names), on the other hand, can be bought in 
the sense that one can register such an address at ICANN (through intermediaries, for a 
fee), and so buy the right to exclusively use that particular address.) The ISPs' activities 
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are regulated by law in a similar manner to, say, telephone companies. 
(TechEncyclopedia 2007.) 
Without going into technological details about the connection to the internet, it is 
important to distinguish, according to the speed of the connection to the internet, 
between "broadband" and "narrowband" connections: broadband connections allow the 
operation of services that involve large amounts of data to be transferred, such as on-
line audio and video streaming. (TechEncyclopedia 2007.) 
As mentioned earlier, the internet is the result of an originally military project (the 
ARPAnet) having turned into civil and commercial use (Living Internet 2000). 
 
4.1 Barriers to entry 
Without going extensively into details, a quick overview of the infrastructural barriers to 
accessing the internet is necessary. 
It is possible for all kinds of gadgets and technological devices to connect to the internet 
for some reason or another, but human users of he internet definitely need a computer 
(hardware), pieces of software that control the operation of the computer and establish a 
link between the hardware and its user and, finally, some kind of connection to the 
network (be it wire-based or wireless). Through these physical factors, the 
infrastructural differences between countries (and within countries) affect the 
availability of the internet, which in the end means that in the present circumstances, 
we cannot talk of a globally equal and democratic internet, if only by its unequal 
availability that is tied to various socio-economic reasons. This is true even though 
computer hardware is getting cheaper and cheaper, and more and more easily available 
(Keohane and Nye 2002: 164–165, see also The Economist 2007c).  
 
As for the software-related barriers to entry to the internet, I would like to focus on only 
one important aspect of the topic – the question of piracy (although it would be 
interesting to analyse how this question, through the question of intellectual rights and 
industry standards is related to business interests, lobbies and national as well as 
international politics). The practice of illegal copying and distributing of software is 
rampant in large parts of the world: according to the Business Software Alliance, an 
organization representing the interests of large software manufacturers, "35% of all 
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software installed in 2006 on personal computers worldwide was obtained illegally." 
Piracy is most apparent in Central and Eastern Europe (68% of software installed in 
2006 obtained illegally), Latin America (66%), and the Middle-East /Africa region 
(60%). (BSA 2007.) 
My point of citing these figures here is to draw attention to the fact, while software 
piracy is ethically questionable, it might contribute to the spread of the internet and 
thereby its democratization (at least if we suppose that those people obtain the illegal 
copies, who otherwise couldn’t afford a certain piece of software). 
 
4.2 Worldwide internet penetration 
Taking into consideration the barriers to entry cited above might offer an explanation for 
the following statistics. According to a report compiled using statistics collected by 
analyst Nielsen//Netratings, the International Telecommunications Union and other 
sources, the global internet penetration, i.e. the percentage of adults who use the internet 
regularly for any purpose, is 18.9% (Miniwatts 2007). Penetration rates (according to 
data compiled on 30th September 2007) of the individual statistical regions are as 
follows: Africa – 4,7%, Asia – 12.4%, Europe – 41,7%, Middle East – 17.3%, 
North America – 70.2%, Latin America / Caribbean – 20.8%, Oceania / Australia: 
55.2% (Miniwatts 2007). See also Table 1 in the appendix. 
That the internet is still in its infancy for the biggest part of the world is also suggested 
by the growth rates. It is, unsurprisingly, the North American region that produced the 
slowest growth between the years 2000 and 2007: in this period the usage of internet 
doubled (117% growth rate). In the same period, Asia produced a 302% growth in 
internet penetration – and in that it still lags well behind Africa (875%) and the Middle 
East (902%), but naturally in these regions the relatively low base is behind these stellar 
numbers. (Miniwatts 2007.) 
From the point of view of the public sphere, it is interesting to match penetration rates 
with actual population figures. So doing it is revealed that Asia could be considered the 
"heaviest" internet user: this region, with an online population of about 459 million, 
accounts for 36,9% of all internet usage. In this comparison, Europe is runner-up with 
27.2% (338 million users), while North America is third with 18.9% (235 million users). 
(Miniwatts 2007, see also Table 1.) 
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Given the significant differences between the numbers, using the overall 18.9% figure 
to describe the state and spread of the internet around the world would probably not 
give an appropriate picture – especially since the possible existence of a global 
Habermasian public sphere is questioned even from the point of view of theories (see 
chapter 3.3). Nevertheless, penetration data from various countries shows that in 
most part of the world it is still only a minority that can take advantage of the 
internet. On the other hand, every sign points to the direction of the further spread of 
the net, and there are no factors inherent in its infrastructure that would cause late-
comers to suffer for being late. In addition to this, in certain countries, such as Finland, 
Estonia or the United States, the internet has gathered such a critical mass that it can 
now play an important practical role in public administration – and, one might expect, 
in well-wired countries, the internet is already making important contribution to the 
goings-on of local public spheres. 
 
4.3 Freedom and advertising 
From more than just the point of view of the business models applied on the internet, it 
is important to stress how the internet can be "free." Connecting to the internet, as 
described above, is in principle not free.  But a lot of services on the net are indeed free, 
from the point of view of clients at least: they are financed by advertisers, who display 
their ads placed next to the relevant, "primary" content of the homepages. This 
advertising-funded business model is well-known from the traditional commercial 
media (see the "logic of broadcasting" by Miège (1989: 10)). 
However, the model of online advertising differs from that of traditional broadcast 
media in a number of important respects. First, technologies enable advertisers and 
advertising space providers to collect data from individual users, creating their "user 
profiles," through the analysis of which advertising can be better targeted. The problem 
is that once online available data (browsing habits, sites visited, e-mail contacts etc.) is 
collected, it can potentially be abused as well. The most well-known (Alexa 2007c) 
search engine, Google, is a case in point. Google collects data from its users in order to 
refine its search engine and to offer advertisers precision in the targeting of their ads 
(Google 2007). They maintain that it is impossible even for the company’s own 
employees to match particular pieces of information with individual users (Economist 
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2007b, Google 2007a). But however good the company’s slogan ("We're not evil") 
sounds, it does not eliminate the danger of potential abuse of an ever growing array of 
publicly available private information. 
 
Second, if technology enables advertisers to launch interactive, "eye-candy" adverts, or 
embed video ad spots into websites, it also enables users to block these ads (as well as 
small textual advertisements) – see for example the ad-blocker feature of popular 
browser Mozilla Firefox (Mozilla 2007). The irony is that after all it is in the users’ 
interests not to be able to block the ads, because it is through the advertising-funded 
nature of the web that several of its services and contents can remain free. 
At the time of writing this paper, online advertising is said to be in an excellent shape, 
illustrated among others by the example of the New York Times and the Financial Times. 
Both papers, by the end of summer, 2007, made available the full contents of their 
websites, instead of charging a fee for the access of the site archives. The reason? Both 
papers’ publishers found that it is more profitable to provide users with free content, 
garnished with advertisings, than to charge visitors for the access of this content. 
According to online trade group the Internet Advertising Bureau, the net is the fastest-
growing ad marketplace: from the $18.2 billion British ad market, it represents a 14.7% 
slice, and without its contribution, the total British advertising spending across all media 
would have fallen by 1.9% during the first half of 2007. (Shannon 2007.) 
 
Third, there is an important difference with regards to the available advertising space on 
the internet and in broadcast media. On the net, (advertising) space abounds, whereas it 
is a scarce resource in broadcast media. There is only one prime-time zone in the 
evening, only one Superbowl every year, and the length of commercial breaks cannot be 
freely stretched. In contrast, there are hundreds of billions of websites, and the creation 
of new ones does not necessarily mean that old ones get obsolete (see the example of 
the archives of the Financial Times or other print papers).  
(The abundance of space also means that online publications hardly ever have to 
consider "economies of space:" publications can cater for the demands of tiny niche-
groups, because making or keeping yet another set of homepages available for readers 
does not lead to additional costs, but it provides additional advertising surfaces. This is 
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how online publications can take advantage of the "long tail" business model: small 
sales (in this case, small value advertising sales) might add up to significant revenues 
outweighing the minor costs involved in their online publication (cf. Anderson 2006).) 
 
The advertising space offered on the internet is, thus, much larger, and much more 
fragmented, than that of traditional media. In practice, this fragmentation also means 
that smaller advertisers can compete with large, multinational companies – something 
they would be unable to do in the territory of traditional broadcast media. For example, 
one can buy contextual "classified ads" to appear on Google’s search results pages, and 
pay 50 cents after each click on the ad in question – the price is the same for all buyers, 
and even if classified ads are not especially spectacular visually, they might be just as 
relevant. Besides, everyone who has a website can become an ad space provider him- or 
herself, through various ad networks such as Google’s AdSense. (Economist 2007a). 
In short: a lot of advertising space means relatively cheaper advertising, and 
fragmentation means a natural resistance to oligo- or monopolistic representation of 
business interests in the advertising sphere. (However, ad space providers and 
companies that compile databases of users' browsing habits might reach and abuse 
oligo- or monopolistic positions.) 
 
To sum up, two currently apparent trends on the internet are its increased capitalization 
through advertising, and the personalization of the advertisements. This holds the 
possibility that private data can be abused according to business interests.. 
In any case, if the internet could positively contribute to the operation of the public 
sphere, this contribution is to an increasing extent contingent upon citizens’ 
consumption, or rather the advertisers’ belief in the possible maintenance of high levels 
of consumption. Capitalism and the possibility of a democratic public sphere are, in this 
regard, tied closely together. 
While this can be seen as the "invasion of the system into the lifeworld," I think the 
capitalism of online ads is closer to the ideal of the "young and healthy" capitalism 
described by Habermas in the Structural Transformation... than to the feudalism-turned 
monopolcapitalism described by Mills, Graham and Luke, for reasons stated above.
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5 Analysis 
 
In this chapter I analyse certain services of the internet, following the conceptual 
framework outlined in chapter 3. Namely, I have decided to examine blogs, social news 
and bookmarking sites, the technology of RSS, and finally, discussion forums. 
The selection and focus on these particular services is somewhat arbitrary, but not 
without reason. From the armada of communication services and technologies brought 
about by the internet I chose these ones because they represent aptly the ways the 
internet itself is expected to redemocratize public communication. Blogs, social news 
and bookmarking sites and forums facilitate the online information exchange of their 
users, and they do it in such a communicative form that stands between traditional 
interpersonal and mass communication: messages are read and reflected upon by 
several people (sometimes, literally: masses), but the ability of immediate and 
qualitatively equal feedback is given to each member of this audience.  
In this thesis I can only attempt an analysis of limited depth of these services – however, 
I believe this analysis can highlight certain important points as well as directions for 
further research. In chapter 7, I mention certain other services and technologies that are 
recommended for similar analysis. 
 
5.1 Blogs 
 
5.1.1 The concept 
The word "blog" originates from "weblog," which originally referred to an 
automatically generated, chronological list of events that took place on a web server 
(TechEncyclopedia 2007). This chronological organization is the main feature of blogs, 
which are websites that usually consist of only a single page, with entries lined up one 
under the other, usually with the most recent on the top. 
However, there are no "official" rules or definitions of a blog, so the term should be 
looked at loosely. Apart from the chronological organization, blogs can (and do) differ 
greatly; and while I suspect that the term itself is often used derogatively, referring to 
personal blogs of lesser importance, I also think that part of the reason for this is 
because professional, themed blogs, run by skilled editors or even an editorial team, 
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simply do not look like blogs at all. 
In any case, often there is a possibility to comment the entries on blogs, and thereby to 
carry out a discussion of the topics. Comments might be moderated (a.k.a. censored), or 
altogether forbidden, by the owner(s) of the blogs. It is also customary to equip blogs 
with sets of links to other, related blogs or websites (cf. Tremayne et al. 2006), and to 
embed videos, pictures or sound files into the texts published on the blog. Entries are 
often organized (described) by freely chosen keywords, known as tags. 
 
5.1.2 The content 
Blogs can be about anything and everything. They are, as I noted above, often identified 
with personal "self-blogs," reporting about the life of their owner in a more or less 
interesting way. (See Arnold 2007.) Naturally, these blogs might not be meant for public 
reading at all, but in any case they propose an opportunity for the Habermasian 
"audience-oriented subjectivity" to thrive – because even if there are no official style 
guides to follow, and one can easily write under a pseudonym (or "nick"), writing a blog 
is a conscious intellectual activity. 
Apart from these self-blogs, which do account for the majority (52%) of blogs at least in 
the US (Pew 2006), there are theme-oriented blogs, focusing on any number of topics 
from technology or computers through cars and movies to medicine and horticulture. Of 
increased popularity are the "life-hacking" blogs (lifestyle blogs, offering practical 
advice; such as Lifehacker.com), and there are also blogs that pose to be modern art 
(such as PostSecret, a blog where anonymously sent in and creatively packaged secrets 
are put on public display; http://postsecret.blogspot.com). According to Pew’s survey, 
around 11% of blogs publishes articles of political opinion (Pew 2006). The style of 
blogs can vary greatly, and the blogs can be written by one or more people. 
Some analysts argue (Arnold 2007) that blogs are inapt for the task of publishing 
relevant scientific articles or texts of logical argumentation – however, based on my 
personal experience I oppose this view. The blog named Critical Biomass is only one 
example of informative, informal, yet scientifically accurate and appropriately 
referenced blogs (http://criticalbiomass.freeblog.hu; although it is in Hungarian, the 
layout, illustrations and references (mostly to foreign academic journals) should give 
anybody an idea). 
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The point of blogs is to provide easily accessible information in a most often informal, 
rather than formal, manner. Its uses include complementing official – business or 
politics-related – sources of information, as seen in the case, for example, of the 
personal blog of Hungarian prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (http://blog.amoba.hu). 
Last, but not least, blogs can also provide an alternative to conventional media, tackling 
censorship and presenting the opinion of minorities. It could function as the terrain of 
underground, opposition journalism – for a more recent example, consider the example 
of Burma Digest, a blog tracking the events of the revolt against the junta in Myanmar 
(http://www.burmadigest.info, and see also CNN 2007). 
 
5.1.3 The business model 
Starting a blog is both technically easy and, with the help of blog service providers 
(companies that provide space for blogs and tools to manage them, such as WordPress 
or BlogSpot), it can also be completely free. The free templates provided by the blog 
service provider can also be modified, and of course it is possible to create a blog from 
scratch, without using pre-defined templates, if one is familiar with programming in 
html (hypertext markup language, the language that "tells" the web browsers how to 
display the contents included in a website). 
If production is cheap, revenues also tend to be low – the overwhelming majority of 
blogs do not make money for their creators in any way (Tozzi 2007, see also Sifry 
2007). It is customary for blogs to ask for donations from visitors, but the primary 
source of revenue for independent blogs – blogs that do not function an as advertising 
space and that are not part of a larger media organization – is advertising revenue. 
However, few bloggers can afford to focus on writing the blog as a full-time job. (Tozzi 
2007.) 
There are also blogs that are not independent in the sense that they are part of a larger 
scheme: e.g. they might be sites of advertising themselves (for the products or services 
of their writer), or acting as an additional communication channel between the company 
and its partners. Online versions of traditional media products also often employ blogs 
as a new surface to present material (see chapter 5.1.4). 
From the point of view of the visitors is that the overwhelming majority of blogs are 
freely available. They are not to be confused by subscription-only newsletters or 
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"premium content" on websites. (Nevertheless, they might act as an advertising front for 
such content.)  
 
5.1.4 Are blogs part of the media institution? 
There is no straight yes/no answer to this question. "Blogs" as such might not be part of 
the media, but certain blogs are. On the one hand, by now it has become a trend to arm 
traditional media outlets with themed blogs, in what can be seen as a double objective 
of increasing traffic to the publisher's website and thereby creating advertising revenue, 
while at the same time offering a more direct communication channel to consumers of 
the publication. The website of English broadsheet newspaper Guardian features 18 
blogs (Guardian 2007), the Daily Telegraph runs 45 of them (Telegraph 2007), and 
Independent launched in October 2007 its 12 own blogs (Independent 2007). Major US 
daily The New York Times has 40 themed blogs (New York Times 2007), the Wall Street 
Journal 16 (Wall Street Journal 2007), and Helsingin Sanomat is also following the 
trend with 26 blogs (Helsingin Sanomat 2007). Not everyone is so keen on the new 
method of getting in touch with readers: French daily Le Monde does not, at the time of 
writing, have its own blog, but notably its website features an extensive selection from 
the best of the French blog-crop (Le Monde 2007). Best-selling Hungarian daily 
Népszabadság follows similar tactics, with an editorial blog picking and mixing (and in 
case of foreign blogs: translating) articles posted in various blogs all over the internet 
(Népszabadság 2007). Naturally it is not unusual for television and radio channels to 
operate their own blogs or to offer a selection from other blogs on their website (or 
both). 
But the sheer number of blogs is at best an indication of trends; it would require an in-
depth analysis to reveal how important role they play in the life of the offline 
publications (for example, it could be analysed to what extent blogs cross-reference 
each other, other blogs and other offline publications). In fact, this short rundown on 
important newspapers using blogs reveals something that follows straight from the very 
concept of blogs.  
 
The word "blog" refers to a certain way of publishing information, a certain 
organization of a website. It has connotations attached to it – e.g. a blog is often 
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expected to be written in a personal, or at least informal style, openly representing some 
kind of bias towards its subject –, it also has a certain "charm" or "hype" attached to it – 
it might be trs chic to read, let alone write, blogs –, but in the end "blog" in any 
instance could be replaced with the considerably more boring term of "website." Blog is 
all about the form, but it is the content that matters. It is, I believe, a widespread fallacy 
to refer to blogs as if they represented a totally new concept in online information 
publishing: in a restrictive use of the word, "blogs" became to mean those particular 
websites that exemplify, in the format of a blog, citizen "journalism." But the “blogs – 
traditional media” dichotomy is misleading. Certain blogs are part of what is commonly 
referred to as traditional media (even if the larger part of blogs is not). 
 
In the theory of the public sphere, Habermas (2006) attributes to the mass media the 
role of filtering the "published opinions" and issues (originating from either the political 
system, or the civil society), picking a handful as "relevant" and channelling, framing 
the formation of public opinion around these. This demands that the media both (a) 
produces news items by first hand reporting and (b) carries out a "secondary 
procession" of said news, or the formulation of some kind of an opinion about them. 
 
(a) I am convinced that original news reporting, if it is to be effective and accountable, 
requires an institutional, organizational background. It is indeed the job of media 
professionals to produce a large share of news because they, or the organizations behind 
them, have the financial, professional and legal means to do so. Might it be that blogs 
and bloggers take up such a role? In theory, by all means, yes. As for existing media 
outlets, it can be seen from the short overview above how they are trying to incorporate 
blogs (as an alternative form of information dissemination) into their profile. 
Independent blogs, i.e. blogs that started out as not being part of a media enterprise, 
have a natural disadvantage – their resources are limited. If, that is to say, they have any 
significant resources at all; seeing that a lot of blogs are part-time projects of a one-man 
team (Pew 2006: ii), it is no wonder that they cannot employ a substantially stable 
business model. In fact, only two of the commercially most profitable blogs deal in first 
hand news reporting (Tozzi 2007). 
In addition, a further piece of analysis that suggests that independent blogs do not 
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threaten the news-production of established media is a report by blog search engine 
Technorati (Sifry 2007), comparing the number of references received by top blogs and 
the websites of offline publications. On the top of the list is the online edition of the 
New York Times (referenced in blogs 83,740 times in the last quarter of 2006), followed 
by CNN (70,100 references) and Yahoo! News (68,233 references). Online versions of 
traditional media publications dominate the first half of the list: the most referenced – 
most influential – "new-media establishment" is Engadget, at the 19th place, with 20,295 
references. 
Engadget is the 501st most popular website in the world at the time of writing (Alexa 
2007), attracting roughly 0,3% of the web's daily traffic. It is undoubtedly a blog: a 
single webpage with short, opinionated and cross-linked articles lined up under one 
another. And it is also, undoubtedly, part of what is generally referred to as “traditional 
media:” its publisher Weblogs, Inc. is owned by American Online – a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Time Warner Inc. (Time Warner 2005). Time Warner's portfolio also 
includes news channel CNN, the Time magazine (and about 130 other print 
publications), cable channel HBO and movie production company Warner Brothers Inc. 
(Time Warner 2007). 
The most influential political blog, according to Technorati's analysis (Sifry 2007) is 
The Huffington Post (http://www.huffingtonpost.com). It is not tied directly to other 
(offline) media organizations, but it is a business undertaking in its own right, with a 
staff of 26 people at the editorial office (The Huffington Post 2007) and a venture 
capital investor as owner (SoftBank Capital 2007). 
(Technorati's method promises to provide more accurate results in measuring a blog’s 
influence than simply counting visitors – supposing that other bloggers do credit their 
sources, which is an uncertain assumption. But I tend to trust it, because the web offers 
great transparency: with the help of tags and search engines, it is very easy to discover 
plagiarism or flawed references, and via commenting or publishing a post on a rival 
blog, it is also very easy to spread this kind of meta-information (about the quality, 
reliability or source of other pieces of info). In addition, given the business model of 
"independent" blogs, notably the point that visitors are not charged for the content they 
can find on the website, there is not a huge incentive to plagiarize, or at least it is 
indirect, in the sense that the plagiarist does not directly benefit from the act, but 
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indirectly, through supposedly increased advertising revenues generated by an increased 
flow of visitors.) 
 
However, if independent blogs – for their lack of resources – cannot compete with 
established media organizations (whether or not their online products take the shape of 
blogs!), there is at least one niche area where they can effectively contribute to news 
production: this is the area of local news, under the radar of larger media institutions, 
who have to take into consideration economies of scale in their operation. E.g. the blog 
Gothamist (one of the most profitable blogs (Tozzi 2007)), reports local sports, traffic 
and crime related news, accompanied also by a digital map, so local visitors to the site 
from can immediately see there what happened in their neighbourhood (Gothamist 
2007). 
 
(b) It is suspected that independent blogs have a greater influence in news dissemination 
than in news reporting, because they provide a cheap and easy way for everyone to 
publicly reflect on current news and events. This is the main role of the blogosphere – 
but just how important that role is? 
According to Technorati’s latest available report, there were about 70 million blogs in 
April 2007 (Sifry 2007). However, an important figure is missing from Technorati's 
analysis, notably the number of active, regularly updated, not abandoned blogs. This 
figure is estimated to be around 15.5 million, which suggests that while the overall 
number of blogs has been constantly growing since their appearance in the end of the 
90s, the number of active blogs seems to have reached its peak (Green 2007). 
This is to be kept in mind when considering some mind-boggling figures: about 120,000 
new blogs are born each day, or 1.4 blogs every second (Sifry 2007). On the other hand, 
an estimated 60-80% of the blogs are abandoned within a month, or, as a somewhat 
bitter analyst noted, the average blog has the life span of a fruit fly (quoted in Arnold 
2007). Every day, between 3,000 and 7,000 fake blogs or spam blogs (splogs) are 
created (the purpose of these is to act as advertising front). The blogosphere is growing 
by 1.5 million new posts every day – that is 17 new entries every second. (Sifry 2007.) 
These figures suggest a large, and in places (abandoned blogs, splogs) fragmented, 
unconnected blogosphere. On the other hand, it has been shown, that both the in- and 
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the outbound links on blogs are distributed according to the "power law" or 80/20 law 
(Tremayne et al. 2006, Kottke 2003). This means that roughly 20% of the blogs 
provides 80% of the links to other websites, and that 20% of blogs are pointed at by 
80% of the links from other sites. Simply, one-fifth of the blogs are highly influential 
(note that referencing a blog does not necessarily mean endorsing its views!), while 
most others have considerably lower visibility (see also Sifry 2007). The blogosphere 
has an influential, small inner core and an extensively fragmented periphery. 
Just how influential that core is is shown by the following example: in May 2007, 
Engadget posted a breaking news item about the delay of two products of IT 
manufacturer Apple Inc. Within minutes of the publication of the item, which later 
turned out to be false, massive selling of Apple's shares began, knocking the share price 
from $107.89 to $103.42 – a $4 billion decrease in the overall value of the company. 
Quite an impact, though after an official press release clarified the news to be hoax, the 
share price quickly recovered (Engadget 2007, TechCrunch 2007, Valleywag 2007). 
It is also interesting to look at the readership of blogs. Statistics in this regard are 
uncertain, but they might be able to offer some indicative points of orientation at least. 
According to a last year report by research programme Pew Internet & American Life 
Project, of those American adults who use the internet regularly, 39% (roughly 57 
million persons) reads and 8% (about 12 million people) writes blogs (Pew 2006). 
Similarly, a survey by Metro and Telegraph Media claims that 40% of those adults 
polled responded that they have read a blog the previous week; the corresponding figure 
in the UK was 13%, in France 25% and in Denmark 12% (quoted in Arnold 2007). In 
the light of Technorati's findings about the current state of the blogosphere, with special 
reference to the fact that the growth of the number of active blogs seems to have stalled 
(Sifry 2007 and Green 2007), it might be hypothesized that the number of blog-readers 
could have slightly increased since the time these two surveys were taken. 
These are not insignificant numbers. It is commonly argued (cf. Tremayne et al. 2006) 
that the internet in general and blogs in particular had an undeniable effect on the 
campaigns and the outcome of the 2004 US presidential elections. Even if independent 
blogs just follow "parasitically" the media’s agenda, or merely act as disseminators of 
information (instead of producing news themselves), they – or at least their influential 
inner core – have proven important in public opinion formation. 
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Upon their rise to popularity, some welcomed blogs as harbingers of a new era of 
media, where traditional journalism becomes obsolete (Arnold 2007). This claim, as I 
hope to have proven, errs in its underlying assumption that the "blogs – traditional 
media" dichotomy can be justified. If we understand "blogs" as referring to 
"independent websites of civil journalism," the claim still doesn’t hold up, because 
independent blogs lack the resources of constant and quality news reporting (at least on 
the national, let alone international, level). On the other hand, as the example of 
Engadget or the Gawker-group25 shows, blogs can become part of the media institution 
themselves. Blogs might make the entry to the media market easier (because of the low 
costs involved in starting an online newspaper, as opposed to a paper-based one), and 
the blogosphere is indeed important as a secondary commentator and disseminator of 
news and information, but if they are to become influential also in the reporting 
(producing) of news, and not "parasitic" on the traditional media institution – then they 
have to become part of this media institution themselves – in which case the blog – non-
blog distinction loses its content. 
As a closing comment, I must note that deciding whether or not a particular blog 
belongs to the established, organizational media might be problematic. Perhaps the 
existence of a filtering mechanism involved in the posting of an entry can be regarded 
as a sign of a “professional” blog. By this filtering mechanism I mean that in the staff 
responsible for the publication of the blog there are people who treat the potential 
articles in a way they are supposed to be treated by an editorial office before their 
publication: drafts are edited and copy-edited, proofread and fact-checked. This kind of 
filtering mechanism is absent from most forms of online communication (posting or 
commenting on blogs or discussion forums.) 
 
5.1.5 Globality and goodness of fit 
Once again we are faced with the limitations of the generalization of speaking about 
"the blogs as such." As the example of Gothamist shows, even within one blog, perfect 
"goodness of fit" (chapter 3.3) and "irrelevant globality" can meet: this blog publishes 
local news from New York, but naturally it is available from all over the world, and with 
                                                 
25
  A publishing company with the core activity of publishing multiple, themed blogs (Gawker 2007). 
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the availability comes the opportunity to post items or comment on the blog, too – so 
the "goodness of fit" only applies for those readers who do reside in New York 
(Gothamist 2007). As is often the case on the internet, the language of the blog might 
act as a barrier to entry and consequently improve the goodness of fit – while this, at the 
same time, might also lower the chances of globality. 
(The blogosphere's dominating language in the last quarter of 2006 proved to be, 
somewhat surprisingly, Japanese: 37% of the entries on blogs use this language, 
followed closely by English (36%). Another interesting trend was the increasing number 
of blogs from the Middle East: Farsi is a newcomer in the top 10 of blog languages, 
with 1% of all new posts. (Sifry 2007, see also Table 2).) 
On the other hand, even international blogs can reach a certain "goodness of fit" in the 
sense that the topic of the blog something the practice of which does not in any way 
involve institutions – a culinary blog being a good example. Blogs can help the creation 
of  global issue publics. 
Given the sheer size of the blogosphere, it is hard to empirically analyse how global 
blogs, in general, are, i.e. how many of them address global issues and how many of 
them manage to reach (and get involved) a global audience. It is certain that the share of 
languages suggests an unequal flow of information. As seen in Table 2, Japanese is the 
most popular language of blogs, but English still seems more important: only 5 blogs in 
the 50 most referenced (most influential) ones are written outside the United States or 
Great Britain (Technorati 2007). However, this fact neither proves nor suggests that 
most of the topics these blogs address deal with regionally specific political issues26.  
What is sure is that there are blogs that do address global issues, and at the same time 
urge readers to follow the "think globally, act locally" principle (see chapter 3.3). One 
example of this is shown by Treehugger, a blog promoting environmental consciousness 
(Treehugger 2007). It is the 17th most popular blog in the world (Technorati 2007). 
 
However, these and similar blogs represent at best an "indirect" notion of public sphere 
                                                 
26
 Moreover, popular blogs might act, precisely because of their communicative authority, as legitimizers 
or points of orientation: they might collect and translate posts from smaller "foreign" blogs, but the 
importance of this type of informaiton flow, measuring the openness of important blogs, could hardly 
even be guessed. 
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– i.e. various thoughts, ideas, originating on blogs, might inspire, stimulate various local 
public spheres or issue publics. Blogs can also contribute to the "global public sphere of 
credibility" (as conceived by Keohane and Nye (2002)), but their impact is hindered by 
two factors: first, the fragmentation of the blogosphere which means that most 
independent blogs have considerably small influence or importance, and second, by 
their limited "discursive resources," by which I refer to the lack of consequences 
stemming from or involved in their reading (or, for that matter, their production). 
 
5.1.6 Questionable identities and reliability 
Blogs are a textbook example of the uncertainty of identities – or roles – on the internet, 
as discussed under chapter 3.4. Both posting and commenting on blogs might happen 
anonymously or under pseudonyms, and / but it is possible to become a successful 
blogger – what's more, an opinion leader – under a fake name. 
Blog content that is appropriate or even funny for a friend can also be cause 
for dismissal to a supervisor or employer. To avoid the problem of colliding 
life spheres (sic!) and to protect personal privacy, many bloggers use a 
pseudonym to keep their offline life separated from their online thoughts. In 
fact, a bit more than half of bloggers (55%) surveyed say they blog under a 
pseudonym or made-up name, while 43% say they blog using their real 
name. (Pew 2006) 
 
The choice of roles is, then, a practical matter, and this refers to the problems discussed 
in connection with the free-of-consequence nature of the internet: increased freedom 
when tackling censorship versus possibly undermined credibility. 
The issue of credibility, however, is of peculiar importance here. 
 
Credibility and reliability are often tied to the supposed independence of blogs. An ideal 
blog is not part of the media institution. But, as we have seen, the traditional media 
openly uses blogs, and there is no reason to believe that it doesn't use them covertly too, 
by running presumably independent, in reality corporately managed blogs. 
But as I mentioned earlier, in my understanding the large number of blogs allows a 
thorough transparency to be established. Because of the multiplicity, the cross-
referenced nature, and the open access to information sources, misinformation is bound 
to be quickly corrected (again, see Engadget's case with Apple – TechCrunch 2007). 
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Naturally, the question of reliability poses itself only in connection with the reporting or 
dissemination of news, but not in connection with discussion and the dissemination of 
opinion. In fact, in this latter case the dubious identity of participants in a discussion 
might work to the benefit of the quality of the debate, because it prevents the abuse of 
signs of authority – i.e. it is more important what somebody says as opposed to who 
they actually are; conditions of a debate on blogs are more equal than in real life. (I deal 
with this topic more extensively in chapter 5.4.) In summary, I am optimistic towards 
the reliability of blogs, even in spite of the factors (e.g. the uncertainty of identities) that 
suggest otherwise. Considerable credibility is established by the large number and 
cross-referenced (transparent) nature of blogs. 
 
(On a side note, perhaps one sentence should be dedicated to hoax blogs (in the genre of 
'literary mischiefs'), and to blogs that are the online versions of tabloids – and they are 
expected to be just as credible.) 
 
5.1.7 The mode of consumption 
Barriers to entry for potential blog readers are quite low, given that blogs are free and 
available from wherever, after one has established a connection to the internet 
(naturally, the language they are written in might pose an obstacle). 
Returning briefly to Mills' criteria of a discursive community of publics (chapter 2.4), it 
can be seen that in the case of blogs there is, indeed, a balance between the ability to 
produce and to consume ideas, and the possibility of cooperation and maintaining a 
flow of communication via feedback is also granted. On the other hand, consumption 
(reading) a blog does not necessarily entail production (posting), and production does 
not necessarily entail consumption – which is an important difference between blogs 
and social news and bookmarking sites (see in chapter 5.2). 
 
The two most important characteristics concerning the consumption of blogs is their 
quickness and their network-like nature – i.e. that they usually offer links to other 
websites27 (blogs and conventional media sites too); and even if they wouldn’t, the 
                                                 
27
 "Most blogs have a semi-permanent "blogroll," a list of links to other blogs that the author has chosen 
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internet immediately offers the possibility to search for additional pieces of info that 
would complement the ones offered in a blog post. If something is unclear, ambiguous 
or incorrect in an entry in a blog, one can easily get in touch with the writer to ask for 
clarification, make a comment or suggest a revision of the entry, and thanks to the 
search engines such as Google and Yahoo!, additional information concerning the topic 
of the entry could also be quickly gathered. 
The characteristic of quickness refers both to the fact that blog entries are immediately 
available upon their publication, and the fact that their preparation does not require the 
lengthy procedure involved in traditional media publishing. No limitations of length 
have to be considered, news can be updated and modified on the fly (as it does happen 
often), and naturally there is no intermediary between publisher and consumer – such as 
printers and logistics providers in the case of paper-and-ink publications. Posting an 
item on a blog is also cheap: even in the case that the blog pays for the online storage of 
its documents, the publication of an additional post bears no new costs. 
Quickness also entails that blogs can immediately notify their readers about new posts 
or updates to existing articles, as well as about new comments to the articles. This is 
done through the technology known as RSS (see chapter 5.3); and what it means is that, 
apart from the appearance of micro-blogging services such as Twitter (2007), blogs 
represent the fastest existing way to disseminate information. Naturally, this speed 
is paired with a limited reach, but on the other hand these limitations of reach are 
not technological. 
 
5.1.8 Community; the possibilities of discussion 
Speaking of contingencies, blogs certainly have the option to offer the possibility to 
readers to comment on the individual entries. Commenting might be tied to certain 
conditions; for example, the site might require – usually free of charge – registration, 
and the owner of the blog might decide to moderate – censor – comments. Naturally, 
comments can be shut down altogether, for example in the case when a blog becomes 
too popular, and attracts so many comments that the one-man team that is the owner of 
                                                                                                                                               
to make available to his or her readers. More importantly, bloggers' posts may contain links to other 
websites, including posts in other blogs." (Tremayne et al., 2006.) 
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the site could not keep track, let alone assist, the discussion going on in the comments. 
If the blog is relevant and referenced, it is safe to assume that discussions about the 
topic will develop anyway, in "nearby corners" of the web – meaning all the sites that 
would reference the particular blog in question. But this once again suggests that the 
blogosphere might easily become too fragmented for meaningful discourse to take place 
between several people. 
However, one of the reasons traditional media outlets have started to use blogs might be 
that they provide the possibility of faster-than-ever feedback (offering both criticism and 
a source of valuable market information on the interests and opinions of the readers). 
All the above points to the direction of a fragmented blogosphere, which in certain 
instances might provide useful information – feedback, critique, personal advice etc. –, 
but which can accommodate discussion and reasoned debate to a very limited extent. 
However, even if we cannot speak of a community encompassing the whole of the 
blogosphere, it is perfectly possible that the audience of certain, specific, individual 
blogs could qualify as "community," e.g.  by the criteria set up by Bender (see Galston 
2002), and it is even conceivable that the formation of the community didn't precede the 
birth of the blog (i.e. the community was formed among participants in a discussion on 
a blog, and based entirely on this very discussion). But in general I downplay the 
importance of the voluntary communities spawn around blogs. The reason for this is 
that blogs' ideal type fits Galston's model (see chapter 3.4.3) in all but one respect: it is 
easier to exit from an argumentative discussion than to pursue an argument or admit to a 
revision of one's views (opinions do not have to confront one another); but blogs do not 
"foster mutual obligation" among members. In fact, we cannot even talk about 
"members" of a blog. There is an inequality in the authority of whoever posts or 
comments on a blog, because blogs have authors, who set the agenda and publish their 
opinion. A blog is almost always someone's blog. If we consider the blog and its 
audience a community, then there is one clear leader – the author –, who can easily 
control the agenda of (and (mis)behaviour in) discussions. Therefore it is inherent in the 
concept of blogs that norms of the discussion are not hammered out in mutual 
adjustment, but are aligned to the concepts of the blog's owner.) (See Galston 2002: 54.) 
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5.1.9 Blogs and the culture industry 
The relationship between blogs and the culture industry could fit perfectly to the 
textbook definition of "ambivalence." As I proposed in chapter 3.5, I examine this 
relationship from two perspectives: first, whether blogs increase the availability of 
cultural products, and second, do they promote "layman criticism" or the pluralization 
of cultural value systems. 
The short answer is "yes" to both of these questions. One could go as far as saying that 
criticism is the very purpose of blogs: "have a say, share with others how you see the 
world, show everyone what is important to you!" The point is exactly that one could 
freely and easily share his or her thoughts with the largest possible audience, without 
having to abide by any kind of perceived intellectual authority. This in itself, as I noted 
before, has ambivalent effects: it does provide a new kind of freedom of speech 
(writing) to tackle censorship or the bias of conventional media against e.g. a minority, 
but the easiness of starting one's own blog also means that, in case of a difference of 
opinion, it might be easier to start a new blog than to engage in reasoned debate with 
someone else on another blog. (Leaving a debate and starting one's own blog might also 
be a preferred method because this latter option provides – supposedly – greater 
visibility to the thoughts published.) 
This suggests a trend of a constantly growing blogosphere, and one that is, once again, 
fragmented. As for the reliability of the layman criticism offered on/by blogs, all the 
factors I detailed in chapter 5.1.7 apply. I would especially like to stress the point about 
the uncertainty of identities, which on the one hand means that participants of a 
discussion are on more equal terms than in real life, because the role of real-life 
authoritative factors (such as age, gender, profession, qualifications etc.) is to a great 
extent eliminated from an online discourse, but which, consequently, also means that 
everybody can pose as an expert. And while the cross-referenced and entangled nature 
of the blogosphere helps fact-checking in the case of news, it cannot work just as 
effectively when it comes to justifying or substantiating opinions about the cultural 
values of cultural products. 
 
At the same time, blogs are undoubtedly an excellent platform for promoting these 
products of the culture industry, especially movies and music. Such products can be 
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consumed right in front of the computer, and blogs might offer easy, often illegal, access 
to them. If a blog publishes a critique about a new album or a movie, it can easily be 
arranged that the sound or video files are hosted on the blog itself, or that the blog 
shows its readers where to download the files in question. The cross-linked and 
searchable nature of blogs mean that the whole of the blogosphere could be viewed as a 
hopelessly unorganized but vast database, and in this database, if someone is willing to 
lend some authority to blog sources of questionable trustworthiness, it is easy to find an 
armada of cultural products. 
Do these two effects offset one another? No. Rather, in my opinion, they work in 
parallel, as far as the culture industry is concerned, in opposite directions, but as far as 
the public sphere is concerned, towards the same end: fragmentation and relativization. 
 
5.1.10 Summary: blogs 
The term "blog" refers to a certain form of publishing online information. Traditional 
media enterprises might use blogs as well as companies not involved in the media, 
private persons, non-profit organizations or states – whoever. Hence, blogs can and do 
have very diverse contents: opinion pieces, articles of scientific information, personal 
experiences, news items, unsolicited business offers or advertising material (spam) – 
etc. The term "blog" is often used in a restricted meaning, referring to personal, 
independent websites. The majority of such independent blogs are not business 
undertakings; the ones that are usually produce revenues from placing advertising on 
the surface of the website. 
Traditional media also uses blogs in the attempt of covering topics of niche interest, 
expressing an opinion and offering means for readers to get directly involved in the 
discussion that is taking place in the particular media product. Given the difficulties 
involved in first-hand news reporting, independent blogs might have an important role 
in the dissemination and secondary processing of news (they reach their readers much 
faster than traditional print media), but not in the first-hand reporting of news. 
Since the barriers to entry are extremely low – anybody can start a blog with just a few 
clicks of the mouse –, the number of blogs in existence is large – however, the majority 
of blogs are abandoned shortly after their start. The blogosphere is, then, considerably 
fragmented, with only a handful of blogs acting as important points of orientation, or 
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the influential inner core of the blogosphere. 
Blogs can be "global" only in the very restricted term of the word (connecting "issue 
publics"), and in my view it would be a mistake to regard the blogosphere as some kind 
of an alternative global public sphere. This is partly because of the questionable nature 
of identities and credibility of blogs and bloggers (even though, in my view, the cross-
referenced blogosphere, providing easy access to information, renders fact checking in 
connection with news items considerably easy and establishes transparency within the 
blogosphere), and partly because of the fact that argumentative discussion on blogs is 
discouraged: not only is it easier to set up one's own blog than to bother arguing with 
someone else, it also provides tangible consequence (one's own blog), as opposed to the 
inconsequential words posted in a commentary to another blog's post. 
From the point of view of the culture industry, blogs produce ambivalent effects: they 
increase the availability of cultural products (legally or illegally), and at the same time 
they promote layman criticism; both of these trends promote the fragmentation of the 
blogosphere and a relativization of value systems cultural products should be judged by. 
 
However, even if the blogosphere as such cannot automatically be regarded as part of 
the public sphere, certain individual blogs could, in my view, take an important role in 
directly influencing the discursive creation of "soft power," by addressing issues of 
credibility, upon which, according to Keohane and Nye, the operations of modern 
politics are based upon (Keohane and Nye 2002). 
In fact I arrived at the view that "blog" is too large, too diverse category for a detailed 
analysis trying to assess their contribution to the public sphere. The difference between 
professional blogs that do not look like blogs at all, and personal blogs that only their 
owner reads, are too big, even if some of the underlying concepts are the same. For 
sure, the tools are readily available to help the dissemination and secondary procession 
– discussion, debate – of news and opinion. In the case of certain, influential blogs, this 
can be proven working, but the large number of blogs suggests that these few examples 
represent only the tip of the iceberg.
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5.2 Social bookmarking and news sites 
 
5.2.1 The concept 
The common principle in the operation of these websites could be phrased as follows: if 
you find something you like on the internet, let others know about it. Ideally, 
communities could be built around the "social" treatment of information on the web, 
and these communities could act as editors of the flows of information available online. 
In this paper I distinguish between two basic types of these web services: social 
bookmarking sites (such as del.icio.us) and social news sites (such as Digg). The 
distinction is somewhat arbitrary, because the working mechanism of these two types of 
sites are often very similar, if not the same. But such "social content" sites tend to define 
themselves as either one or the other, and this self-definition encourages users to use the 
sites in significantly different manner. But what are these, after all? 
 
Social bookmarking means saving the 
address of interesting websites, or pieces 
of websites (e.g. pictures or other 
individual files) and describing these 
websites with the help of freely chosen 
keywords (tags). The resulting package of 
information is simply called a bookmark: 
it tells you where to find a particular site 
and what you can expect to find there. 
Since the bookmarks are stored on the 
web server that powers the bookmarking 
site, they can be accessed from any computer that is connected to the internet28. What 
makes this bookmarking social is that all users have access to all other users' public 
bookmarks (one can decide whether to save a particular bookmark as public or private). 
Everyone can browse and search other people's bookmarks, and it is possible to have a 
                                                 
28
 A tremendous advantage if one is doing research work in several places, e.g. using both a home 
computer and computers in a library – no need to scribble long and difficult web addresses onto pieces 
of paper that eventually always get lost somehow. 
 
Figure 1: The front page of del.icio.us 
 82 
discussion about the bookmarks themselves directly on the bookmarking website. 
The idea behind this is that searching in a database of links that is compiled by humans 
can complement the search in databases that are compiled by algorithms (such as the 
database of Google) – because of the underlying assumption that people will only 
bookmark links that point to relevant and high quality content29. In the case of 
del.icio.us in particular, one can also subscribe to certain tags – meaning that one gets 
automatically notified of all the bookmarks that get saved under the specified tags in the 
future. This means that there is no need to search for bookmarks with the same tags over 
and over again just in order to keep 
up-to-date regarding a certain topic. 
Let, say social bookmarking sites, 
others do the searching. 
 
Social news sites such as Digg 
(http://www.digg.com) or Reddit 
(http://www.reddit.com) are also 
based on user-submitted content, 
decidedly focusing on news items and 
putting a more pronounced emphasis 
on the discussion about the submitted 
news items. Importantly, the users of social news sites can express both their like as 
well as their dislike for an article. In the case of Digg, one can see the list and a brief 
summary of the submitted articles, and can can decide whether to "digg" (vote for) or 
"bury" (vote against) a particular item. The constantly refreshed list of the most popular 
articles is published on the main page of the site – which then acts as a news site in its 
own right –, and the entries submitted are usually filed into different categories such as 
world news, political opinion, science etc. The submitted articles can freely be 
commented upon; it is in this "comments area" where discussion is expected to develop. 
Submitted items could be textual articles, but also video or audio files, for example 
                                                 
29
 Not to mention the fact that such links can also be bookmarked that are missed or ranked low in the 
popular search engines. 
 
Figure 2: The front page of Digg 
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"podcasts," or pre-recorded radio shows that are disseminated on the internet. In 
addition, social news sites might offer the possibility to rate not only the submitted 
items themselves but also the comments that make up the discussion about the articles. 
Social news sites are not to be mistaken for sites that promote citizen journalism – such 
as Korea-based international OhMyNews (http://english.ohmynews.com), where users 
are expected to submit their own, original articles which are then edited by a 
professional team of editorial staff. Newsvine (http://www.newsvine.com) is a 
combination of such grassroots citizen journalism and social news sites, insofar as there 
is a more pronounced emphasis on the submission of original articles than in the case of 
Digg or Reddit, but articles are judged by the 
community, not a designated editorial staff. 
Both in the case of social news and 
bookmarking sites, owners or managers of the 
site may naturally exercise rights to moderate 
– censor – the submitted items, e.g. not to 
allow links to illegal or offensive contents, and 
to prevent copyright infringement by citing an 
item that is not allowed to be cited. 
It is noteworthy that broadband internet connections and the spread of the so-called 
flash technology30 allow new ways to visually represent the constantly changing 
contents of a website – such as a social news site. For example in the case of Digg Arc 
(Figure 3) – a free application available from the homepage of Digg – news items are 
represented as coloured segments of a circle; the more popular the piece if news is, the 
longer its segment. The picture is updated in real time, and it can be stopped at any time 
so that the user can browse among the articles. Users can also follow in real time which 
stories are being "dugg" and buried, in other spectacular visualizations 
(http://labs.digg.com). 
This feature of social news sites does not necessarily help discussion about the news 
                                                 
30
 "A multimedia authoring and playback system from Adobe. [...] Flash became popular for its animated 
graphics. Responsible for much of the animations, advertisements and video components found on 
today's Web sites, the Flash Player is a free client application that works with popular Web browsers." 
(TechEncyclopedia 2007.) 
 
Figure 3: Digg Arc 
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items. But it does help usability (having visual signposts in the armada of news items is 
a positive asset), and it can be one feature that attracts users to use the site – and the 
viewership of the site is indeed important, from reasons to be detailed later. 
 
5.2.2 The content 
In this paper, I will focus on two social content websites: Digg and del.icio.us, because 
presently these are the most-visited, most popular ones of such web services (PEJ 
2007). However, they only represent the tip of the iceberg. According to web traffic 
analyst site Alexa (2007a, 2007b), at the time of writing this paper Digg is the 106th 
most popular website of the world, attracting 0,6-0,8% of the web's traffic every day, 
while del.icio.us is in the 262nd position, with roughly 0,4% of the daily web traffic 
passing through it. But there are many more social news and bookmarking sites of lesser 
importance: Markaboo.com, Ma.gnolia.com, Furl and Stimpy, to name but a few; not 
mentioning the local interpretations translated versions of the most popular sites. And 
since these sites maintain only a few barriers to the contents that users upload, it could 
be established that the contents of such sites are extremely diverse. 
However, according to a recent report by research organization "Project for Excellence 
in Journalism," one common feature of the contents of social news and 
bookmarking sites is that they differ significantly from the contents offered by 
mainstream media. PEJ's research analysed during a one-week period the most popular 
contents of Digg, Reddit (the second-biggest user news site) and del.icio.us, as well as 
mainstream news site Yahoo! News, and cross-matched these contents to the news 
agenda of the offline mainstream media in the U.S. (considering 48 various news 
outlets, TV and radio channels as well as daily and weekly newspapers). (PEJ 2007.) 
On the week of June 24 – 29, 2007, main stories on the agenda of mainstream media 
dealt with a political debate over immigration (representing 10% of all news stories in 
PEJ's compilation of news, referred to as News Coverage Index), a fire near Lake Tahoe 
(6%), a failed terrorist attack in the U.K. (6%), and events in Iraq (6%).  The top 10 
stories that week accounted for 51% of all the stories in the News Coverage Index, but: 
[i]n the user-generated sites, these stories were barely visible. Overall, just 
5% of the stories captured on these three sites overlapped with the ten most 
widely-covered stories in the Index (13% for Reddit, 4% for Digg, and 0% 
for Del.icio.us). (PEJ 2007: 4.) 
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In contrast, it was technology–related entries that dominated the social bookmarking 
and news sites: e.g. the launch of Apple's iPhone. However, "domination" might only 
refer to the broad category of news, but not to individual news items because, 
unsurprisingly, the news coverage of social news sites proved to be considerably 
fragmented. According to PEJ's report, the only event that was covered by popular news 
items on more than one day was the iPhone-launch. (PEJ 2007: 2–4.) 
Social content sites also differ from traditional media outlets in the sources they use: 
"[a]bout seven in ten (70%) stories on del.icio.us, Reddit and Digg, originally appeared 
on blogs and sites that generally offer very little news." Forty percent of all stories 
submitted originated on blogs, and only 25% of the entries referenced to the mainstream 
media (such as BBC News or the online Slate magazine). In addition, 1% of the stories 
appeared as original reporting. (PEJ 2007: 4–5.) 
On the website of Yahoo! News, even when picking from a limited list of stories that 
was already filtered and trimmed down by editors of the site, users' top stories only 
rarely matched those of professionals. PEJ compared the front page section of the site 
with its "most viewed," "most e-mailed" and "most recommended" list: most viewed 
stories generally tended to be the most sensationalist news, while the most e-mailed and 
most recommended articles were usually concerned with foreign politics, or offered 
lifestyle-related, or otherwise useful advice. (PEJ 2007: 11–13.) 
The report also found that, contrary to expectations of the web internationalizing the 
news diet of media consumers, popular items on the social content sites focused mostly 
on domestic events – even more than the traditional media (PEJ 2007: 2). 
The analysis leads to a carefully phrased conclusion, stating that at the moment those 
who rely on user-generated news and bookmarking sites are just a fraction of those 
attracted by the mainstream media (and these two sets might overlap to same extent), 
but it is now beyond doubt that "user-driven sites have entered the news business, or 
perhaps more accurately, they have entered the news dissemination business" (PEJ 
2007: 2, 14). 
 
Concerning the above analysis, I first have to comment that I don't fully agree with its 
practice of putting del.icio.us in the same basket as Digg and Reddit. These latter are 
decidedly news sites; they offer a front page with various categories of articles to 
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browse, list of topics etc. In contrast, del.icio.us merely offers a "What's hot?" list, 
showing the bookmarks that in the past hours have been saved by most users of the site. 
In addition, I suspect there is a marked difference in how these various sites are used. 
The point of saving a bookmark is that with its help, one can return to a certain website 
later, i. e. there is an expectation that the information stored on the website will be 
relevant days, weeks, months or even years later. This long-term aspect is missing from 
the concept of news: there is, as the saying goes, nothing less worthwhile than 
yesterday's newspaper. Of course in some cases it might be relevant to bookmark certain 
articles – e.g. in conducting research –, but in my understanding bookmarking rather 
concerns news websites as such (in the expectation that they might provide interesting 
news in the future), but not individual news items. The situation is the opposite for of 
user news sites: the point there is to submit individual pieces of news, not whole 
websites as such. 
This is part of the reason why bookmarks on social bookmarking sites tend to link to 
websites with higher perceived usability, but lower news value. Tutorials, opinion pieces 
and other instances of static information are more suitable for being bookmarked than 
news items – indeed, PEJ's report confirms that these latter only constitute under 5% of 
popular bookmarks on del.icio.us (PEJ 2007: 7, 9). 
 
Second, I think it would be a mistake to draw, from the findings of the PEJ report, the 
conclusion that internet users are not interested in what is covered by the mainstream 
media. Partly because, as the report itself states, the sample and the scope of analysis 
was considerably small, and it might also have been distorted by the fact that Digg- and 
Reddit-users tend to be interested in technology more than the average in the first place 
(this is why they became Digg- and Reddit-users). But I also think that the most popular 
user-submitted topics suggest disinterest in news which were already covered anyway.  
In my reading, the figures of the PEJ-report indicate an underlying principle in the 
concept of user news sites: the idea of helping the underdogs in the mass media flow, or 
promoting articles which are deemed interesting but which do not get enough attention 
from traditional media outlets. Even the mere popularity of user news sites points in this 
direction; after all, who would want to visit a site which provides all the information 
that one has already heard on tv or the radio and read about in the daily paper? 
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However, I agree with the final conclusion of the PEJ report (2007: 14), namely that 
further and deeper analysis would be necessary to assess the reasons behind and 
implications of the contents of user news sites. Until then we can only safely state that 
these contents, as well as their sources, are fragmented, and they tend to differ largely 
from those of the mainstream media output. 
Analysing the contents of the most popular social news and bookmarking sites from the 
perspective of the culture industry, it is telling that neither Digg nor Reddit features 
"culture" or "arts" as news category (in the case of del.icio.us this is not a problem, of 
course, because tags, describing the submitted bookmarks, are freely defined by the 
users). On the other hand, both of them do feature an "entertainment" category. I find 
such an organization of things troubling. Given the free availability of space on the 
internet, and the fact that pages can be personalized (no one has to read through 
categories of news (s)he is not interested in), there seems to be no reason for the 
omission of art-related categories. 
One might think that the reason lies in the post-modern, popular view of Digg and 
Reddit on culture (or, in Eagletonian terms, Culture) – but at least in the case of Digg I 
strongly doubt this, not least because of the fact that none of the sub-categories under 
"entertainment" would be fit for accommodating news items about theatre, literature or 
fine arts31. The most popular story at the time of writing this paper, that contains the 
word "art," is a collection of pictures of works by street graphic artists. Interestingly, it 
is filed under the "Design" sub-category of "Technology" (Digg 2007c). 
 
Naturally, the set-up of categories might be explained by Digg's strategy not to target all 
audiences, but rather younger – and technology-oriented – users, who might not be 
expected to be interested in arts and culture related news. It is expected that once user 
news sites become more popular, others sites will appear dealing in the distribution of 
these more "mature" news items. 
 
                                                 
31
 There are four sub-categories of "entertainment" in Digg: "Celebrity," "Movies," "Music" and 
"Television." (Perhaps not accidentaly, Adorno referred to the film industry as being the "central 
sector in culture industry" (2001: 100).) On the other hand, both Digg and Reddit deal extensively 
with computer games also, which, according to Hesmondhalgh (2002: 12) belong to the products of 
the culture industry. Machin and Leeuwen (2007) share his view, and I agree with it myself. 
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5.2.3 The business model 
User content sites produce revenues from publishing advertising on the same website, 
for which they are a very apt surface, because adverts can be highly accurately targeted. 
Taking, again, the example of Digg, registration involves creating a user profile, which 
will keep track which articles on has read, voted for or submitted. Advertisers can target 
their offers based on these profile data, trying to make sure that people will only be 
exposed to ads they might genuinely be interested in (Digg 2007). 
However, the nature of user content sites puts their owners into a risky position: with a 
large number of users constantly posting new items, owners will only have limited 
control over what gets published on the web page. The business interests of the 
companies behind the sites might dictate that at least on the outside, on the front pages, 
the items submitted should suggest an image about the company that is coherent with 
what advertisers would like to see. This dilemma advocates the so-called "mullet 
strategy." Trimmed in the front and loose in the back, social content sites do best by 
taming their most visible image (the front pages), while also allowing users to freely 
discuss and debate in the back, e.g. in the contents that are attached to entries, and in 
other areas that are not immediately visible upon visiting the site. (BuzzFeed 2007.) 
Advertising might only be a partial source of revenue for social content sites. Digg, as 
an independent company, is entirely advertising-driven, but Reddit is owned by 
worldwide publisher of traditional and electronic publications Condé Nast (Condé Nast 
2007), and del.icio.us is owned by online content provider and search engine giant 
Yahoo! (del.icio.us 2007). Although control over the exact contents of the sites is 
maintained by their clients, the owners, in line with the mullet strategy, might also use 
these sites to promote material furthering their own business interests. 
 
5.2.4 Social content sites and the media institution 
Social news sites do not directly provide own content – indirectly, as alluded to above, 
they might do so. Consequently, they rely on other media outlets for material. 
As the analysis of the PEJ-group shows (2007: 4–5), 70% of the most popular entries on 
user-driven news sites originate from blogs and other alternative sources that provide 
little news content (which gives a slight twist to the word "news" in the the term "social 
news site"). But of course this does not mean that the role of traditional news media 
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wouldn't be important! As I have stated before (chapter 5.1), the blogosphere is rather a 
sphere of dissemination and secondary news processing, than a sphere of original news 
and first hand reporting – which, in turn, means that it has to be traditional media 
sources that provide raw material for the blogs themselves. 
Therefore, in my interpretation, the PEJ-analysis indicates that social news sites 
complement traditional media sources, instead of aiming at their replacement. 
Neither do I think that this would significantly change with a possible massive surge in 
the number of audiences of such websites. Firstly because first-hand news reporting is a 
resource-demanding business undertaking, and one that requires the tight cooperation of 
an editorial staff, not the very loose cooperation of a cast of thousands. And secondly 
because, in my view, there is a clear, functional upper limit on the growth of the 
number of users of social news sites: more users mean more submitted stories, 
which in turn is expected to lead to an ever more fragmented coverage of news32. 
(In March 2007, Digg grew to over 1 million registered users (Digg 2007a), and yet 
most popular items in a week’s time receive merely 3 – 5 thousands diggs.)  
 
5.2.5 Globality and goodness of fit 
As the PEJ-report also claims, social news sites tend to focus on domestic issues, and 
this could presumably be true about their local incarnations too (such as fledgeling 
Digg-clones Linkter (http://www.linkter.hu) or Kerro.fi). Similarly to blogs, the 
language of the site can be an implicit regulator of the goodness of fit. 
On the other hand, social news sites provide the opportunity to present stories from a 
more global approach, e.g. by citing articles about well publicized events from 
alternative, foreign sources. And of course if one is able to overcome the language 
obstacle, they can also have a say, influence the discussion and the contents of the 
website. And it is this influence that is the key here; coupled with Digg's attempts to 
take the image of a conventional news site. 
Simply, it does matter what gets to the front page of Digg or Reddit. It does matter, 
                                                 
32
 On the other hand, just because a news item does not get immediately popular, it usually stays for 
considerable time available on the social news site, and as long as it is available, it can also be 
discussed on the site. However, I think that from the point of view of the public sphere, whether or not 
something has a real chance of getting on the front page of a social news site is of crucial importance 
– as I explain under 5.2.5. 
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because the front page is the most visible for users and for non-registered visitors of the 
site as well (usually visitors do not have to register to be able to view the contents of the 
websites; registration is only necessary for voting on the news items). And this means 
that talk and actions on such websites do have consequences.   
Some might say there is no point in arguing in a conventional discussion forum or in a 
blog's comments area, but this is not the case here: on social news websites, every single 
vote counts towards a certain piece of news getting in the centre of attention, and it is 
worth making explanatory comments and arguing, because one can modify his or her 
points of view easily, in the light of the comments attached to an article33. The 
"comments system" of Digg is especially interesting: comments themselves can be rated 
positively or negatively, and it can be set that Digg lists the comments ordered by the 
number of positive votes they received – this means that more positively rated 
(supposedly: better phrased, more accurate, more valid, snappier) comments will be 
listed closer to the article, and thereby they might have a bigger effect on subsequent 
voters. A very elegant way of promoting reasoned debate, in my view: if your arguments 
are rated high, they might be significantly more influential than if they are rated low, 
e.g. for being offensive or narrow-minded. 
(This is why I suppose there is an upper limit to the usability of social news sites. Too 
small audience renders such a site 
insignificant, but too many users – 
unmanageably many stories and 
comments – render the individual voice 
insignificant.) 
 
The consequence of good 
argumentation on a social news website 
is not tied to any institution (apart from the website itself), and such a consequence is 
outside the realms of formal or procedural democracy. But it really can, in my view, 
help substantial democracy, in the exact Habermasian sense. This is the promise of 
                                                 
33
 Votes are not final in the case of Digg: "dugg" articles can be "undugg" and buried articles can be 
"unearthed" and voted for. 
Figure 4: Comments on Digg 
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social news sites – contingent on the competence of their users, and their willingness to 
put "their reason to public use." 
 
5.2.6 On the identity of users and the reliability of social content sites 
Because of their different uses and different attitudes towards shared contents, I 
distinguish here, too, between social bookmarking sites and social news sites. I focus on 
these latter first. What does credibility mean in connection with social news sites? 
On one hand, credibility could be understood in relation to the individual entries, 
articles posted. This is not a simple issue: articles might become popular on a social 
news website in spite of their lack of credibility – or in fact, because of their total 
incredibility, their – perceived – blatant lies or stupidity, which then can be 
mocked, criticized and made fun of. But if this is so, then this fact can be pointed out 
in the comments attached to the article, and the reliability of the individual articles can 
be, in the manner I have described in the case of blogs, cross-checked on the internet. 
On the other hand, the notion of credibility could be examined in relation to the social 
news site as a whole, in line with the expectations that such a site should provide a more 
balanced representation of news than traditional media does (because here the editors – 
i. e. the audience – have no vested interest in the contents of the site). This does not 
mean that a social news site is not expected to feature news items from the traditional 
mass media – but the idea is that a supposedly open-minded and interest-free audience 
could apply some kind of a filter to the flow of media output, picking out the best 
available articles. It could, with Dahlgren's terms, act as part of the advocacy media; and 
this is a way in which social news sites could fulfil a role in the public sphere. 
It is the latter interpretation of credibility that I turn to here. 
 
If a social news site wants to be a legitimate part of the advocacy media, then it should 
reflect some kind of a popular – public – opinion and interest, which in the first place 
means that entries should be given attention because readers find them interesting, but 
not because some hidden business interest. Admittedly, this is not always the case – 
there is for instance no way to make sure whether or not someone is voting for or 
against an article that (s)he actually read.  (See Seopedia 2007.) 
Vote rigging – hiring registered users at a social news site to promote certain news 
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items, making them look more interesting than they actually are – is also possible. Sites 
such as User/Submitter (http://www.usersubmitter.com) act as intermediaries between 
submitters (of phoney stories, e.g. badly disguised advertising), and users (e.g. of Digg), 
with these latter being paid a small sum after each vote they cast on the submitted story. 
Digg claims that it is capable of filtering phoney votes (Digg 2007b). On the other hand, 
according to an experiment carried out by a journalist on behalf of Wired magazine, vote 
rigging is indeed possible. (The fact that Wired is also tied, through its owner, to Digg's 
main rival Reddit, does not alter the conclusion of the article itself, it merely suggests, 
somewhat awkwardly, that Reddit could just as well be hacked.) However, it is expected 
that once a story gets popular – it receives enough  rigged votes to be put on the front 
page –, and hence it receives a lot of interest, it will finally be up to the larger 
community of Digg to decide if it can stay there for much longer. And, importantly, 
most members of this larger community have no vested interest in voting for 
uninteresting stories (unlike the corrupted voters who helped the story get on the front 
page). (Newitz 2007.) 
 
Taking a look from another perspective, is it possible for the owners of a social news 
site to affect the flow of news? It certainly is; as I mentioned previously, it is customary 
to moderate submitted items in order not to publish anything illegal or offensive. 
Besides, in line with the mullet strategy, there might be other reasons as well to restrict 
the freedom of the editorial community. Having said that, the following case study 
illustrates that even the owners' own hands can be tied after the users of the site gather a 
critical mass. 
On April 30th, 2007, a user posted a news item on Digg: a message which contained the 
encryption key to the digital rights management application of the HD-DVD standard34.  
Digg promptly removed the story from its site: 
We’ve been notified by the owners of this intellectual property [the 
encryption key in question], that they believe the posting of the encryption 
key infringes their intellectual property rights. In order to respect these 
rights and to comply with the law, we have removed postings of the key that 
have been brought to our attention. (Digg 2007d) 
                                                 
34
 Knowing this encryption key allows programmers to crack the copy protection mechanism of HD-
DVDs, and thus to make illegal copies of movies and video games that are burnt onto HD-DVD 
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However, the news, apparently of great importance to a significant part of the Digg-
community, resurfaced over and over again, not only in the form is simple news items, 
but also in photo montages or disguised in other forms. It became clear that users did 
not tolerate censorship in this case, even though the Advanced Access Content Systems 
group (AACS), the owner of the encryption key, threatened to pursue lawsuits against 
everybody who contributed to spreading it (Waters 2007). Managers of Digg could 
either choose to face a lawsuit or to lose the confidence and support of their users. They 
chose the first option: one day after the previous statement, Digg founder Kevin Rose 
declared in the company's blog that the site is not giving in to the legal threats of AACS. 
[A]fter seeing hundreds of stories and reading thousands of comments, 
you’ve made it clear. You’d rather see Digg go down fighting than bow 
down to a bigger company. We hear you, and effective immediately we 
won’t delete stories or comments containing the code and will deal with 
whatever the consequences might be. (Digg 2007e) 
 
This example illustrates that social news sites with considerably large readership can 
effectively tackle the problem of vote-rigging and the unwanted influence of the 
"official" editorial staff; the credibility of news items, insofar as they represent points of 
genuine interest, can be safeguarded. The malevolent, deliberate hacking of social news 
sites is highly unlikely to succeed in the medium or long run. 
 
But this is only part of the problem. Whether such sites can provide relevant, high-
standard advocacy media is the function of the competence and social sensitivity of 
their users. A user news site might accurately reflect public opinion, or at least topics 
that public opinion finds interesting, but this does not mean that these topics, or their 
cited coverage, would constitute a meaningful alternative to the output of traditional 
media. Or, in Habermas' words, issues reflected upon in user news sites might not be 
among the "relevant issues" from the point of view of the political public sphere. 
However pessimistic this sounds, I do believe that user news sites are a welcome effect 
of the internet on the public sphere. Reiterating a previous point: their solution is not 
"perfect" solution. But they certainly offer an opportunity, what's more, they strongly 
encourage conducting meaningful, consequential discussion about topical issues. 
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Slightly different considerations apply for the reliability of social bookmarking sites. 
Since the primary function of these sites is to manage one's bookmarks in an easy-to-use 
and accessible manner, the rating of each other's bookmarks, even if present as a feature 
of the site, carries no such weight as in the case of social news sites. The underlying 
assumption is that all bookmarks are relevant, otherwise there would be no point in 
saving them for one's own use. Therefore, establishing how credible a particular 
bookmarked site is, is down to individual judgement. 
It is certainly possible to hack these sites in similar ways as social news sites, but I 
downplay the importance of this practice, because here users have no incentive to 
bookmark links they consider useless. The "front page" or "what's hot" page of social 
bookmarking sites lacks the "front page quality" of news sites – it is rather just an 
assorted, random list of possibly interesting things from the web. In addition, the 
bookmarking of useless links is discouraged by the fact that the more bookmarks one 
has, the harder it is to organize and keep track of them. 
Therefore it can be claimed that the contents of social bookmarking sites represent 
genuine interest, but without the idea that these contents should represent some kind of 
advocacy media. These sites are rather a loose gauge of opinion. 
 
5.2.7 On the mode of consumption 
Social bookmarking and news sites are very fast when it comes to the dissemination of 
news, given their extensive staff – that is, audience. Of course the submission of a 
certain news item does not guarantee that it will get on the front page, and I also showed 
how today's social news sites differ in their contents from the conventional media. 
In fact, the usability of such websites is strongly tied to the number of users: if there is 
an abundance of submitted, upcoming stories, it becomes hard to find the ones that are 
really worthwhile of a positive vote. It is helpful if these stories can be arranged into 
various categories, or filtered through pre-defined filters regarding the contents or 
source of the news items. Digg's practice, that the stories buried become invisible for 
the person that buried them, but stay visible for everyone else, also helps to establish an 
ease-of-use. 
 
Part of the consumption of social content sites, and especially social news sites, is 
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discussion. In contrast with blogs, and referring back to C.W. Mills, here the production 
and the consumption of ideas imply one another; they happen simultaneously. If I read 
an article on a social news sites, I have three options: vote for the article, vote against 
the article, or abstain from voting – and whichever of these I choose influences whether 
or not the story ends up (or stays) on the front page of the site.  
 
Posting a comment on the story further enhances this influence; the primary function of 
discussion is to provide a framework for the argumentation about the items posted. As 
mentioned earlier, comments can also be rated, and offensive comments, or ones that are 
judged to be spam, can be removed. I underlined in chapter 5.2.5, how the comments 
system can, in the case of a social news site, encourage reasoned, argumentative debate 
– and also that the limitations concerning the size of audience concern the comments as 
well: discussion can only be relevant if its scope and the number of its participants 
stays manageable. Theoretically there is no barrier on the growth of social network 
sites, but practically, from the point of usability, there indeed is one – however, further 
substantial research is required for establishing where exactly this barrier is, and what is 
the optimal size of a social news site audience is. 
 
As for social bookmarking sites, their modes of consumption hold no particular 
implications for the public sphere. As the example of del.icio.us illustrates, they can be 
seamlessly integrated into an ordinary web browser; one can just as easily use a social 
bookmarking site "unconsciously."  
 
5.2.8 Social contents and the culture industry 
I have found that Digg, and Reddit, the most popular social news sites consider the 
culture industry non-existent, or at best something roughly equating to celebrity news 
and gossip, Hollywood and popular music (see chapter 5.2.2). But I would argue that 
even if this was not the case, the role of social news sites would be considerably smaller 
than that of social bookmarking sites, in affecting the culture industry. This is because 
cultural products usually differ from disposable, ephemeral news items, insofar as these 
former are meant to be enjoyed not instantly, but over a longer period of time. Cultural 
products are not news items. 
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The role social bookmarking sites play in the promotion of the culture industry is 
similar to that of blogs: free choice, without regards to external intellectual authority is 
encouraged (you should bookmark the links you yourself find interesting), and at the 
same time, it is easy to find consumable (downloadable) cultural products in the 
network of bookmarked links. 
On most social bookmarking sites there is at least some kind of indication of the 
popularity of a certain website – for example in del.icio.us upon bookmarking a link, it 
can be seen how many other people had bookmarked it before. But, importantly, one 
can only express like or dislike towards bookmarks that he or she saved – it is formally 
impossible to argue about something that was not bookmarked. Since bookmarking is 
an activity which serves the bookmarker's own interests – quite in the same way as 
traditional, offline, “book-based” bookmarking serves the interests of the reader –, it can 
be assumed that those who bookmark a certain website are all in favour of it; that in this 
respect, there is a coherence of opinion among bookmarkers. This, in turn, significantly 
lowers the chance of a reasoned debate to spring to life about the merits or artistic value 
of an artist or a particular work of art. Therefore I am inclined to say that social 
bookmarking sites further deepen the fragmentation of the cultural public sphere, as 
they promote the birth of loosely tied groups of like-minded individuals. 
 
Once again, it is important to emphasize that there are all sorts of discussion forums on 
the internet, concerning various products of the culture industry: conventional, textual 
forums as well as applications like Last.fm (http://www.last.fm), where people can 
listen to music online and become part of a community that is organized by music taste. 
But the point of these sites is not to promote reasoned debate, at least not nearly as 
effectively as social news sites do. However, as I noted earlier, with the growth and 
development of social content sites as such, it is expected that either the most popular 
sites will open up to the culture industry, or that separate sites will be born, focusing 
exclusively of culture-related news items. But these are still expected to focus on works 
of art only indirectly, because these latter seldom have news value, and seldom have the 
short expiry date news items have. This is important, because it is precisely the news 
value and the short lifespan of news items that enables social news sites to function in 
the first place: voting and argumentation about a particular news item is important 
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because this will decide what gets on the front page from the constantly renewing, 
overwhelming flow of information. 
 
5.2.9 Summary 
Following the distinction I pursued throughout this chapter, first I turn my attention to 
social bookmarking sites and then to social news sites, when summarizing and 
evaluating their contribution to the public sphere. 
As for social bookmarking sites, their relevance seems considerably smaller, given the 
ways they are meant to be used. They help finding relevant information – but the 
"relevance" here is defined very loosely, and following individual preferences and 
judgement. I am convinced that social bookmarking is a very useful personal activity, 
but that doesn't mean that such sites would be promoting reasoned discourse. They do 
not directly contribute to either the political or the cultural public sphere in a 
meaningful way. 
 
Social news sites fell in a different category. As we have seen from the analysis of the 
Project for Excellence in Journalism research organization, their contents complement 
that of traditional media output, and hence they establish a setting that could 
accommodate an alternative media sphere – using Dahlgren's term, an advocacy media. 
This is not carried out by first hand news reporting, but by secondary procession of 
existing media sources, by filtering these sources in a more balanced way than the 
conventional media. 
Social news sites are reliable in the sense that their contents reflect genuine interest 
from their members, and they also promote constructive, argumentative discussion 
among their members. Therefore they do contribute positively to the public sphere. 
This advocacy media might not be relevant to larger groups of society, or perfect in any 
sense; it might exclude the representation of minority groups that, given the unequal 
access to the internet or other barriers to entry such as the language, cannot take 
advantage of its services. Social news sites are indeed limited both in their reach and in 
their use; they are sites are no panacea, and their role will always be the function of the 
(in)competence of their users. But within these limitations they come much closer to the 
ideal advocacy media than it would be possible for conventional media institutions. 
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However, their beneficial role can only manifest if the size of the audience is in an 
optimal range: big enough so that a large amount of content is continuously submitted, 
big enough so that the front page of the website becomes meaningful by its popularity, 
but not too big, because that would render discussion impossible and the news coverage 
uselessly fragmented. (Where this "optimal range" stretches could be the subject of 
further studies.)
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5.3 RSS and personalized starting pages 
 
I dedicate this sub-chapter to the description of two important pieces of technology, 
changing the way online available information is consumed. These are: the RSS (Really 
Simple Syndication), and the personalized, information-aggregating starting pages. 
  
5.3.1 The concept – and the mode of consumption 
Approaching from the point of view of users, RSS is a technology that delivers the 
contents of websites to users without the users themselves having to visit the site. 
How does this work in practice? 
Users subscribe to the RSS-feed of a website, using a so-called RSS reader application. 
This application might be a separate piece of desktop software, an integrated part of an 
e-mail client (such as MS Outlook), or part of a website. Through this established feed, 
the website publishes information every time it is updated. For example, as is customary 
with blogs or news sites, if a new article is published on a news site, its headline, lead or 
brief summary is sent out to the RSS-subscribers. The feeds are updated automatically, 
and users can, in their RSS reader, see all the updates from all the different sources in 
one place. Thereby they can in real time monitor the contents of all potentially 
interesting websites. And if a certain article looks interesting, the user can just click on 
the item in the RSS reader and immediately get transported to the website itself, where 
the whole article can be found. (Cf. TechEncyclopedia 2007.) 
Using an RSS-reader makes browsing more convenient (users won’t have to visit their 
favorite websites just to find out that nothing changed on them) and faster (users are 
notified immediately of the updates). The flow of information is reversed: the user 
does not need to visit the website – because the website visits the user. 
 
Personalized starting homepages help collecting and organizing RSS feeds, and also 
scores of other applications that users might find useful. Picking and mixing from the 
available applications and sources of information, users can create their personalized 
starting page. Information on what constitutes such a starting page is stored on a server 
of the service provider, which means in practice that the page can be accessed not only 
from one’s own computer, but from wherever there is an internet connection available. 
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Figure 5 shows an example 
of a personalized starting 
page, run by the service 
provider Netvibes, and 
collecting RSS feeds from 
The Guardian, The 
Independent, BBC, YLE, an 
additional application 
displaying a cartoon strip, 
and another one producing 
an instant weather report. 
Such is a very convenient 
way of organizing information – one that at least creates the illusion what we are not 
lost in the sea of information online. When clicked on a news item, it can be read in its 
entirety within the personalized page itself, and it is also possible to get directly 
transferred to the website in question. 
 
5.3.2 The content 
The RSS technology can be used by any website that is not entirely static. Naturally, the 
use of RSS is more important for sites that produce quickly perishable information, such 
as news sites or blogs that deal in actualities. 
As for the kinds of information that can be published on personalized starting pages, it 
is hard to provide an extensive list. Apart from conventional RSS feeds, an armada of 
"widgets" or "mini-applications" are available: these can, for example, display the 
weather forecast or continuously updated photo galleries, show famous quotes or stock 
exchange indicators, play embedded videos, or entertain the user with crosswords, 
puzzles or some other mini-games. 
 
5.3.3 The business model 
Admittedly, there is little public information on the business models behind 
personalized starting pages. "The Netvibes business model is largely undisclosed, 
although clearly investors are satisfied that the company is more than cool technology" 
Figure 5: Netvibes personalized starting page 
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(Maven 2007). In most cases, this business model differs from the popular advertising-
powered model of the net: even Google’s personalized home page service iGoogle 
(http://www.igoogle.com) does not feature ads35. Direct advertising cannot be found 
either on Bloglines (http://www.bloglines.com), Microsoft’s Live.com 
(http://www.live.com) or on Netvibes (http://www.netvibes.com) – in fact, Netvibes 
explicitly states on its homepage that it features "no ads, no logos, no corporate control" 
(2007). Instead, since these sites act as gateways to other contents, it is supposed that 
behind their operation stand affiliate programs: i.e. content providers share their 
revenues with the referring sites (Maven 2007). Content provision does not necessarily 
mean links through RSS: companies might also provide various applications (such as 
the price-comparison product finder of Kelkoo.com) that users can integrate into their 
homepage (Netvibes 2007a).  
 
5.3.4 RSS and the media institution 
RSS – and similar syndication methods such as Atom – and personalized starting pages 
are not business services in themselves; they are merely pieces of technology. Through 
their use, readers can pick and mix contents from all over the web, but these 
technologies do not belong to anyone: nobody profits directly from other people using 
them. The copyright of the RSS specification is owned by Harvard University, who 
published it in Creative Commons license, meaning that it is free for everyone to use, 
copy, distribute, transmit or adapt it, as long as credit is given to the licensor, and the 
modified version is published under the same copyright license as the original (Harvard 
2003). That is to say, a website – say, an online outlet of a traditional newspaper – might 
decide to develop its own, improved, private version of RSS, but if it takes the RSS 
specification as a starting point, then this "new RSS" must be made public too. If it is a 
new specification from scratch, then it won’t be compatible with existing RSS readers, 
and therefore it will have to build up its user base from scratch, too. 
So the best an existing site can do is to subscribe to the publicly available model of RSS 
– meaning that it would have to compete with everyone else who uses the same 
                                                 
35
  …even though Google is an important publisher of contextual classified advertising (Economist 
2007a). In the second quarter of 2007 alone, it produced $3.87 bn revenues, chiefly stemming from 
advertising (Google 2007b). 
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technology. The domination of this technology is, thanks to the publicity of the 
technology, impossible. 
 
5.3.5 Summary 
The syndication of news items and the collection of these syndicated news items onto 
personalized "news-aggregator pages" enables online contents to reach their consumers 
quickly, and they offer considerable freedom and convenience in filtering the contents 
available online. Since the technology of RSS (and, similarly, that of Atom36) is freely 
and publicly available, their publicness opposes their domination by a minority interest 
group that would prefer excluding other sources from reaching audiences. 
All the above, however, does not mean that these two technologies in question would 
contribute directly to reasoned debate or to the development of the political or cultural 
public sphere. They are merely tools for organizing and spreading (quickly) information 
that is available online.
                                                 
36
 Atom is a standard published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (http://www.ietf.org), a non-
profit industry organization (IETF 2007). 
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5.4 Discussion forums 
 
5.4.1 The concept 
Internet discussion forums are a basic form of debate and opinion exchange. Forums are 
sometimes referred to as message boards – as if they were real life boards onto which 
messages are attached, one under the other, organized into different topics and, within 
the topics, various threads. 
Using the graphical interface 
of the World Wide Web, users 
can attach pictures or other 
files to their posts, and 
naturally they can establish 
hypertext links between the 
posts and other homepages. 
There is no single generic 
model of forums on the 
internet. However, the 
following "ideal type" of 
forums illustrates well the 
concept and the operation of such a website, even though actual instances of such 
message boards might differ from it to a certain extent. 
 
Users of the forum can participate in the discussion upon registration, which is free of 
charge (considering an often-used business model of the forums (see chapter 5.4.3), it is 
in the owner’s interest to generate as much traffic to the site as possible – hence the free 
registration and participation). Upon registration, users choose a user name and provide 
the board’s administrators with an e-mail address, through which they can be contacted 
by other users or the staff of the forum (e.g. in case of a technical problem). 
 
Although in the discussion everyone is equal in principle, in practice, this is not always 
so. Naturally, the existence of the forum requires that there are administrators who take 
care of the website’s maintenance. Users with special rights to edit or remove posts, and 
 
Figure 6: Topics and threads in a forum 
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to carry out sanctions against other members, are called moderators – their task is to 
keep the conversation within the boundaries set by the owners of the forum. Sanctions 
include verbal warnings and the temporary, or, in worst case, permanent, ban of users. 
Administrators might restrict the rights of (certain groups of) users, too. For example, 
they can allow or disallow the creation of new topics, the editing of certain already 
existing threads etc. 
Still, in general, there is a balance between "those who produce and those who consume 
ideas." Every spectator is a potential participant. Similarly, the opportunity of quick and 
public reply is also secured for all participants. In line with the arguments of C. W. 
Mills, these features suggest that forums contribute to people forming a "community 
of publics" rather than an aimless "mass" (Eldridge 1983: 82). 
 
Next to the entries on a message board, you can see the nickname – user name – of the 
submitter, and some other pieces of information, such as their location, e-mail or 
website address, number of posts on 
the board and a stamp-sized picture, 
known as avatar, supposedly 
representing the user. 
It is also customary at forums to rank 
users in function of their activity – 
however, this usually means the mere 
evaluation of quantity but not quality 
(i.e. more posts equal higher ranks). 
"Post count" and rank are supposedly 
signs of internal authority on the 
forum (as opposed to the external 
authority – authority a forum 
participant has in real life), but this internal authority is often obviously questionable 
(e.g. with topics such as "Pump up your post count here" or "What are you listening to 
right now?"). 
The question of authority is tied to the basic idea and raison d’être of forums: to provide 
space for discussion. This discussion, naturally, is hardly ever for itself, but what its 
Figure 7: Entries in a forum 
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"real end" is depends on the contents of the forum. 
More often than not, posts on a forum are archived into a searchable database. In 
addition, items already posted might not be edited even by their original author, which 
suggests that forums, just as comments on a blog or on a social news site, promote 
conscious, careful conversation – you have to phrase your argument in such a way that 
it could be defended in subsequent debate. On forums, the sentence "everything you 
said could be used against you" is absolutely true. 
 
5.4.2 The content 
Creating a new forum or starting a new topic in an existing one is very easy, and so it is 
not surprising that there is hardly any area of "life, universe and everything" that is not 
discussed on internet forums. 
One could distinguish between two broad types of forums: certain boards such as that of 
Hungarian online news portal Index.hu, or the Japanese 2-Channel are what I would call 
"loose" forums, which accommodate a broad range of sub-forums, each dealing with a 
specific topic – from cat names through politics and gardening. In contrast, other forums 
only deal with a more or less narrowly defined topic – such as the fan discussion board 
of a band or the forum of, say, deer hunting enthusiasts. 
The use and purpose of a forum, as stated above, is closely related to its topic. But in 
general, the following categories might be established: forums might spread news and 
information (in which case the discussion is, in itself, inconsequential), they might 
provide help, advice or troubleshooting for their users (in which case the discussion is 
indeed consequential, but not necessarily contributive to a public sphere in a 
Habermasian sense), they might act as a virtual playground or sandbox (e.g. "Solve 
the riddle and post a new one!"), or, most importantly, their purpose might be the 
exchange and debate of opinion. 
 
In this latter case, the exchange of opinions is still inconsequential insofar as there are 
no inherent, built-in mechanisms in a forum that would lead to a change in the 
"established state of things" only because a debate took place and resulted in a certain 
outcome. As I noted earlier, I located the importance of social news sites in the fact that 
reasoned argumentation there does have a consequence – it decides what gets on the 
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front page of the site and therefore which issues gain wider recognition. But forums do 
not have front pages, and this mere technical detail means that even the most interesting 
conversation can get buried under other topics quickly and easily. 
As Mills established, for a group of people to act as a public as opposed to a mass, it is 
important that their crystallized "common opinion" could be mobilized into action 
(Eldridge 1983: 82). Such a mobilization does not occur on internet forums – but neither 
does this necessarily occur in the case of a conversation taking place in a coffee house, 
among real life actors. ("Talk is cheap," we could say, but talk is just as cheap when it 
happens in real life.) In my view, the reason why internet forums fail to channel opinion 
into action lies in the fact that they do not encourage reasoned argumentation (this, in 
turn stems from their inconsequential nature). It might be considerably easier to leave a 
forum or even to found a new one altogether than to bother with arguing against others 
(see Galston 2002: 55–56). 
 
5.4.3 The business model 
From the point of view of the technology, it is very easy to set up and run a forum; the 
only requirements being some storage space on a web server and a freely available 
"forum engine" – a piece of software that manages, stores and displays the entries in the 
form that is conventional among forums. Often these two are offered for free by forum 
providers such as AceBoard (http://www.aceboard.net). (As described in chapter 4, 
"free" from the point of view of the user might mean "funded by advertising" from the 
point of the provider.) 
In other words, the barriers to entry are very low. Precisely because of these low barriers 
to entry, there is very limited business potential in running the forum itself. Once 
members are required to pay for their membership, they can easily migrate to other, free 
sites (unless there is some kind of added value to the forum, such as the contribution of 
a well respected, important personality or celebrity). However, there might be a 
rationale in charging members for the access of the archives of the forum, as shown by 
the example of 2-Channel (Furukawa 2003). 
 
Considering the business model applied, we can also distinguish between discussion 
forums that were created for their own sake, and forums that are part of a business 
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organization with a higher agenda. A fan-created discussion group of an actor might be 
an example for the former, while the discussion board on a company website, where 
customers can get advice or leave feedback, is an example for the latter use of forums. 
In the first case, the model fits into the general pattern of online advertising (creating 
audiences with a free service, and exposing these audiences to advertising), although it 
does not necessarily follow that such forums are profit oriented. In the second case, the 
organization behind the forum foots its costs, but here, even if the forum greatly 
enhances "customer experience," or at least provides some help to clients, it hardly ever 
could act as a direct contributor to revenues. 
 
5.4.4 On the identity of users and the reliability of forums 
The issue of reliability or credibility of forums could, and in my view, should, be 
addressed from different points of view, pertaining to various purposes of forums. What 
I mean by this is the following. 
When forums are considered as media (although not part of the official media 
institution, as I will show shortly), or as transmitters of news and information, their 
reliability is very important. And, given the opportunity of anonymous participation, it 
is highly questionable, too, especially when it comes to such pieces of information that 
do not appear in traditional media and therefore could hardly be cross-checked with 
other sources. (Paradoxically, it is often precisely the anonymity of participants that 
enables important pieces of "sensitive" information to emerge.) 
But online forums are most important for the public sphere because they provide a place 
for discussion. And judged from this approach, the question of reliability turns out to be 
of secondary importance.  
 
Unless registration on a forum is tied to some kind of sensitive, private information, 
such as one’s bank account number or real-life address, participants in an online 
discussion might feel reasonably safe in the knowledge that their real identities could be 
kept separate from their online user names. 
The use of screen names is a large step towards establishing a disregard for external 
authority, and thus, towards an equal discussion among the participants and a larger 
freedom of speech. Further, if the forum requires its participants to use user names or 
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nicknames, then these virtual identities will automatically gather some kind of a history 
behind them, and from the archives of the forum this history can be retrieved. This, as 
noted in 5.4.1, is supposed to contribute to the quality of discussion. On the other hand, 
the use of pseudonyms also means a step towards information with inherently 
questionable credibility. 
Finally, if posting is anonymous and doesn’t require any kind of registration, this has the 
double consequence of allowing totally free speech and total disregard for external 
authority, at the expense of further loss of (both "external" and "internal") credibility37. 
And in fact this might just present the ideal situation for a public sphere to manifest in. 
This is the argument of Hiroyuki Nishimura, founder of 2-Channel. 
Delivering news without taking any risk is very important to us. There is a 
lot of information disclosure or secret news gathered on Channel 2. Few 
people would post that kind of information by taking a risk. [In addition,] 
people can only truly discuss something when they don’t know each other. 
[…] Under a perfectly anonymous system […] all information is treated 
equally; only an accurate argument will work." (Quoted in Furukawa 2003.) 
 
This is why the world’s biggest discussion forum, the Japanese 2-Channel is almost 
entirely anonymous (users do have the option to log in and use a nickname of their 
choosing, but the ‘default setting’ is namelessness); this is a contrast to "Western" style 
forums whereby the use of user names is most often than not required (and members are 
usually willing to share not only their user names but bits of other information about 
themselves as well). (Katayama 2007.) 
In what seems to highlight an important cultural difference between Japan and "the 
West," the anonymous nature of 2-Channel was linked to the formality, repression and 
importance of honor ("face") in Japanese culture. "On any given day you can read 
[anonymous] messages about users’ schemes to assault their bosses, murder their 
teachers or blow up a neighborhood kindergarten" (Furukawa 2003), which shows that 
2-Channel can function because it provides the freedom of expression that is missing 
from, or repressed in, real life, bound by formalities, tradition, and deeply rooted, 
unwritten laws. (Katayama 2007.) 
                                                 
37
 By external credibility I mean credibility established via the real-life identity of the submitter of a 
post, whereas internal credibility refers to the credibility that is attached to a user name on a forum 
because of its perceived previous activity. 
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The founder of the site himself cites another reason: 
I think [the popularity of 2-Channel] is related to the Japanese sense of 
homogeneity and our mentality of all being in the middle class. For 
instance, in the United States, people wouldn’t argue with someone they 
don’t know. Japanese don’t feel awkward even if they don’t know others’ 
status or background. (Quoted in Furukawa 2003.) 
 
The structure of 2-Channel is loose in every respect. There are no boundaries on the 
topics, and there are no appointed, official moderators – instead, a handful of volunteers 
try to have participants respect the lax rules of the message board. The optional, but 
often preferred, anonymity, might promote reasoned argumentation insofar as "all 
information is treated equally," but it also leads to a lot of hate speech, propaganda, and 
in general, the publication of posts that cannot be judged informative or constructive 
from any point of view. The founder of the board has faced more than 50 lawsuits so far, 
for defamation, copyright and privacy violations and for causing "personal injuries." 
(Katayama 2007.) 
And yet this tolerated anarchy seems to be working. If 2-Channel is a soapbox from 
where everybody can shout their woes and frustration into the world, political parties, 
companies and civil organizations are listening to it. 
[W]ith 2.5 million posts a day and about 800 active boards split into 
thousands of threads, […] this single site has more influence on Japanese 
popular opinion than the prime minister, the emperor and the traditional 
media combined. (Katayama 2007.)38 
 
Katayama’s article (2007) enumerates a couple of stories that are meant to illustrate the 
power of the "mob" of 2-Channel – these include a case where users of the forum 
responded to the call for help of a disaster-struck area, and another where they, by acting 
in unison, managed to have a possibly dangerous advertising billboard removed from a 
busy shopping street in Tokyo. According to the founder of the site, 2-Channel often 
"corrects the mistakes" of the conventional media by publicizing stories that at first 
went unnoticed by this latter, with many of these stories eventually making it into the 
mainstream media through 2-Channel (Furukawa 2003). 
                                                 
38
 2-Channel is the 281st most visited website, according to web analyst Alexa (2007d). Its daily share of 
global internet traffic varies between 0.2 – 0.3%.  
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Could 2-Channel be the example of a Habermasian public sphere, where opinions are 
detached from their anonymous bearers? This is the ultimate abolishment of any regard 
for external authority: as far as it is possible, it is not people, but solely arguments that 
confront one another. This kind of freedom might prove stimulating, because not only is 
it possible in such an environment to argue for every possible view without the least 
restriction, it is also possible to argue for fabricated, fake views, as in a thought 
experiment. In such an environment, everything can be disputed or questioned, the most 
fundamental tenets of a given ideology as well as the most superficial, insignificant 
details of our lives. In addition, when considering the Madisonian view on democracy, 
there is reason for optimism: without even knowing the names of other participants, it is 
extremely hard, if not impossible, to cooperate, to form factions. 
 
However, this kind of a public sphere has its own problems too: attached to the 
unbounded freedom of speech comes a set of problems that makes reasoned argument – 
discussion instead of parallel monologues – difficult. Most notably, if utterances cannot 
even be matched with a virtual identity, it is easier to simply leave a conversation or 
disrupt it in some way (e.g. abusing others) than to offer a reasoned argument in the 
defence of one’s view. In such a setting, it is also possible to manipulate the flow of the 
conversation, e.g. by posting messages in favor of one’s own view in the name of 
others, or posting badly constructed counter arguments and then crushing them, thereby 
making one’s real view appear more convincing. 
A deeper analysis of 2-Channel, taking into consideration its cultural background and 
implications, could help evaluate the possible benefits of such an anonymous forum. 
Due to the lack of my Japanese language skills, I cannot even attempt to undertake this 
task. 
 
In summary, the following can be established. Forums apply different regulations for 
the use of screen names, from requiring registration with a real-life name to allowing 
completely anonymous participation in the discussion. The inherent credibility of 
forums varies accordingly: as a rule of thumb, the more information users provide 
about themselves on a forum, the higher the general reliability of information. On the 
other hand, distancing oneself from their real-life identities, via the use of screen 
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names or remaining unnamed, enables an increased freedom of speech and an 
increased disregard from external authority. 
It also should be kept in mind that the issue of credibility is more important for forums 
that act as disseminators of information than for forums whose main goal is the 
discussion of personal opinion. 
 
5.4.5 Are forums part of the media institution? 
Naturally, traditional media enterprises can just as well use discussion forums as anyone 
else – the question is rather whether traditional media holds a monopoly over them, or 
can these forums, by acting as advocacy media, influence the media institution's 
operation. 
The answer to the first part of the question is a definite "no," since the technology of 
setting up and running a forum is freely available. The business model of forums differs 
from the traditional setting of a small number of news producers and a large number of 
consumers – their very point is that consumers are transformed into participants. 
 
Whether or not forums can act as important advocacy media is tied in part to their 
popularity and "visibility." It is not by accident that Dahlgren’s original concept of the 
advocacy media demands that space is provided for alternative media by the traditional 
media. Having a time slot on a national TV channel in itself loans a certain weight and 
importance to a programme that, for example, deals with issues of minorities. Visibility 
means making a narrow sphere "public" in the broad sense of the word; it refers to 
bringing attention to issues. 
As I have noted several times, visibility thus understood is a key problem of the 
internet, stemming from the fact that virtual space is a practically unlimited resource. In 
other words, there is a natural tendency towards the multiplication of websites, and thus 
the fragmentation of audiences. For a discussion board to become part of an advocacy 
media, it is necessary to overcome this inherent tendency towards fragmentation, and to 
create an audience of considerable size. 
This is exemplified by 2-Channel, and its uncommon match between a "goodness of fit" 
(provided by the confines of the language) and cultural factors that together result in a 
message board of both great popularity, and, in the specific local setting, influential 
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advocacy media39. 
But in general, forums are more suitable for creating fragmented issue publics than a 
coherent advocacy media. Partly because, as said before, they are very easy to create 
and multiply, and partly because, just like in the case of blogs and social news sites (or 
for that matter, face-to-face conversation), there is a limited number of participants that 
could effectively converse on the same message board.  
 
5.4.6 Globality and goodness of fit 
As I have described in chapter 3.3, the "globality" of public spheres can be interpreted 
in a number of different ways. 
For a start, forums hold the potential of a global discussion the the sense that they are, 
just like any other site, accessible from all over the world. The number of potential users 
is limited, on the other hand, by the language(s) used on the forum and the topics it 
deals with – these two factors, in combination with the visibility (see above) of a 
particular message board, can establish a perceived "goodness of fit" between the scope 
of discussion taking place on the forum and the real-life institutions that this discussion 
is aiming to influence. 
However, such a goodness of fit is unlikely to be established on a global scale, given the 
lack of powerful global institutions. On the other hand, discussion forums are also apt 
for creating issue publics. These issue publics can become global in the sense that the 
problem they are focusing on might present itself globally, and in order to address this 
problem either it is not necessary to turn to institutions, or solutions involve addressing 
local institutions ("think global, act local"). 
 
In addition, examining the role of forums from the point of view of the theory of 
Keohane and Nye, forums, again, have a potential to establish a global public sphere, 
questioning, trying and testing the credibility of participants in this imagined global 
political public sphere. What hinders this potential to become actualized is the 
questionable credibility of forums itself; as discussed in chapter 5.4.4. 
                                                 
39
  "There have been quite a few stories tha the mass media picked up (from 2-Channel) that became big 
stories. At the same time, 2-Channel has a role as an ombudsman, investigating mass media’s reports" 
(2-Channel creator Nishimura, quoted by Furukawa 2003). 
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5.4.7 Mode of consumption 
When referring to discussion forums, consumption could mean both reading and 
contributing (posting). Communication on discussion boards employs not only textual 
but also graphic elements, such as the avatar ("self-portrait") of the participants, 
attached pictures or even video clips, animations. 
 
Although apparent in all forms of online communication, it is here, in connection with 
the message boards that I mention smileys and emoticons – two sets of signs that have 
the purpose of enriching written, textual communication by representing the emotions 
of the writer of the text. 
Smileys in online communication are groups of characters representing a face – as in : ), 
the colon being the eyes and the closing bracket a smiling mouth, when the group of 
characters is looked at sideways. Other variations include the sad :(, the winking ;) and 
the laughing :-D. At least this is the case in Western style written communication. In the 
Asian group of smileys, variations of the sign ^_^ are used to represent faces, the 
difference between the groups of smileys illustrating how various cultures affect 
people's perception of emotions40. Smileys using conventional textual characters and 
punctuation marks are often replaced by small, sometimes animated icons or 
"emoticons." (McCarthy 2007, Wenner 2007.) 
 
Online communication has also developed its own sets of "online dialects," often 
characterized by the heavy use of abbreviations and/or a creative use of spelling rules. 
The following are but a handful of examples that one can come across on any online 
message board: LOL (laughing out loud), ROTFL (rolling on the floor, laughing), 
AFAIK (as far as I know), IMHO (in my humble opinion), pwnage ("ownage," used as 
an expression of appreciation and respect), or the " > " sign, as in "Conan O'Brien > 
life," meaning "Conan O'Brien is bigger, better, funnier than life itself." Among 
computer game enthusiast the use of "leetspeak," or the substitution of alphabetic 
                                                 
40
 According to a study by behavioural scientist Masaki Yuki, Japanese tend to look at the eyes for 
emotional cues, as opposed to Americans for whom the key indicator of emotion is the mouth. (Yuki 
et al. 2007, cited by Wenner 2007). 
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characters with numerical ones41 is also a popular practice. 
In short, online written communication operates with a unique set of communicative 
tools at its disposal. Naturally, it lacks vocal means of expression and bodily cues of 
metacommunication such as tone, pronunciation, volume of speech, hand gestures and 
body language in general, and it is different from hand-written communication as well 
(in that, obviously, it is not hand-written). On the other hand, it provides communicators 
with various other means to illustrate, stress, alter or expand the meaning of the pure 
written text: these include pictures, animations, smileys, the use of colours, etc. Just as 
in face-to-face communication, whether or not someone can effectively participate in a 
discussion depends on whether they understand these communicative devices. 
It would require a more extensive textual analysis to find out if online written 
communication is in any way more restrictive – or on the contrary, more enabling – than 
face-to-face, spoken communication. (It is to be noted, however, that the hypertextuality 
of the internet – the faculty of linking related websites to one another via hyperlinks – 
provides an ease of information retrieval that is missing from print texts. This is 
hypothesized to be especially useful in a supposedly reasoned argumentation, as pieces 
of information supporting a claim can be easily made available and "seamlessly 
inserted" into the argument itself.) 
 
As I have noted in the introduction to chapter 5, forums are particularly interesting 
(along with blogs and social news sites) from a communicative point of view because 
they represent a communicative form between mass and interpersonal communication – 
and as I have noted under chapter 5.1.4, forum entries are often unedited: even if there 
are moderators who might censor the individual entries, the practice of such censorship 
does not affect the contents and quality of an entry in such a way as the work of an 
editorial staff affects a draft article. 
 
Finally, I shall mention two further, minor points in connection with the "consumption" 
of forums. First, I reiterate the point that the archives and the searchable nature of 
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 For example, this sentence in leetspeak could look like this: f0r 3x4mpl3, thi5 53nt3nc3 in 1337-
5p34k c0u1d 100k 1ik3 thi5. 
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forums is expected to improve the natural quality of discussion, because, if users are 
required to use at least a virtual identity in their posting, previous utterances can be 
checked and faults or inconsistencies in an argument can be pointed out – or, more 
bluntly, whatever you say can (and will) be used against you in subsequent debate. 
Second, it is worth noting how forums can cooperate with e-mail or RSS feeds: it is 
customary to provide participants with the option of sending notifications to them if 
someone else has replied either to a topic in general or to a specific post in particular. 
This helps the debate going on even without the participants having to constantly 
monitor all the forums and all the discussions they are engaged in. 
 
5.4.8 Forums and the culture industry 
Thanks to their ease of use (and ease of creation) and hence their proliferation, in 
combination with their accessibility and hypertextual nature which makes cross-
referencing easy, forums do increase the availability of cultural products and promote 
cultural diversity (this is especially true in connection with – popular – music and 
movies). Hand in hand with this former phenomenon, forums also promote layman 
criticism or the relativization of cultural – aesthetic standards. In fact, much that has 
been written about the cultural ("Cultural") importance of blogs apply to forums as well 
(see chapter 5.1.9). 
However, the example of 2-Channel prompts me to revisit Adorno's idea of autonomous 
art and the role of the culture industry. 
"The development of modern news journalism, with its non-decorative and formulaic 
discourse, was seen [by Frankfurt School scholars] as the degradation of language 
which deprived it of faculties capable of giving expression to personal experience," 
writes Malmberg (2006: 7) about the reasons for Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse 
rejecting the idea of communicative freedom. But do not, after all, forums change this, 
by reintroducing a highly informal and decorative discourse? After all, forums mix the 
elements of interpersonal and mass communication, often matching the informality tied 
to the former with the visibility tied to the latter42 (instead of imposing the formality of 
public communication). Thanks to the use of nicknames, or, as the example of 2-
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  See also chapter 3.4.2. 
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Channel shows, total anonymity, a hitherto unknown degree of freedom of speech is 
established – but does it mean that this communicative freedom could have a similar 
role to that of authoritative art? Could it also act as "an avenue through which 
[individual] freedom could speak?" 
In my understanding – although of course I cannot hypothesize about what Adorno 
would say –. the answer is in the question. If the communicative freedom of forums can 
only be taken advantage of through the use of fake names or through avoiding using 
names altogether, then it cannot be real freedom. Real freedom would imply that there 
would be no need to hide or disguise one's real identity. 
 
5.4.9 Forums as communities? 
Discussion forums have not evolved spectacularly since Galston (2002) analyzed their 
role in the establishment of online communities, and I agree with him that although it is 
not impossible for a textbook-definition community to form among participants of an 
online message board, this is only likely to happen in case the members of the forum are 
already connected through real-life communities – see chapter 3.4.3. 
 
5.4.10 Summary 
Online message boards are a popular form of discussion, dealing with a wide range of 
topics. Often organized into an archived and searchable database, they serve as points of 
"secondary information procession," news dissemination, opinion formation or as 
providers of help and advice. 
Given the low costs and the ease involved in creating or running such a forum, they can 
only be part of the established, traditional media institution insofar as the media can use 
them just as well as any other institution or group of people. On the other hand, there 
are examples (such as that of Japanese 2-Channel) that illustrate that forums in certain 
circumstances can act as effective advocacy media, reflecting upon and "correcting" 
traditional media output. 
Forums, just as other internet sites, are global in principle and as for their access, but 
their globality is unlikely to be actualized on the global scale in the same ways as it is 
manifest locally – because of the lack of global institutions. On the other hand, forums 
can create global issue publics (in the loose or narrow interpretation of "public sphere"), 
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and they also take part in the credibility-based concept of globality created by Keohane 
and Nye – however, from this aspect it is especially important that forums themselves 
have to tackle the issue of questionable credibility of their members. 
Credibility, when looking at forums as points of information dissemination, is often 
inversely related to members' freedom of speech. If members of the forum can be 
identified (and thus credibility is reinforced), then the freedom of speech is often 
curtailed and there is less chance that participants' external rank and authority is 
disregarded in the discussion. If members use pseudonyms, then freedom of speech can 
be enhanced and there is a way – although an uncertain one – to build up 
communicative, reasoned authority within the message board itself. If the forum is 
entirely anonymous and posting is entirely noncommittal, then the freedom of speech is 
maximized, but credibility is at its lowest (cf. how Thompson (2002) addresses this 
problem, taking uncertainty as the premise for online communication, chapter 2.5.2). 
 
Credibility is of secondary importance from the aspect of opinion exchange on forums 
(unless of course opinions are backed up by facts that cannot be easily checked from 
other sources). In fact, a total detachment of arguments from their bearers might help 
the case of a Habermasian public sphere where the role of external rank, authority, or 
any other factor not stemming directly from the argument itself is eliminated. But in 
such a setting, conducting or merely following the debate itself is expected to be 
difficult, because of the unstructured, loose nature of the discussion. 
 
Overall, the role of "forums, as such" in the re-democratization of the public sphere is at 
best ambivalent. Most of their impact and use is contingent upon the behaviour of their 
members, but there is one particular factor inherent in the concept of forums that 
opposes deliberative, democratic discussion, and this is the ease with which new forums 
can be launched. It is easier to leave a board than to respond to criticism with reasoned 
counterarguments (with the words of Galston, "exit" is favoured over "voice" (2002)). 
This results in the creation of a large number of small "issue publics." 
Admittedly, merely through their global availability and access they do promote 
discussion, but they have no inherent mechanisms that would incite members to make 
this discussion reasoned, deliberative debate as opposed to casual chit-chat or 
 118 
emotional, personal bickering. 
However, even if forums might not revolutionalize deliberation, they might gain an 
important role in the public sphere as representatives of an advocacy media and as 
points of information dissemination.
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6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have analyzed certain services of the internet, notably blogs, social 
bookmarking and news sites, RSS, personalized homepages and online discussion 
forums, in order to understand whether or not they contribute to the democratization of 
the public sphere, by helping substantial democracy and the discursive construction of 
democratic "soft" power. Such a contribution might involve the establishment of some 
kind of advocacy media – setting the agenda and framing the issues the public sphere is 
concerned with – as well as the establishment of "virtual coffee houses," i.e. virtual 
meeting points where citizens can exchange their thoughts in reasoned debate. 
I first present a summary of my findings and an overview of the conclusions I have 
drawn from them. 
 
6.1 Infrastructural limitations and business interests 
First of all, the internet is today, globally speaking, a scarce resource – in other words, 
although it has become part of citizens’ everyday life in certain parts of the world, its 
distribution among (and possibly even within) nation states is highly unequal, as its 
access is tied to certain infrastructural requirements. However, internet penetration rates 
have been growing ever since the physical establishment of the network, and there is 
also an obvious trend of developing and more easily available IT devices (computers). 
 
Second, part of the democratizing potential of the internet stems from the fact that a 
large array of its services, and especially services which provide space for online 
discussion, are free (from the point of view of the customer, the only costs involved are 
the costs of connection). This freedom is tied to business interests of providers of 
advertising space. Given the fragmentation of the internet (a natural corollary of space 
as a practically infinite resource), it is harder to establish a monopoly on the online 
advertising market than in the traditional media (this is certainly beneficial from the 
point of view of a democratic public sphere), but popular web services that collect data 
from internet users might attain and potentially abuse a monopolistic position. (Google, 
the owner of the world’s most popular search engine (Alexa 2007c), and one of the most 
important advertising space providers, has been accused of such charges.) 
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6.2 Blogs, social news sites, forums 
The term "blog" originally referred to a certain form of publishing information on the 
internet – however, it is often used in a restrictive sense, referring to personal websites 
that try to give a new form to "citizen journalism." Since blogs are easy and cheap to 
create, they do democratize the ability to have a "public(ly available) voice," but it 
would be a mistake to expect them to guarantee that these voices will be heard, too – for 
a start, traditional media organizations might use blogs just as well as aspiring civil 
journalists. The democratizing potential of blogs is limited by the fragmentation of the 
"blogosphere" (stemming precisely from their availability). 
From the analysis of in- and outgoing links on websites, it can be established that 
certain blogs, acting as a core of the blogosphere, are highly influential (often 
referenced – but referencing, once again, does not mean agreement with the views 
published on a particular blog). However, these influential and highly valued blogs 
might just as well be part of the organized, institutional, mainstream media (as the 
example of Engadget and The Huffington Post illustrates). 
Given their limited resources, independent blogs are more important as disseminators, 
collectors and commentators of news, than as first-hand suppliers of news. They might 
still be capable of contributing to providing an alternative framework to the one 
supplied by mainstream media, by using multiple alternative sources, but their 
fragmentation and the inconsequential nature of the information published on blogs 
hinders the actualization of this potential. 
Thanks to the technologies utilized by online information publishing, blogs act as an 
extremely fast channel of news. (Naturally, these technologies can be used by online 
versions of traditional, offline publications too.) 
Given the non-consequential nature of discussions developed in the comments area of a 
blog, or between blogs, their ability to construct a space for discursive deliberation is 
limited. 
 
Social bookmarking sites indirectly help discussion taking place in the public sphere, by 
providing an alternative way to find useful and valuable information on the internet. But 
such sites’ direct, discursive relevance to the public sphere was found to be meagre. 
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Social news sites, on the other hand, provide a promising opportunity for the 
establishment of advocacy media, and thus for the discursive control, creation and 
curbing of power. This is possible because such sites actively help, promote and reward 
reasoned debate to take place, via the system that is characterized by a "front page" and 
"meritocratic" comments area. But social news sites can only take full advantage of 
their potential if their "population" remains in an optimal range: such a site needs to be 
popular enough to be meaningful, but it also needs to keep discussion manageable and 
to prevent its contents from being overly fragmented. (Further research is advocated to 
find out where exactly this optimal range of members stretches.) Social news sites, 
according to the analysis of the Project for Excellence in Journalism scheme (PEJ 
2007), are dependent on traditional media outlets for "raw material" (articles, original 
reports). In this sense, they are still "parasitic" in nature (cf. Habermas (2006)), but they 
tend to utilize a large variety of sources, to focus on different issues and in general to 
provide an alternative agenda and an alternative framing of current topics, compared to 
traditional, institutionalized, mainstream media. 
 
RSS and personalized home pages were briefly covered in this paper, because they are 
very important in speeding up, simplifying and controlling the consumption of online 
news and information. This also means that indirectly these technologies might 
contribute to discussion that is taking place online.  
 
Online message boards or forums were designed to facilitate online discussion – and yet 
their role in the establishment of a deliberative public sphere is ambivalent. 
The category of "discussion forums" as such is too large for detailed analysis, because 
forums can differ from one another greatly, e.g. as regards their policy on the 
identification of members, the number of members, their topic(s) or their purpose. In 
general, however, the following can be established. 
Forums encourage the discussion of their members – this being their raison d’être –, but 
they do not have inherent features that would promote reasoned argumentation. In 
contrast, the inconsequential nature of arguing on a forum contributes to the creation of 
fragmented discussion groups where members largely share similar views (i.e. it might 
be easier to leave a discussion than to stay and argue). 
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In general, the credibility or reliability of information posted on forums is questionable 
to a greater extent than e.g. information published in face-to-face meeting or published 
in the media, because utterances on a forum are often tied to fictious identities (if they 
are tied to any identity at all), and there is no such filtering mechanism involved in the 
posting of an entry to a forum as, for example, the editorial staff of an established media 
organ. However, often information "value" is bought at the expense of credibility: the 
publication of sensitive, important pieces of information is helped if the person 
publishing it does not have to worry about being held accountable. 
In the secondary procession – dissemination, evaluation – of news the aspect of 
credibility is less important. In addition, the uncertainty that is attached to virtual 
identities (or the fact that virtual identities or roles can hardly be connected with real-
life identities) also means that external authority is disregarded on discussion forums. 
Hence (anonymous) forums present a setting in which arguments can be detached from 
their bearers, and thus reasoned debate can take a "pure" form. However, such a setting 
also poses practical problems as to how to conduct the debate so as to avoid it becoming 
an irreflexive set of parallel monologues. 
In summary, the impact of discussion forums on the deliberative public sphere is 
ambiguous. Certain forums can become its constructive part, either by acting as 
advocacy media and thus modifying, altering the agenda set by the mainstream media 
and directing attention to pressing issues (shown by the example of Japanese 2-
Channel), or, naturally, by serving as a place of discussion for a community the 
members of which strive for rational debate even if this activity is not immediately 
rewarded by the forum itself. Certain forums might contribute to the establishment of 
global issue publics; and certain forums might only work towards the creation of 
extremely fragmented opinion groups. 
 
6.3 Is a global public sphere possible? 
The internet is a global network of computer network, and as such it is capable of 
providing a platform for global discussions to take place. Whether this can mean the 
establishment of a public sphere depends on how we understand this latter concept. 
Following the institutionalist view that uses Habermas' original theory of The Structural 
Transformation... as a starting point, a global public sphere cannot exist, because there 
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are no global institutions it could affect. The concept of "political public sphere" makes 
sense in a national framework43. Certain theories hypothesize that this might change in 
the future: e.g. through revising rules of a procedural democracy and extending these 
rules to supranational organizations such as the European Union (Bohman 2004), or 
through globalization (powered by international capitalism) resulting in the erosion of 
national institutions (Lash 2002). But today's reality is that there are no such powerful 
supranational institutions that could be addressed by a global citizenry. 
However, the public sphere can also be seen as built around groups of people interested 
in particular problems: issue publics. The analysis of blogs, social bookmarking and 
news sites and discussion forums shows that the internet helps the formation and 
cooperation of such issue publics on a global scale. The conversation among members 
of these issue publics can be understood as constituting a "public spheres" in a narrow 
sense of the expression, where deliberation does not concern the common interests of 
society as such, but the interests of narrowly defined (identity-)groups (see also: Fraser 
1992, Garnham 1992). A public consisting of such issue publics is necessarily a 
fragmented one, but even Habermas himself admits that if there is connection or overlap 
between these issue publics (e.g. people belong to several such publics at the same 
time), then this may "even serve to counter trends of fragmentation" (2006: 25). 
Advocates of online communication are eager to point out that one of the greatest 
advantages of the internet is that its technologies (e.g. its hypertextual nature) allow and 
promote such connections between issue publics on a hitherto unknown scale. 
On the other hand, my analysis showed that both blogs and discussion forums rather 
promote the creation of groups where members tend to agree on the issue they are 
concerned about, as opposed to the creation of discursive publics where members of the 
group represent different opinions and are willing to conduct reasoned argument about 
them. Social news sites do promote and reward reasoned argumentation and the 
formation of more heterogeneous publics44, but they, just like blogs and discussion 
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 This view is also apparent from Habermas' assessment of the public sphere and the internet (Habermas 
2006). 
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 User-compiled knowledge databases, such as Wikipedia, are similar in this regard to social news sites. 
Contribution to such a site is consequential, given the objective of the site. This fact, especially when 
combined with general popularity of the site in question, advocates reasoned debate as opposed to 
creating a new database altogether. (See chapter 7.) 
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forums, can only accommodate the conversation of a limited number of users. 
Finally, in the understanding of Keohane and Nye (2002), there is a global 
communicational public sphere, which affects the legitimacy and practice of power 
indirectly, through the reinforcement or weakening of participants' credibility. My 
analysis of blogs, forums and social news sites found that all of these services can play a 
part in influencing the perceived credibility of public figures (as well as of any other 
individual), but only to a very limited extent, ironically, because of the inherent 
uncertainty of credibility of these services. 
 
6.4 Intercultural public sphere(s) 
Assessing the possibility of a global public sphere prompts the question: can the internet 
in general and blogs, social news sites and discussion forums in particular aid 
intercultural communication?  
The analysis of the three said services of the internet suggest an affirmative answer. Not 
because online, virtual spaces would not be bounded by the particular culture they were 
formed in (or formed by), but because they provide an open, accessible channel of 
communication45: because users can take up virtual identities, it becomes extremely 
hard to exclude someone from the discussion for reasons tied to their real-life identities 
(e.g. their nationality, skin colour, religion, gender, age, wealth or political views). 
Because participants of an online discussion can choose which features of their 
identities to show to others, the impact of prejudices can be curbed. 
However, deeper analysis would be required to gain an insight into how exactly online 
communication affects intercultural dialogue. I formulate a handful of reservations 
concerning this future study in chapter 7. 
 
6.5 Impact on the culture industry 
As I have noted in chapter 3.5, I cannot in this paper follow the aesthetic-philosophical 
approach of Horkheimer and Adorno. Instead of trying to reconcile the views of the 
original theory of the culture industry with subsequent theories of the culture industries, 
I focused on two practical aspects of the question – notably, whether or not the analyzed 
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 Unless of course they are tied to a strictly controlled real-life community. 
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services help or hinder cultural diversity (the availability of cultural products) and 
layman criticism (or the relativization of cultural (Cultural) standards). 
Again, both "forums" and "blogs" were found to be overly generalizing categories: even 
if an ideal type of such applications can be described, this ideal type will contain no 
information about its contents. The blogosphere is large and fragmented, the not-
necessarily interlinked totality of forums is large and fragmented too. Nevertheless, I 
believe it can be established that blogs and forums potentially promote both the 
availability of cultural products and the practice of layman criticism. These 
developments do not offset or balance one another, rather, they work in tandem, towards 
a more fragmented and relativistic cultural public sphere. 
 
Social news sites, for the time being, do not seem to provide much space for the 
promotion of products of the culture industry. This is explained by their very concept, or 
their emphasis on news (quickly perishable pieces of information). But it is expected 
that their focus will open towards other topics of the culture industry, apart from popular 
music, movies and computer games. (The current emphasis on technology in the case of 
social news sites is partly explained by a large portion of users being IT-experts or at 
least users with a penchant for technology. (Cf. PEJ 2007.)) 
 
6.6 Internet, mass media and public sphere – a short summary 
In his latest return to the subject of the public sphere, Habermas (2006: 9) downplayed 
the importance of the internet in making it more democratic, and named its help in 
tackling censorship as its single important positive contribution. In contrast, Bruns 
(2007) argues that the internet establishes a democratic organization and production of 
information on the internet, and thereby offers its users meaningful participation in the 
affairs of the public sphere. The "paradox of plenty" does not apply: "as networked 
information has grown, so have the tools available for making sense of it" (Bruns 2007). 
The analysis of blogs, forums and social news and bookmarking sites suggests that the 
truth is somewhere in between these two approaches. 
It is true that the internet in general, wherever it is available, democratizes access to 
information. But at the same time, the supposedly democratic tools and services of 
information production and dissemination still rely on the institutionalized, 
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organizational media for "raw material" (it might be, that such services – e.g. blogs – 
become part of this media institution themselves). I would not, on the other hand, call 
this reliance "parasitic" (cf. Habermas  2006: 9). Blogs, forums and especially social 
news and bookmarking sites show how, thanks to the hypertextual nature of the internet 
and the availability of multiple alternative sources, the existing framework and agenda 
of the media might be rearranged. Under certain circumstances, blogs, forums and 
social news sites might constitute highly influential advocacy media. The best setting 
for such media would be provided by social news sites, because these promote 
deliberative, egalitarian and democratic treatment (filtering) of available information. 
But the internet is no panacea from any point of view. Most importantly, the effective 
operation of the above mentioned services is tied to an optimal number of users. (This 
is, naturally, a precondition that applies to offline establishments of the public sphere, 
too, even if we disregard the Madisonian interpretation of democracy.) 
 
Returning to the question posed in the introduction of this thesis, analysis of said web 
services suggests that the hypothesis of “paradox of plenty” is too simplifying. The 
research indicates that fragmentation does hinder the efficiency of blogs, forums and 
social news sites. But the 'net also offers increased connectivity, and as Habermas 
(2006: 25) himself noted, the multiplication of connected, overlapping issue publics 
might in fact counter the effects of fragmentation.  
Further, if there is one marked point this thesis would like to make is that the use of 
umbrella term such as “blogs” or “forums,” while useful in describing overall potential 
and possibilities of the internet, is discouraged in the concrete analysis of the internet's 
effects on the public sphere: given the huge differences between instances of these 
various categories, it is through the analysis of these particular instances that 
meaningful and precise conclusions can be drawn. If the internet has the potential, 
through enabling a democratic access to communication channels, to create spheres of 
democratic, deliberative discourse, whether or not this potential is actualized depends 
on the characteristics of particular web services and the technologies they utilize. 
Of the services analyzed in this paper, it is social news sites that were found to have the 
greatest chance of contributing meaningfully to the public sphere; but the in-depth 
analysis of particular social news sites remains the task of subsequent research. 
 127 
7 Suggested further research 
 
A logical continuation of this thesis would be researching where exactly the optimal 
"population range" stretches for various web services (blogs, social news sites etc). It is 
expected that the ideal number of users varies in function of e.g. the contents and the 
purpose of the website. 
 
An in-depth and long-term content analysis of certain influential websites – blogs, 
social news sites and discussion forums – could supply further proof concerning their 
dependence on established, organizational, institutionalized media, and consequently, 
their ability to alter or expand the agenda and framing of news of this media. 
 
In addition, further research is encouraged to examine how "traditional" or mainstream 
media embraces new technologies, with particular focus on how established, well-
known, mainstream media organs utilize alternative sources. 
 
Particular online services could also be analyzed within an intercultural framework. As I 
noted in chapter 6.4, the free-to-choose virtual identities break down certain barriers and 
contribute to an open channel of communication, facilitating intercultural 
communication. The analysis of such acts of communication is expected to reveal both 
cultural idiosyncrasies46 and information on how these idiosyncrasies (related e.g. to the 
use or mode of consumption of certain web services) converge in the communication 
process itself. 
I would once again underline the importance of these cultural differences concerning the 
very use of the internet. As I have mentioned, the internet is unquestionably the product 
of the West, and this fact might be inherently represented in its services and the way it is 
expected to be used – and it is expected to be interesting to look at how particular 
cultures relate to this "embedded Westernness" of the global network. 
On the other hand, I might be overestimating the cultural embeddedness of the internet 
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 See for example the suspected cultural embeddedness of the Japanese 2-Channel discussion board 
(chapter 5.4). 
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(in general, but not its individual services in particular!). In any case, it would be worth 
carrying out further inquiries into this topic, to establish points of orientation for the 
analysis of examples of intercultural (online) communication. Subsequently, it is 
suggested that intercultural communication is analyzed both in the discussion of issue 
publics formed around non-identity-related topics (e.g. in the discussion forum about a 
hobby or a professional area of expertise) and in the discussion of issue publics formed 
around a group identity. 
 
The technology of wikis, and Wikipedia in particular, is also recommended for further 
study. I have, in this paper, found that the reason why social news websites can 
contribute effectively to the public sphere is that discussion conducted on them is 
consequential. On a forum or a blog, there is no external factor that would incite 
participants of a discussion to carry out reasoned debate – in contrast, social news sites 
have a very definite purpose (to filter the media output), which means that participation 
in their operation has tangible consequences. It does matter, and similar is the case of 
wikis. 
A wiki is a set of tools that enable documents to be created online by the contribution of 
a group of people. Documents in a wiki can be edited simultaneously by several users; 
the changes will be kept track of, and space is provided for discussion about the edited 
document as well. Wikis can be used for many purposes. The most important of these 
purposes, from the point of view of the public sphere, is that wikis can be used to create 
user-contributed knowledge databases (such as Wikipedia), and that they can be used to 
actualize "participatory democracy," giving every citizen the right to modify e.g. drafts 
of bills (see for example New Zealand's new police act (New Zealand Police 2007)). 
Once again, discussion on wikis is always secondary, it is never for itself. Discussion is 
instrumental to cooperation, to the creation of one, single piece of document. In 
addition, if the wiki in question has some kind of authority – via its popularity or 
official status (for instance, being run by a governmental organization) –, then the 
resulting combination means that, unlike in the case of blogs and forums, the creation of 
an alternative "counter-wiki" is not advised, even if the tools to create yet another wiki 
are readily available for everyone. (If one does not agree with a particular definition on 
Wikipedia, one might decide to create a new blog or a new wiki altogether to present 
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another, competing view on the subject. But one might also choose to modify 
Wikipedia's entry – and, simply by the popularity of this website, this latter solution will 
be much more efficient than the former.) 
Hence, whether dealing with the discussion of opinions focused around a practical 
problem, or with the encyclopedic collection of facts, wikis are worthy of further, in-
depth analysis, because they can become highly influential in both the political and the 
cultural public sphere. 
 
In connection with the culture industry, and especially focusing on music, movies and 
computer games, an analysis of the new distribution methods (legal or illegal digital 
downloads) of the internet is recommended. It might be that these distribution methods 
will irrevocably transform the culture industry (or industries); such an analysis would 
not step outside the framework outlined in this paper, i.e. it would not necessarily take a 
side in the debate between supporters of the original theory of the culture industry and 
the advocates of multiple culture industries – because in this "debate" parties are 
approaching the subject matter using a different theoretical framework. 
 
Finally, on a "micro-level," as mentioned in chapter 5.4.7, the research of peculiarities 
and practicalities of online written communication (i.e. online language variations, or 
the use of non-verbal communicative tools) is also recommended.
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APPENDIX – Tables cited. 
 
Table 1. Worldwide internet penetration rates 
Region Population 
(2007 est.) 
Population % 
of world 
Internet usage Internet usage 
in % of 
population 
(penetration) 
Usage % of 
world 
Usage growth 
(2000 – 2007) 
Africa 933,448,292 14.2% 43,995,700 4.7% 3.5% 874.6% 
Asia 3,712,527,624 56.5% 459,476,825 12.4% 36.9% 302.0% 
Europe 809,624,686 12.3% 337,878,613 41.7% 27.2% 221.5% 
Middle East 193,452,727 2.9% 33,510,500 17.3% 2.7% 920.2% 
North America 334,538,018 5.1% 234,788,864 70.2% 18.9% 117.2% 
Latin America 
/ Caribbean 
556,606,627 8.5% 115,759,709 20.8% 9.3% 540.7% 
Oceania / 
Australia 
34,468,443 0.5% 19,039,390 55.2% 1.5% 149.9% 
World total 6,574,666,417 100% 1,244,449,601 18.9% 100% 244.7% 
Source: Miniwatts 2007. 
Notes from the original source: (1) Internet Usage and World Population Statistics are for September 30, 2007.  (2) 
Demographic (Population) numbers are based on data contained in the world-gazetteer website. (3) Internet usage 
information comes from data published by Nielsen//NetRatings, by the International Telecommunications Union, by 
local NICs, and other other reliable sources. (4) For definitions, disclaimer, and navigation help, see the Site 
Surfing Guide. (5) Information from this site may be cited, giving due credit and establishing an active link back to 
www.internetworldstats.com. Copyright © 2007, Miniwatts Marketing Group. All rights reserved worldwide. 
 
Table 2. Languages of the blogosphere 
Language Share of new posts 
on blogs, Q4 2006 
 
Language Share of new posts on 
blogs, Q4 2006 
 
Japanese 37%  French 2%  
English 36%  Portuguese 2%  
Chinese 8%  German 1%  
Italian 3%  Farsi 1%  
Spanish 3%  Other 5% 
Russian 2%  Total 100% 
Source: State of the live web 
report (Sifry 2007) 
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